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A quarter of a century ago, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in 
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe1 holding that tribes had no criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians.  Since that time, the Court has progressively 
limited tribal criminal, civil, and regulatory jurisdiction over those that are not 
enrolled members of the tribe.   While the decisions have a veneer of history 
and precedent, their legal basis is extremely thin—so much so that Justice 
O’Connor called a 2001 decision “unmoored from our precedents.” 2
This trend is one of the most important developments in Indian law.  It 
is the focus of sustained attention by scholars, tribes, attorneys, and 
legislators.3  A decision regarding criminal jurisdiction over nonmember 
Indians spurred a congressional reversal in 1991,4 and the Supreme Court has 
just heard arguments in a case addressing the nature of this legislative action.5
Congress, moreover, is debating a broader legislative fix as to civil 
jurisdiction.6
Despite this importance, there has been little empirical work on the 
workings of contemporary tribal legal systems, and even less on cases 
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2involving nonmembers.  This Article begins to fill this gap.  It examines the 
Court’s decisions regarding nonmembers to reveal the non-doctrinal 
suppositions about tribal legal systems that undergird them.  It then tests those 
assumptions empirically and theoretically to show the ways that they fail to 
reflect reality. 
The Supreme Court’s nonmember decisions, I show, are shaped by 
two beliefs about justice and those considered outsiders to Indian tribes.  The 
first is that jurisdiction over nonmembers should be limited because tribes will 
treat outsiders unfairly.  Tribal courts according to this assumption are 
unfamiliar places in which outsiders are at a disadvantage, characterized by 
unwritten customs and traditions and bias toward nonmembers.   Subjecting 
outsiders to their jurisdiction, therefore, would contravene the “great 
solicitude” of the United States “that its citizens be protected . . . from 
unwarranted intrusions on their personal liberty.”7
The second assumption is that jurisdiction over outsiders and issues 
shaped by outside influence has little to do with tribal self-government.  Over 
the twenty-five year period, the court has repeatedly affirmed the tribal right 
to self-government.  Self-government, however, has been defined according to 
a stereotypical idea of what tribes are and what they need to survive.  Because 
of this, jurisdiction has been limited to control over tribal members and the 
power to reproduce practices, such as hunting and traditional ceremonies, 
understood as traditionally “Indian.”  The power to regulate new disputes and 
issues or to engage in the “commonplace” stuff of government, on the other 
hand, is deemed largely irrelevant.  
The remainder of the Article tries to obtain the “view from the 
reservation” on these assumptions.8  The empirical part of the project seeks to 
test the assumptions against the experience of nonmembers in the Navajo 
Nation courts.  With regard to the first assumption, the Navajo Nation court 
system on its face might appear to be extremely vulnerable to the kinds of 
“intrusions on personal liberty” the justices fear.  The Navajo Nation has no 
constitution, all of its judges are Navajo, and only one in six judges has a law 
degree.  The court, moreover, aggressively seeks to incorporate Navajo 
customary in its procedures and decisions.  Despite these characteristics, the 
court is both numerically balanced in its decisions regarding nonmembers—
50% of nonmembers win when they appear before the court, and 50% lose—
7
 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 210 (1978); Duro v. Reina, 494 U.S. 
686, 692 (1990); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 384 (2001) (Souter, J. concurring). 
8 See FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS: AMERICAN INDIAN LAW AND 
CONTEMPORARY TRIBAL LIFE 2-3 (1995)  (arguing for an “inside-out” approach to federal 
Indian law considering the perspective from the reservation context).
3and qualitatively balanced, even in areas, such as child custody, employment, 
and contract disputes, which might seem particularly prone to bias.  
With regard to the second assumption, the Article examines the role 
that outsiders play in tribal legal systems.  This role is shaped, in part, by the 
unique history of tribal courts, which typically came to reservations as tools of 
acculturation and control rather than as means to address the needs of tribal 
people.   In light of this historical legacy, tribal legal systems have an uphill 
battle both in tailoring their law to the needs of tribal communities and in 
overcoming the perception that they are alien and hostile to tribal traditions.   
Restricting tribal jurisdiction to tribal members both denies courts the 
opportunity to respond to many of the most significant concerns of tribal 
members and perpetuates the perception of these courts as inferior bodies 
designed only for control of Indians. 
Jurisdiction over outsiders is also crucial for reasons common to all 
legal systems.  Here, I build on the insight of law and society scholars that 
formal legal institutions play one of their most important roles not in resolving 
disputes to which community norms already provide a solution, but in 
addressing new conflicts that challenge community norms in a way commands 
the acceptance of the community.  This is particularly true for tribes, which 
must find ways to deal with foreign cultural and economic pressures without 
losing their coherence as communities.   Disputes involving outsiders and the 
issues arising from the new kinds of commercial and domestic relationships 
they bring with them, therefore, are exactly the kinds of questions that it is 
most important that tribal legal institutions resolve.   
The case load of the Navajo appellate courts confirms this importance:  
despite the tiny fraction of nonmembers on the Navajo Nation, 21.2% of the 
cases decided by the Navajo appellate courts over the last 32 years have 
involved nonmember litigants, as have over 30% of the cases decided in the 
last ten years.   Without jurisdiction over such cases, the courts would not only 
be denied jurisdiction over some of the disputes most pressing to Navajo 
people, but would be forced to forgo their community-building role in forging 
distinctly tribal solutions to distinctly modern problems. 
Finally, jurisdiction over outsiders is necessary to protect the 
institutional incentives for tribal judges to do their jobs well.   In line with 
work on the importance of role perception in judicial performance, I argue 
that the good track record of the Navajo courts is a function of its sense of 
self-importance as the institution that must resolve the full range of conflicts 
affecting the Navajo people and do so in a way that expresses the ideals of 
Navajo culture.  This institutional pride leads the judges to carefully scrutinize 
the facts, law, and morality of the issues before them to fulfill this institutional 
role, and resist temptations to rule based on the status of the parties or political 
4pressure.  Denying the courts jurisdiction over outsiders and the issues they 
raise would radically diminish both the judges’ sense of self-importance and 
the impetus to take an objective view of Navajo practices.  Despite the recent 
decisions of the United States Supreme Court, tribal legal systems have and 
will continue to have broad and often exclusive jurisdiction over many 
disputes arising on reservations.  Preserving and enhancing these judicial 
incentives to fairness, therefore, is a matter of importance to both members 
and nonmembers of Indian tribes.  
Part One of the Article discusses United States Supreme Court 
opinions regarding tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers, showing both how 
they diverge from legal precedent and the assumptions about tribes and justice 
that undergird the decisions.  Part Two presents findings regarding decisions 
involving nonmembers in the Navajo appellate courts, showing the balanced 
disposition of these cases, even in factual situations one would assume would 
be particularly prone to bias.  Part Three discusses the history of tribal courts 
in general and the Navajo courts in particular to show the challenges to 
legitimacy and potential for resistance this history engenders.  Part Four 
returns to my empirical work on the Navajo courts, and discusses the role of 
outsiders in the development of tribal legal systems and legal systems 
generally.  In conclusion, Part Five argues for a reconceptualization of what 
tribes are, what those considered outsiders mean for them, and their 
importance as the Supreme Court and Congress consider jurisdiction over 
nonmembers in tribal legal systems.   
I. Judicial Divestiture in the United States Supreme Court
Over the last 25 years, the Supreme Court has progressively whittled 
away tribal jurisdiction over those that are not members of their tribes.  
Scholars have devoted much attention to this trend.9 While they have reached 
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5varying conclusions of about the roots of the cases, they almost uniformly 
agree that they are not accurate reflections of established Indian law 
doctrine.10
Scholars have identified many potential justifications for these 
opinions.  One might simply dismiss this trend as racism or hostility to tribes.   
More subtly, one can find convincing links between this trend and the colonial 
project of the United States with respect to Indian nations.11   One can also 
find congruence between the Court’s Indian law jurisprudence and its rulings 
in other areas of the law.  David Getches, for example, has pointed to the 
extent to which the trend of ruling against Indian tribes corresponds with the 
Court’s other tendencies of ruling to further state interests, protect 
majoritarian values, and undermine special minority rights.12
But such insights do not fully explain why, within the same period, the 
Court has been relatively consistent in protecting tribes and their members 
from state and federal jurisdiction where tribes and their members alone were 
affected.   Nor do they explain why the four more liberal members of the 
Court—Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter and Stevens—have often joined and 
Indian law cases, not just the ones concerning jurisdiction over nonmembers, explains these 
cases as part of the general tendency of the Court to favor state’s rights, disfavor “special 
rights” of minorities and other isolated groups, and protect majoritarian values and 
expectations.  David Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court’s Pursuit of States’ 
Rights, Color Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN. L. REV. 267, 277 (2001).  L. 
Scott Gould posits that these cases are evidence of a “consent paradigm,” L. Scott Gould, The 
Consent Paradigm: Tribal Sovereignty at the Millennium, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 809 (1996), 
while Frickey, in another article, argues that although this paradigm may be descriptive of the 
Court’s rhetoric, it does not explain the normative underpinnings of the results.  Philip 
Frickey, Adjudication and Its Discontents: Coherence and Conciliation in Federal Indian 
Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1754 (1997).  Alexander Aleinikoff’s recent book, SEMBLANCES OF 
SOVEREIGNTY (2002), contains elements all of these approaches, drawing links between the 
Court’s Indian law cases and its other cases in which the United States defined itself as a 
colonial power, as well as current jurisprudence of the Court drawing lines between those 
considered legal citizens and those who are members of a community without possessing 
formal citizenship in the community. 
10 See, e.g., Philip Frickey, A Common Law For Our Age Of Colonialism: The Judicial 
Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority Over Nonmembers, 109 YALE. L. J. 1, 8 (1999) (“What 
I identify is more an unreflective judicial trend rooted in apparent uneasiness with tribal 
authority than a paradigmatic, entrenched doctrinal shift.”); David Getches, Conquering the 
Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CAL. L. 
REV. 1573 (1996) (arguing that recent Indian law decisions are result of subjective biases of 
justices rather than legal analysis).
11 See Frickey, Common Law of Colonialism, supra note 9; Singer, Cannons of Colonialism, 
supra note 9. 
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6sometimes led the charge to limit tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers.  These 
conflicting trends are best explained by justices’ assumptions regarding what 
jurisdiction over outsiders means both for outsiders and for tribes.  More 
specifically, the decisions are rooted in a dual sense that tribal courts will not 
be fair to nonmembers, and that jurisdiction over nonmembers, except where 
such jurisdiction is necessary to protect practices perceived as traditionally 
Indian, has little to do with the legitimacy of legal systems or tribal self-
government. In this section, I describe the developments that led to the 
conflict over jurisdiction over nonmembers, analyze the cases concerning 
nonmember jurisdiction and the assumptions behind them, and conclude by 
summarizing the tribal jurisdiction that remains and the questions left 
unresolved. 
a. Historical Background:  Tribal Resurgence
Tribal sovereignty has seen a renaissance in the latter half of this 
century.13  Mobilized by efforts to terminate their existence in the 1950s, 
inspired by successful group action by African Americans, and aided by 
federal policy initiatives regarding poverty and group rights, tribes 
increasingly found ways to assert and exercise governmental power.
After initial resistance, Congress and the Executive largely supported 
these efforts.  First on a piecemeal basis by providing funding under 
discretionary programs, then through legislation directed at tribes, Congress 
has generally tried to enhance tribal self-determination.14  Together, these 
tribal and federal actions have created a revolution in Indian country.15
These actions include both economic and institutional development, 
each of which has had the effect of subjecting more nonmembers to potential 
tribal jurisdiction.16 Tribes increasingly took over management of natural 
resources and businesses on reservations, resulting in their employing, 
contracting with, and leasing lands to nonmembers.  At the same time, tribes 
sought to develop tribal governmental capacity, increasing the sophistication 
of their courts and exercising broader regulatory control over their territories.  
13 See generally STEPHEN CORNELL, THE RETURN OF THE NATIVE: AMERICAN INDIAN 
POLITICAL RESURGENCE (1988). 
14
 CHARLES F. WILKINSON, AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME AND THE LAW at 83 (1987).
15 See, e.g., Timothy Egan, Parallel Nations: New Prosperity Brings New Conflict to Indian 
Country, NEW YORK TIMES (March 8 & 9, 1998).
16 Id.
7In the early part of the twentieth century, few tribes exercised 
significant jurisdiction over non-Indians.17  Except for tribes such as the “Five 
Civilized Tribes” of Oklahoma, which had long traditions of written laws, the 
laws of many tribes were drafted and designed by federal agents.18  These 
laws typically limited tribal jurisdiction to tribal members or to Indians 
generally.19  Federal regulations governing federally assisted reservation 
Courts of Indian Offenses did the same.20  But in the 1950s and 60s, tribes 
began to focus resources and energy on development of tribal courts and law 
enforcement.  As part of this process, tribes began to amend their constitutions 
and laws to provide for jurisdiction over all people in their territory.21  This 
institutional development had many motives:  practically, it responded to a 
real need to prevent lawlessness and regulate economic activity on 
reservations; symbolically, it asserted the relative equality of tribal courts; and 
defensively, it helped to ensure that states and the federal government would 
not seek broader jurisdiction to fill a perceived jurisdictional gap.22
These efforts got encouragement from the United States Supreme 
Court in 1959.  In Williams v. Lee a non-Indian trader sued a Navajo couple in 
state court to enforce a contract arising from the sale of goods on the Navajo 
Nation.23  The Court held that the state had no jurisdiction over the dispute:
There can be no doubt that to allow the exercise of state 
jurisdiction here would undermine the authority of the tribal 
courts over Reservation affairs and hence would infringe on the 
right of the Indians to govern themselves.  It is immaterial that 
respondent is not an Indian.  He was on the Reservation and the 
17
 This was not always true.  Tribal judicial authority over non-Indians on tribal land without a 
federal purpose was recognized in early treaties and federal documents.  See Russel  L. Barsh 
& James Y. Henderson, The Betrayal: Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe and the Hunting of 
the Snark, 63 MINN. L. REV. 609 App. A (1978-1979) (collecting treaties).  Tribal taxes on 
nonmembers were considered and upheld at the turn of the century.  See discussions of 
Oliphant and Atkinson, below. 
18 See Russel Barsh & J. Youngblood Henderson, Tribal Courts, the Model Code, and the 
Police Idea in American Indian Policy, in AMERICAN INDIANS AND THE LAW AT 50-51 
(Lawrence Rosen, ed. 1976).
19 See, e.g., Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 134-36 (1982) (discussing 
amendments to Jicarilla Apache constitution and code to permit taxation of nonmembers); 
Thompson v. Lovelady’s Frontier Ford, 1 Nav. R. 282 (Ct. App. 1978) (discussing 7 N.T.C. § 
1333 (1958) which provided for “jurisdiction over all civil causes of action in which the 
defendant is an Indian and is found within the territorial jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation”).  
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 25 C.F.R. §§ 11.2, 11.22 (1975).
21 See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 196-97 (1978). 
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 See Part III, infra, on these multiple purposes in the development of the Navajo Nation and 
other tribal legal systems. 
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 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
8transaction with an Indian took place there. The cases in this 
Court have consistently guarded the authority of Indian 
governments over their reservations.  Congress recognized this 
authority in the Navajos in the Treaty of 1868, and has done so 
ever since.  If this power is to be taken away from them, it is 
for Congress to do it.24
The holding that the plaintiff’s nonmember status was irrelevant and the 
concern for the impact on tribal legal institutions if jurisdiction was upheld 
provided strong judicial support for the development of tribal courts. 
By 1978, about a third of tribal courts exercised jurisdiction over non-
Indians and non-tribal members on their reservations.25  At that time, there 
was relatively broad recourse to federal court to challenge tribal actions.  The 
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA) made most of the federal Bill of 
Rights applicable to tribes,26 and until 1978 lower courts typically interpreted 
it as creating a federal cause of action to challenge tribal actions that violated 
individual rights.27  But relatively few individuals subject to tribal jurisdiction 
challenged tribal actions, suggesting relative satisfaction with its exercise.28
Despite this experience on the ground, however, many non-Indians 
were fearful and resentful of tribal authority.  While some states and local 
governments supported these tribal exercises of jurisdiction, welcoming the 
assistance in the expensive task of policing vast reservation areas, others 
joined the protests of non-Indians, in part to support their citizens, and in part 
because of the perceived threat posed by these new assertions of governmental 
power within their borders.
b.  The Beginning: Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe
In 1978, the question of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians was placed 
directly before the Court in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe.29  In some 
24 Id. at 223.
25
 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 196 n.7 (1978).
26
 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1302.
27 See Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. U.S., 515 F.2d 926, 933 n.6 (10th Cir. 1975) (collecting 
cases). In Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978), the Supreme Court held that 
the only federal actions permitted to challenge tribal actions under the Indian Civil Rights Act 
were habeas actions.  Today, therefore, one may only challenge federal actions under ICRA in 
cases challenging tribal custody or detention or threats of custody or detention. 
28
 Brief of Amicus Curiae Association of American Indian Affairs at 39, Oliphant v. 
Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 201 (1978) (No. 76-5729); Brief of Amicus National 
Conference of American Indians at 43, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 201 
(1978) (No. 76-5729).
29
 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
9ways, the facts seemed well designed to illustrate the need for tribal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians.    Mark Oliphant was a resident of the 
Suquamish reservation that had gotten drunk and got into a fight with non-
Indians residing in tribal campgrounds to attend the tribe’s Chief Seattle Days 
celebration.30 When tribal police went to break up the fight, Oliphant attacked 
them.31 Oliphant was arrested and charged with assaulting a police officer and 
resisting arrest.32  In response, Oliphant filed a habeas petition with the U.S. 
District Court.33  After the district court had denied the writ, tribal police 
officers observed Daniel Belgarde, another non-Indian, driving his pick-up 
truck recklessly and speeding across the reservation.34  When the police 
signaled to Belgarde to pull over he refused, and instead led the tribal police 
on a two-hour chase that only ended when he crashed into a tribal police car 
with which the police had blocked the road.35  One of Belgarde’s two 
companions on this wild ride was Mark Oliphant.36  The police released 
Oliphant and Brad Bray, the other passenger, but arrested Belgarde for 
reckless endangerment and damage to public property.37   The police called 
the Kitsap County Sheriff and the state police to the scene, but they declined 
to take jurisdiction.38  Both incidents exemplified the kind of lawlessness that 
occurred when non-Indians did not recognize the authority of tribal police, 
and the need for tribal, rather than state or federal, jurisdiction to address it.
But other facts in the Oliphant case made it a dismal one in which to 
test the scope of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians.  Almost the entire 
habitable portion of the reservation had been allotted and sold to non-Indians, 
as a result of which non-Indians vastly outnumbered tribal members.39  The 
30
 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 6, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 
U.S. 201 (1978) (No. 76-5729).  Before the celebration, in anticipation of the many people 
that would attend, the tribe had requested assistance in policing the event from the county and 
the federal Bureau of Indian Affairs, but received assistance of only one county deputy for an 
eight hour period over the weekend. Id. at 5.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34
 Brief of Petitioner at 17, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 201 (1978) (No. 76-
5729).
35 Id.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 7, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 
U.S. 201 (1978) (No. 76-5729).
39 At the time of the trial, almost 3,000 non-Indians resided on the reservation, while only 50 
to 173 tribal members lived there. See Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 193 n.1 (reciting district court 
findings that there were 2928 non-Indians and 50 tribal members on the reservation); Brief for 
Amicus Curiae Kitsap County at 7 (although tribal elder had guessed there were 50 tribal 
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non-Indians, moreover, could not vote in tribal elections or serve in tribal 
government.  Although this extreme population imbalance was as uncommon 
as it was bizarre,40 a worse case in which to argue for tribal jurisdiction over 
non-Indians could hardly be imagined.  
The briefs of Oliphant and amici opposing jurisdiction41 encompassed 
hundreds of pages.  The Court, however, did not accept any of their legal 
arguments,42 but instead created something wholly new in Indian law, the 
principle that simply by incorporation within the United States tribes had been 
divested of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.   
How, without any legal arguments that it was willing to uphold, did 
the Court deny jurisdiction?  It did so through a process that Russel Barsh and 
James Henderson have aptly compared to Lewis Caroll’s description of the 
Hunting of the Snark: “they charmed it with smiles and with soap.”43 By 
patching together bits and pieces of history and isolated quotes from 
members most recent BIA census found 173 members residing on the reservation).
40 See Brief of Amici Curiae National Congress of American Indians et al. at 33-34, Oliphant 
v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 201 (1978) (No. 76-5729).
41
 The amici included the Attorney General for the State of Washington, the State of South 
Dakota, and Kitsap County, whose land base included part of the reservation, weighed in 
against tribal jurisdiction. Interestingly, the Governor of Washington petitioned to be included 
as amicus to support the findings below—the opposite position taken by the Governor’s 
Attorney General.  See Objection of Petitioners to Motion of Governor of State of Washington 
for Leave to File Brief as Amicus Curiae (Jan. 17, 1977), Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 
435 U.S. 201 (1978) (No. 76-5729).
42 One of the petitioner’s core arguments was that there was no such thing as “independent 
tribal sovereignty” and that any authority tribes had must come from delegation by the federal 
government.  That term, however, the Supreme Court rejected this argument in a companion 
case to Oliphant, United States v. Wheeler. 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978). The Petitioners also 
argued that not only must tribal powers come from the federal government, but also that 
federal law preempted any tribal authority to prosecute non-Indians that did exist.  They 
devoted many additional pages to presenting treaties, statutes, and attorney general opinions, 
which, they claimed denied tribes criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.  While the Supreme 
Court agreed that these documents revealed a “commonly shared presumption” that tribes did 
not have such jurisdiction, it did not hold that the laws themselves took jurisdiction away. 435 
U.S. at 206 (statutes and opinions “not conclusive on the issue before us”).  Finally, the 
Petitioners argued that jurisdiction over non-Indians would violate the Constitution, both 
because such jurisdiction was not provided for in the Constitution and because tribal 
governments, whose membership was based on descent, could not constitutionally exercise 
governmental authority. But the Supreme Court did not base its holding on the Constitution or 
suggest that there were constitutional objections to such jurisdiction.  Indeed, its affirmation 
in Wheeler that tribal authority was not subject to constitutional restrictions effectively 
undermined constitutional arguments about the limitations on tribal jurisdiction.
43
 Russel  L. Barsh & James Y. Henderson, The Betrayal: Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe
and the Hunting of the Snark, 63 MINN. L. REV. 609, 609 (1978-1979).
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nineteenth century cases, and relegating contrary evidence to footnotes44 or 
ignoring it altogether, the majority created a legal basis for denying 
jurisdiction out of whole cloth. 
This approach categorizes the two thirds of the opinion in which the 
Court discussed historic non-judicial assumptions about tribal jurisdiction 
over non-Indians.45  The Court, for example, quoted Felix Cohen’s statement 
that “attempts of tribes to exercise jurisdiction over non-Indians . . . have been 
generally condemned by the federal courts since the end of the treaty-making 
period.”46 But it elided the fact that this statement described what courts had 
done after a certain period in federal policy, and failed to cite what Cohen 
actually wrote about the scope of inherent tribal power.  On this score, Cohen 
wrote that originally a tribe “might punish aliens within its jurisdiction 
according to its own laws and customs,” and that “[s]uch jurisdiction
continues to this day, save as it has been expressly limited by the acts of a 
superior government.”47 While this omission might be excused as a mere 
mistake, a failure to look at every page of a 662 page book, the Court had 
before it two briefs quoting this language.48
This problem is even more glaring in the Court’s discussion of much 
shorter documents.  In 1834, Congress considered a bill to regulate the 
Western Territory beyond the Mississippi to which it was moving eastern 
Indian tribes.49 As the Court described the bill, “Congress was careful not to 
give the tribes of the territory criminal jurisdiction over United States officials 
and citizens traveling through the area,” citing portions of the bill that 
44
 For example, the Court relied on a single treaty in which the Choctaw Tribe requested the 
right to punish white men within their limits as evidence of a commonly held assumption that 
no such jurisdiction existed absent delegation, leaving for the footnotes the many other 
treaties that acknowledged the right of tribes to punish non-Indians in footnotes.  Id. at 197-98 
& 197 n.8.  Barsh and Henderson collect the many other such treaties in the appendix to their 
article.  Barsh & Henderson, supra note 17, App. A.  Similarly, the Court relied on a 1970 
Solicitor General’s opinion stating that tribes did not have criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians, only mentioning in the footnotes that the opinion had been withdrawn.  435 U.S. at 
201 & 201 n.11.
45
 435 U.S. at 196-208. For an excellent criticism of the history in this opinion, see Barsh & 
Henderson, supra note 17 at 617-31.  
46 Id. at 199 n.9.
47 FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 146 (1942) (hereinafter 1942 
COHEN).
48
 Brief of Amici Curiae Assocation of American Indian Affairs, et al., at 13 (quoting 1942
COHEN along with identical language in 55 I.D. 14, 57 (1934)); Brief for Respondents at 57 
(quoting 55 I.D. 14, 57 (1934)).
49
 H. Rep. No. 23-474, 23d Cong., 1st Sess. (1834), reprinted in 263 U.S. Serial Set 
(hereinafter 1834 House Report).
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provided for federal jurisdiction over these two categories of non-Indians,50
and the statement that such jurisdiction was required by the current “want of 
fixed laws [and] competent tribunals of justice” in Indian country.51
Although the Report stated that non-Indians voluntarily settling in the area 
would be subject to tribal jurisdiction, this fact appears only in the footnotes.52
Even more misleading is that Oliphant presented the bill as concerning 
whether tribes would be granted criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.  The 
report, however, makes clear that far from granting tribal jurisdiction, 
Congress saw itself as placing certain limitations on inherent tribal authority 
over non-Indians, and assumed that absent such limitations a tribe had 
“jurisdiction over all persons and property within its limits.”53  This 
jurisdiction included even the ultimate punishment: the proposed bill did not 
provide that tribes could impose capital punishment on American citizens—
this power was assumed—but instead simply limited this inherent power by 
providing that where tribes sentenced citizens to death, the United States had 
the power to pardon them.54  In addition, the 1834 Congress understood the 
federal jurisdiction it had provided over federal officials and travelers as a 
protection analogous to protections provided to foreigners in a strange land 
under international law,55 not as a response to the lack of tribal jurisdiction.  
And while the proposed bill said nothing about granting tribal jurisdiction 
over non-Indians outside these categories, the Report makes clear that 
Congress believed tribes had such jurisdiction: “As to those persons not 
required to reside in the Indian country, who voluntarily go there to reside, 
they must be considered as voluntarily submitting themselves to the laws of 
the tribes.”56  All of these statements are on page eighteen of the House 
Report—the same page that the Oliphant opinion cited.57 But while the 
opinion stated that the report “suggests that Congress shared the view of the 
Executive Branch and lower federal courts that Indian tribal courts were 
without inherent jurisdiction to try non-Indians,”58 the report actually shows 
the opposite.
50
 435 U.S. at 201-202.
51
 435 U.S. at 202, quoting 1834 House Report supra note __ at 18.
52
 435 U.S. at 202 n.13.
53
 1834 House Report, supra note ___ at 18.
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57
 435 U.S. at 202.
58
 435 U.S. at 203.  As the Oliphant Court itself recognized, one should not place too much 
weight on an unenacted bill.  The Report, however, is interesting not primarily for what the 
bill provided, but rather for what it reveals about what the House assumed about tribal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians where federal law was silent. 
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Similarly, the Court cited an 1855 attorney general’s opinion that the 
Choctaw nation did not have criminal jurisdiction over a non-Indian, ignoring 
the fact that the Attorney General stated that “it is certain that the Agent errs 
in assuming the legal impossibility of a citizen of the United States becoming 
subject in civil matters, or criminal either, to the jurisdiction of the 
Choctaws,”59 so that the question was not whether the tribe had inherent 
jurisdiction, but whether Congress had taken such jurisdiction away.60  It was 
only because the Attorney General read the relevant treaties and statutes as 
preempting tribal criminal jurisdiction over U.S. citizens that he held it did not 
exist; with respect to civil disputes, as to which the treaties and statutes were 
silent, he opined that such questions “appertained to the local jurisdiction, 
whatever maybe the ultimate political sovereignty.”61  The remainder of the 
Court’s discussion of positive sources of law follows this same pattern of 
partiality and misconstruction.62
But then, as if to prevent readers from focusing too closely on the 
holes in this historical lace, the Oliphant Court provides us with more smiles 
and soap.  The Court acknowledged that the historical documents are “not 
conclusive of the issue before us” and then continues:  “But an examination of 
our earlier precedents satisfies us that, even ignoring treaty provisions and 
congressional policy, Indians do not have criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians absent affirmative delegation of such power by Congress.”63  What 
did these earlier precedents say?  First, that Indian tribes "hold and occupy 
[the reservations] with the assent of the United States, and under their 
authority,"64 second, that upon incorporation within the United States, “their 
rights to complete sovereignty as independent nations, were necessarily 
diminished,”65 and finally that “any attempt [by foreign nations] to acquire 
59
 7 Op. Atty. Gen. 174, 177 (1855).
60 Id. at 178.
61 Id. at 180-81.  While the fact that Thomas Cheadle, the white man concerned, had become a 
citizen of the Choctaw Nation by marriage and thereby gained rights to Choctaw property, 
affected the court’s determination of the fairness of Choctaw jurisdiction, the opinion does not 
turn on this fact.  Rather, the Attorney General declared that “As to the general question of 
allegiance, it is palpable that this has no necessary connection with judicial jurisdiction. . . . 
Nay, a Frenchman or Englishman, residing in the United States, has to submit many questions 
of right to the local courts, as an American must in France or England; but the national 
allegiance is not touched in either case. . . [W]e see and acknowledge that the question of 
allegiance is a non-essential in the question of judicial competency.” Id. at 181-82.
62 See Barsh & Henderson, supra note 17 at 617-31.
63
 435 U.S. at 208.
64
 U.S. v. Rogers, 45 U.S. at 572 (1846), quoted at 435 U.S. at 208-09.
65
 Johnson v. M’Intosh, 8 Wheat. 543, 574, 5 L. Ed. 681 (1823), quoted at 435 U.S. at 209.
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their lands, or to form a political connection with them, would be considered 
by all as an invasion of our territory, and an act of hostility.”66
How did the Court translate these intrinsic limitations on tribal 
sovereignty into an inability to prosecute non-Indians that violated tribal law 
on tribal land?  By pointing to dicta in a concurrence by a single justice to the 
Supreme Court’s 1810 opinion in Fletcher v. Peck67 that “the restrictions upon 
the right of soil in the Indians, amount . . . to an exclusion of all competitors 
[to the United States] from their markets; and the limitation upon their 
sovereignty amount to the right of governing every person within their limits 
except themselves.”  Although Justice Johnson’s concurrences always 
expressed radically different views on Indian law than the opinions of the 
Court,68 the 1978 Court relied on this slender reed to hold that “the intrinsic 
limitations on Indian tribal authority” were not restricted to these two hundred 
year old restrictions on “the tribes’ power to transfer lands or exercise external 
political sovereignty.”69  Rather, the Court held, simply by “submitting to the 
overriding sovereignty of the United States, Indian tribes  . . . necessarily give 
up their power” to try and punish non-Indian citizens without authorization of 
this power by the United States.70
The Court announced this rule with so little law to support it because 
of its dual sense that tribal jurisdiction was just not fair to outsiders, and that 
66
 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1831), quoted at 435 U.S. at 209. 
67
 10 U.S. 87, 147 (Johnson, J. concurring) (quoted at 435 U.S. 209).    
68
 While the majority opinion in Fletcher barely touched on Indian law, Johnson’s 
concurrence in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831), for example, is a concurrence 
as to result only; while the Court’s opinion by Justice Marshall held that tribes while not 
“foreign nations” were certainly “sovereign nations,” id. at 16, Justice Johnson argued that “I 
cannot but think that there are strong reasons for doubting the applicability of the epithet 
state, to a people so low in the grade of organized society as our Indian tribes most generally 
are.” Id. at 21 (Johnson, J. concurring). Johnson’s view, however, was not the opinion of the 
Court.  While Johnson might have desired, as he wrote in Fletcher, that tribes should have 
jurisdiction over their own members only, it is only Justice Marshall’s opinions for the 
majority that have the force of law.  In contrast with Johnson’s proposals, these opinions state 
that Indian nations were “distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries, within 
which their authority is exclusive,” Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 557 (1832), and that a 
“person who purchases land from the Indians, within their territory, incorporates himself with 
them, so far as respects the property purchased; holds their title under their protection, and 
subject to their laws.” Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823).  The Oliphant Court seems to 
have been aware of this problem.  Although the Petitioner’s cited Johnson’s similar language 
from Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. at 27 (Johnson, J. concurring) (stating that tribal 
powers were limited to a right of “personal self-government”), quoted in Brief of Kitsap 
County at 27-28, the Oliphant Court did not cite it, perhaps aware of the contrast between this 
concurrence and the Court’s opinion in the case.
69
 435 U.S. at 209. 
70 Id. at 210.
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the effort to exercise such jurisdiction was a modern upstart of little 
importance to real Indian tribes.  The opinion is infused with suggestions that 
the exercise of such jurisdiction had little to do with traditional tribal power.  
The first lines of the opinion question the status of the Suquamish government 
as either tribal or governmental:
Two hundred years ago, the area bordering Puget Sound 
consisted of a large number of politically autonomous Indian 
villages, each occupied by from a few dozen to over 100 
Indians.   These loosely related villages were aggregated into a 
series of Indian tribes, one of which, the Suquamish, has 
become the focal point of this litigation.71
The government trying to assert its retained sovereignty is thus subtly 
transformed into a federal creation with little claim to the historical 
conception of a tribe.  Similarly, control over a formal court system is 
portrayed as a modern, un-Indian creation.  Traditionally, the Court tells us, 
“[o]ffenses by one Indian against another were usually handled by social and 
religious pressure and not by formal judicial processes; emphasis was on 
restitution rather than on punishment.”72 Both formal court systems and the 
attempt to exercise jurisdiction over outsiders were thus creatures of the late 
twentieth century, and had little to do with the traditional concerns of tribes.73
The doubt that tribal governments can exercise jurisdiction fairly 
figures even more prominently in the opinion.  The petitioners and amici
portrayed a “parade of horribles” should the Court uphold tribal jurisdiction.74
(Slade Gorton, who later became a famous modern-day “Indian fighter” in the 
U.S. Senate, wrote the amicus brief as Attorney General of the State of 
Washington.) While these specific allegations of unfairness do not figure in 
the reasoning of the Court (and indeed the district court held that Oliphant had 
thus far been afforded equal protection and due process in the matter75), it is 
clear that uneasiness about tribal jurisdiction does much of the work of the 
71
 Id. at 193.
72
 Id. at 197.
73
 Id. 
74
 Brief of Amici Curiae Association of American Indian Affairs at 40, Oliphant v. Suquamish 
Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 201 (1978) (No. 76-5729).  It is interesting to note that many of the 
attacks on the competency of the tribal justice system derived not from objective unfairness, 
but from their relative lack of resources and formal education.  See, e.g.,  Petitioners’ Brief at 
17, Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 201 (1978) (No. 76-5729). (noting that 
tribal police wrote that Belgarde was charged with “wreakless” driving and that the 
“arraignment was held in the back of a former barber shop in an area roughly 8' x 10', not 
physically capable of handling a fair, free and public trial or hearing. The presiding judge 
appeared to have little knowledge, training or practice in law.”).
75 Mem. Op. (W.D. Wash. Apr. 5, 1974); J. App. 51-52.
16
Oliphant opinion.  The Court held that tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians 
must be denied because of the “great solicitude” of the United States “that its 
citizens be protected . . . from unwarranted intrusions on their personal 
liberty.”76  Tribal jurisdiction would cause such an intrusion on liberty 
specifically because of the cultural and racial divide between those exercising 
jurisdiction and those upon whom it was exercised. The court quoted an 1883 
case regarding federal criminal jurisdiction over members of the Sioux tribe to 
suggest that subjecting the defendant to the tribal court would extend 
[O]ver aliens and strangers; over the members of a community 
separated by race [and] tradition . . . the restraints of an 
external and unknown code . . . which judges them by a 
standard made by others and not for them  . . . It tries them, not 
by their peers, nor by the customs of their people . . . but by  . . 
. a different race, according to the law of a social state of which 
they have an imperfect conception.77
The 1883 Supreme Court had not held that this cultural divide was an absolute 
bar to federal criminal jurisdiction over tribal members,78 only that it was an 
additional reason not to construe a vague treaty provision to repeal a statute 
that clearly prohibited such jurisdiction.79   The 1978 Court, however, held 
that these considerations spoke “equally strongly against the . . . contention 
that Indian tribes . . . retain the power to try non-Indians according to their 
own customs and procedure.”80  What was simply a rule of statutory 
construction where federal jurisdiction over Indians was concerned, with 
respect to non-Indians was used to justify a new common law doctrine 
allowing the Court to deprive tribes of jurisdiction in the absence of any 
statute or provision of law doing so. 
c. Reaffirming Tribal Control Over Tribal Members
While these concerns were sufficient to remove all tribal criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians, that same term the Court issued two other 
76
 435 U.S. at 210. 
77
 435 U.S. at 210-11 (quoting Ex Parte Kan-gi-shun-ca (Crow Dog), 109 U.S. 556, 571 
(1883)). 
78
 Indeed, three years later the Court upheld a federal statute authorizing such jurisdiction.  
U.S. v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
79
 109 U.S. 556, 571 (circumstances of case reinforce general rule against repeal by 
implication). 
80
 435 U.S. at 211.
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opinions insulating tribal actions concerning Indians from federal control.  In 
U.S. v. Wheeler, a companion case to Oliphant, the Court held that the Navajo 
Nation’s power to criminally prosecute a member of the tribe was “part of the 
Navajos' primeval sovereignty . . . attributable in no way to any delegation to 
them of federal authority” and therefore did not trigger the Fifth Amendment 
prohibition on double jeopardy.81 The Court was careful to distinguish 
between this retained power over tribal members and power over 
nonmembers, aspects of which tribes had “implicitly lost by virtue of their 
dependent status,” and coined the term “implicit divestiture” to describe its 
new doctrine with respect to jurisdiction over nonmembers.82
A few months later, in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, the Court 
denied a tribal member the right to challenge a tribal ordinance that excluded 
her children from tribal membership on grounds that discriminated on basis of 
her gender in federal court. 83  Although the opinion turned on the holding that 
the Indian Civil Rights Act only created a federal cause of action for habeas 
cases and therefore applied to non-Indians as well,84 Oliphant had insulated 
these non-Indians from much tribal jurisdiction.  With hindsight, one sees in 
these opinions two separate tracks regarding tribal jurisdiction emerging:  
where such jurisdiction touched non-Indians, it threatened personal liberty and 
was not essential to tribal self-government; but when it touched tribal 
members only explicit federal action was sufficient to overcome the invasion 
of tribal sovereignty. 
d. The Middle Period:  Colville, Montana, Merrion, National Farmers, 
Iowa Mutual, and Brendale
Oliphant seemed to concern only criminal jurisdiction. The Court’s 
emphasis on historical assumptions regarding criminal jurisdiction and 
concerns for personal liberty suggested that civil and regulatory jurisdiction 
would not be governed by the same rule.  In addition, the Supreme Court had 
upheld imposition of tribal taxes on non-Indians in 1905,85 and in 1959 had 
81
 435 U.S. 313, 327 (1978). 
82
 435 U.S. at 326.
83
 Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
84 Id. (construing 25 U.S.C. §§1301-1303).
85
 Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384 (1904).  In Morris, the Supreme Court sustained a tribal 
tax imposed on non-Indians grazing cattle on land they owned within tribal territory. An 
Eighth Circuit decision the following year further explained the nature of this power. In 
Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947, 950 (8th Cir. 1905), the court rejected a challenge by non-
Indians to tribal taxation of their activities on non-Indian lands within the reservation. The 
court held that the “authority of the [tribe] to prescribe the terms upon which noncitizens may 
transact business within its borders . . . was a natural right of that people, indispensable to its 
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held that a contract action by a non-Indian against an Indian could only be 
brought in tribal court.86  The year after Oliphant was decided, moreover, the 
Court in Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation
upheld tribal taxes on non-Indians purchasing cigarettes on tribal land, stating 
that “federal law to date has not worked a divestiture of Indian taxing 
power.”87
But in 1981, the Court decided U.S. v. Montana.88  Compared to 
Oliphant, Montana was a low profile case.  It was brought by the United 
States as an action to quiet title to the bed of the Big Horn River, which ran 
through the Crow Reservation, and which was claimed both by the State of 
Montana and by the United States in trust for the Crow Tribe.   This issue 
occupied the first five questions presented to the Court by parties, and was the 
subject of the bulk of their written arguments.89   The question of jurisdiction 
to regulate hunting and fishing by non-members was a “corollary” to this 
question, and only arose because the federal government sought a declaration 
that tribal and federal laws preempted concurrent regulation of such activity 
by the state.90  But the Supreme Court framed the issues very differently.  This 
was the first sentence of the Supreme Court’s opinion: “This case concerns the 
sources and scope of the power of an Indian tribe to regulate hunting and 
fishing by non-Indians on lands within its reservation owned in fee simple by 
non-Indians.”91
Montana addressed head on a question that had only been part of the 
subtext of Oliphant case: how should the Court respond to non-Indian land 
ownership on Indian reservations.  In the latter part of the nineteenth century 
and the beginning of the twentieth century, the United States pursued a policy 
of allotting reservation land in parcels of up to 160 acres to Indian heads of 
autonomy as a distinct tribe or nation, and it must remain an attribute of its government until 
agreement of the nation itself or by the superior power of the republic it is taken from it.” 
Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947, 950 (8th Cir. 1905).
86
 Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
87
 Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 153 
(1980).  While parts of the opinion could be read to suggest that it applied only to tribal trust 
land, others indicate that it applies to all doing business on the reservation generally. Id.
88
 U.S. v. Montana, 450 U.S. 544, 549 (1980).  The case involved two conflicting 
presumptions: first, the presumption, based on the equal footing doctrine, that States took title 
to lands under navigable waters within their borders upon being admitted to statehood, and 
second, the rule that treaty rights, such as the right to the Crow Reservation recognized by the 
1868 Treaty with the Crow Tribe, were not abrogated absent clear and plain intent by 
Congress to do so.  See FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 2.02 
(forthcoming 2005) (hereinafter 2005 COHEN). 
89 See Petitioner’s Brief, U.S. v. Montana, 450 U.S. 544 (1980) (No. 79-1128).
90
 U.S. v. Montana, 457 F. Supp. 599, 599 (D. Mont. 1978); 450 U.S. at 549. 
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 450 U.S. at 547. 
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households, and selling off the remaining land to non-Indian purchasers.92
This policy first became coercive, broad-based law with the Indian General 
Allotment Act of 1887,93 but had been pursued by the federal government for 
many years through treaties providing that land could be provided to heads of 
households in severalty if they chose. Although the policy was intended to 
civilize Indians by turning them into farmers and property owners, it “quickly 
proved disastrous for the Indians.”94  In 1934, Congress declared the end of 
allotment, and prohibited any further division of Indian lands.  But the policy 
had already wreaked havoc on the tribal landscape.  Two thirds of Indian 
lands had passed from native ownership.95 Most reservations were now 
“checkerboards,” dominated by squares of land (so called “fee lands”) owned 
and occupied by non-Indians.
In response to this problem, Congress took early steps to try to 
reconsolidate tribal land holdings on such reservations96 and affirm uniform 
federal jurisdiction over them.97  The Supreme Court had affirmed these steps, 
holding that the federal sale of lands within a reservation, without more, 
neither diminished the reservation,98 nor gave states criminal99 or taxing 
jurisdiction100 over the people there.   Even before these congressional actions, 
the Court and the Executive had affirmed tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians 
on allotted land on reservations.  In 1904, the Court had affirmed federal 
responsibility to enforce tribal tax laws against non-Indians on non-Indian 
lands within the reservation.101 In so doing, the Court followed executive 
branch opinions stating that even when non-Indians purchased land pursuant 
to federal laws they did so “with the assumption that the purchaser, if he 
wishes to occupy, will comply with the local laws, just as in other cases. The 
United States might sell lands which it holds in a State, but it would be a 
strange contention that this gave the purchaser any immunity from local laws 
92 See, e.g., Treaty with the Stockbridges, Nov. 24, 1848, 9 Stat. 955; Treaty with the Ioways, 
May 17, 1854, art. 6, 10 Stat. 186; see generally, FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK ON FEDERAL 
INDIAN LAW at 98-102, 129-134 (2d ed., 1982) (hereinafter 1982 COHEN). 
93
 Ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887).
94
 Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234, 237 (1997).
95
 1982 COHEN, supra note 92 at 138.
96
 25 U.S.C. § 465.
97
 18 U.S.C. § 1151.
98
 Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351, 357 (1962).
99 Id.
100
 Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 478-79 (1976).
101
 Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384, 386 (1904).
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or local taxation.”102  In 1934, in its influential opinion on the “Powers of 
Indian Tribes,” the Solicitor General made clear that tribal jurisdiction over 
non-Indians on lands they owned was not limited to the power to tax: 
Over tribal lands, the tribe has the rights of a landowner as well 
as the rights of a local government, dominion as well as 
sovereignty.  But over all the lands of the reservation, whether 
owned by the tribe, by members thereof, or by outsiders, the 
tribe has the sovereign power of determining the conditions 
upon which persons shall be permitted to enter its domain, to 
reside therein, and to do business, provided only such 
determination is consistent with applicable Federal laws and 
does not infringe any vested rights of persons now occupying 
reservation lands under lawful authority.103
After the 1960s, however, assertions of tribal jurisdiction raised new protests 
by non-Indian residents who felt subjection to the rules of unfamiliar tribal 
governments violated their rights as property owners and citizens.
Although the Court’s opinion in Montana did not accord with the prior 
executive branch opinions, it still seemed to strike a middle ground in 
resolving the dispute between tribes and non-Indians.  The Court affirmed 
tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on tribally owned land:
The Court of Appeals held that the Tribe may prohibit 
nonmembers from hunting or fishing on land belonging to the 
Tribe or held by the United States in trust for the tribe, and 
with this holding we can readily agree.   We also agree . . . that 
if the Tribe permits nonmembers to fish or hunt on such lands, 
it may condition their entry by charging a fee or establishing 
bag and creel limits.104
It addition, the Court stated that the treaty with the tribe, which provided that 
the reservation would be “set aside for the absolute and undisturbed use and 
occupation” of the Indians arguably conferred authority to control hunting and 
fishing on such lands.105  But the Court reached an opposition conclusion with 
102 23 Op. Atty. Gen. 213, 217 (1900); see also 23 Op. Atty. Gen. 528 (1901) (affirming 
power to impose export tax on hay grown on reservation “even if the shipper was the absolute 
owner of the land on which the hay was raised”).
103
 55 I.D. 14, 31 (1934).
104
 U.S. v. Montana, 450 U.S. at 557.
105 Id. at 558-59.
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respect to fee lands.   Although the Court produced no history of assumptions 
regarding authority to regulate activities of tribal members comparable to that 
in Oliphant, the Court relied on Oliphant and Justice Johnson’s concurrence in 
Fletcher v. Peck to hold that the same principles “support the general 
proposition that the inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend 
to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe.”106
Given the history of federal affirmation of tribal civil jurisdiction over 
non-members, the Court had to acknowledge that tribes retained significant 
inherent jurisdiction over non-Indians, even on fee lands: 
A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other 
means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual 
relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial 
dealing, contracts, leases, or other arrangements. A tribe may 
also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the 
conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when 
that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political 
integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the 
tribe.107
This jurisdiction seemed quite expansive.  After all, the power to legislate to 
protect health or welfare of one’s citizens is the core of the police powers of a 
state—a broad power that traditionally has been granted “great latitude.”108
As described in the edition of the Cohen Handbook that came out in 1982, the 
case seemed only stand for the unproblematic principle that tribes did not have 
the power to regulate non-Indians on non-Indian land “when no tribal interests 
were directly affected.”109
But in hindsight, the opinion contains some troubling suggestions as to 
how tribal interests would be defined. While Congress and tribes were 
increasingly defining tribal sovereignty as a modern, dynamic thing, the 
Montana majority seemed to define tribal sovereignty as the creature of a 
remembered past.110  The Court began its description of the facts of the case 
by stating that “[t]he Crow Indians originated in Canada,” and had migrated to 
the United States 300 years ago.111  The fact that the State of Montana had 
106 Id. at 565.
107 Id. at 565-66 (citations omitted).
108
 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 475 (1996).
109
 1982 COHEN, supra note 92 at 245.
110
 This sense that regulation of fishing was not rooted in the past of the tribe also clearly 
influenced the reasoning of the district court. See 457 F. Supp. 599, 602.
111
 450 U.S. at 547.
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traditionally exercised “near exclusive” jurisdiction over hunting and fishing 
on fee lands on the reservation, and that, until recently, the tribe had 
“accommodated itself” to this state regulation was core to the Court’s holding 
that tribal regulation did not impact the self-government of the tribe.112  In 
addition, although this fact was important principally in construing the treaty, 
the Court found that “the Crows were a nomadic tribe dependent chiefly on 
buffalo, and fishing was not important to their diet or way of life.”113  The 
Court did not consider the fact that the tribe now sought jurisdiction over 
natural resources on the reservation as a means to revitalize its government 
and the reservation economy; all that was important was that it had not done 
so in the past.  The Montana Court seemed to define self-government 
according to its sense of what tribes had been, not what they could become. 
But the Supreme Court’s cases over the next few years did not follow 
this lead, and instead protected tribal sovereignty as an evolving thing.  In 
1982, the Court prohibited a state from taxing a non-Indian contractor 
building an on reservation school in part because it would undermine the 
modern federal policy of encouraging tribal independence.114  The next year, 
the Court held that where a tribe had undertaken substantial development of 
hunting and fishing resources on its reservation, not only could it regulate 
such activity by nonmembers,115 but also that state regulation of hunting and 
fishing was preempted.116
The nonmember jurisdiction cases of these middle years also 
encouraged cautious optimism about the limited scope of Montana.  When the 
Court issued its opinion in Montana, it had before it Merrion v. Jicarilla 
Apache Tribe, a case in which non-Indians challenged tribal authority to 
impose a tax on oil and gas production on lands leased to them by the Tribe 
for that purpose.117  If Montana stood for the proposition that tribal power to 
regulate non-Indians derived from the power to exclude, as the Merrion 
petitioners argued, their long-term leases allowing them to enter the land 
would seem to deprive the tribe of regulatory power.118 The Supreme Court 
rejected this argument and upheld the taxes.  The Court explained that
112 Id. at 565 n.13 & 566-67.
113 Id. at 556.  
114
 Ramah Navajo School Board, Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue of New Mexico, 458 U.S. 832 
(1982).
115
 New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 337 (1983).
116 Id. at 338-38.
117
 Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).  The taxes were part of the recent 
tribal resurgence: although the tribe had leased the lands to the taxpayers since 1953, it had 
only amended its constitution to permit jurisdiction over nonmembers in 1968, and had only 
enacted the taxes in 1976. Id.
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The power to tax . . . does not derive solely from the Indian 
tribe's power to exclude non-Indians from tribal lands. 
Instead, it derives from the tribe's general authority, as 
sovereign, to control economic activity within its 
jurisdiction, and to defray the cost of providing 
governmental services by requiring contributions from 
persons or enterprises engaged in economic activities 
within that jurisdiction.119
Even if the authority to tax did derive solely from the power to exclude, 
moreover, the tribe had not “abandoned its sovereign powers simply because 
it [had] not expressly reserved them in a contract.”120
Justice Stevens wrote a lengthy dissent in which Chief Justice Burger 
and Justice Rehnquist joined.  Although the tribal taxes were lower than state 
taxes for the same activity, the dissent centered around concern for the non-
Indian plaintiffs subject to the vagaries of tribal jurisdiction.  Non-Indians 
were not represented in tribal governments,121 and tribal governments were 
not bound by the constitution.122  Non-Indians contracting with the tribe might 
find themselves subject to taxes when the contract was half completed.123
Although the majority had held that secretarial approval of the Jicarilla taxes 
mitigated the potential for discrimination, the dissenters stated that “ignoring 
the risk of such unfair treatment” for this reason was to “equate the unbridled 
discretion of a political appointee with the protection afforded by the rules of 
law. . . Neither wealth, political opportunity, nor past transgressions can 
justify denying any person the protection of law.”124  But these dissenters did 
not carry the day—the opinion of Justice Marshall, the Court’s strongest 
advocate for the rights of minorities, did that.125
The question of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians also came before 
the Court in National Farmers Union Insurance Co. v. Crow Tribe.126  The 
case concerned a personal injury action by a tribal member filed in tribal court 
119 Id. at 137. 
120 Id. at 144-48.
121 Id. at 172-73.
122 Id. at 170-71.
123 Id. at 190.
124 Id.
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 While Justice Stevens was a concerned advocate for the rights of individuals, and I believe 
that his Indian law jurisprudence was honestly motivated by this concern, Justices Brennan, 
Blackmun, and Marshall, the justices that equal Stevens in his concern for fairness and 
constitutional rights of individuals, consistently voted to uphold tribal jurisdiction. 
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against a state school district and its insurance company for an accident on 
land owned by the State of Montana within the Crow Reservation.  The non-
Indian defendants filed a federal action challenging the tribe’s jurisdiction 
over them.  The Supreme Court held that non-Indians challenging civil 
jurisdiction of tribal courts were required to exhaust tribal remedies before 
turning to federal court:
If we were to apply the Oliphant rule here, it is plain that any 
exhaustion requirement would be completely foreclosed 
because federal courts would always be the only forums for 
civil actions against non-Indians.   For several reasons, 
however, the reasoning of Oliphant does not apply to this case. 
First, although Congress' decision to extend the criminal 
jurisdiction of the federal courts to offenses committed by non-
Indians against Indians within Indian Country supported the 
holding in Oliphant, there is no comparable legislation granting 
the federal courts jurisdiction over civil disputes between 
Indians and non-Indians that arise on an Indian reservation. 
Moreover, the opinion of one Attorney General on which we 
relied in Oliphant, specifically noted the difference between 
civil and criminal jurisdiction. . . . “By all possible rules of 
construction the inference is clear that jurisdiction is left to the 
Choctaws themselves of civil controversies arising strictly 
within the Choctaw Nation."127
The Court concluded that 
[T]he answer to the question whether a tribal court has the 
power to exercise civil subject-matter jurisdiction over non-
Indians in a case of this kind is not automatically foreclosed, as 
an extension of Oliphant would require. . . .  Rather, the 
existence and extent of a tribal court's jurisdiction will require 
a careful examination of tribal sovereignty, the extent to which 
that sovereignty has been altered, divested, or diminished, as 
well as a detailed study of relevant statutes, Executive Branch 
policy as embodied in treaties and elsewhere, and 
administrative or judicial decisions.128
127
 471 U.S. 854-55 (quoting 7 Op.Atty.Gen. 175, 179-181 (1855)) (emphasis added 
by Court).
128 Id. at 855-56.
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Two years later, in Iowa Mutual Insurance Co. v. LaPlante, the Court 
affirmed this exhaustion requirement and extended it to cases founded on 
diversity jurisdiction.129  The Court also went even further in affirming tribal 
jurisdiction than it had in National Farmers: “Tribal authority over the 
activities of non-Indians on reservation lands is an important part of tribal 
sovereignty. . . Civil jurisdiction over such activities presumptively lies in the 
tribal courts unless affirmatively limited by a specific treaty provision or 
federal statute.”130  Only Justice Stevens dissented from the opinion, and only 
on the grounds that exhaustion of state remedies would not have been required 
had a diversity case been brought in state court.131
Iowa Mutual, following National Farmers and Merrion, seemed to 
signal that while civil jurisdiction on fee land was subject to certain 
limitations, these limitations were narrow, and the general presumption was 
that tribes had civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations.  In 
1989, however, the Court issued its opinion in Brendale v. Confederated 
Tribes & Bands of Yakima,132 which considered whether the Yakima Nation 
could impose its zoning requirements on reservation fee lands owned by 
nonmembers.  Eighty percent of the reservation was held in trust for the tribe, 
while twenty percent was fee land owned by non-Indians.  Most of the fee 
land was at the edges of the reservation, which had significant commercial 
and residential development.133  The parties referred to this land as the “open 
area.”134 In contrast, the “closed area” toward the center of reservation was 
almost entirely in trust, was largely uninhabited, and had maintained a 
“pristine, wilderness-like character.”135  Philip Brendale136 owned a twenty-
129
 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
130 Id. at 18.
131 Id. at 20. 
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 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
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 617 F. Supp. at 752.
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 492 U.S. at 415. 
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 Brendale reflects the artificiality of sharp divisions between members and nonmembers.  
The land had originally been allotted to Brendale’s great-aunt, who was an enrolled member 
of the Yakima Nation, and had then descended to Brendale’s grandfather and mother, who 
were also enrolled members, and from them to Brendale.  Despite his Yakima descent, 
Brendale was not himself a member of the Nation.  Brief of Philip Brendale, Brendale v. 
Confederated Tribes of Yakima Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989), Nos. 87-1622, 87-1697 and 87-
1711 at 3.  But the tribe and the federal government were equally responsible for reinforcing 
the distinction between members and nonmembers.  In order to preserve the character of the 
area, in 1954 the tribe had forbidden entry to all but tribal members and those with legitimate 
business or property interests on the land.  617 F. Supp. 735, 738.  The BIA subsequently 
closed the BIA road leading to the area to all but tribal members and permittees.  Id.  Brendale 
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acre parcel in this closed area, which he proposed to divide into ten 2-acre lots 
to be sold as summer cabin sites.137  Stanley Wilkinson, a non-Indian, owned a 
32-acre parcel in the open area, which he proposed to develop in 20 lots for 
family homes.138  As in Montana, although the case was originally brought to 
seek a declaration that the County’s zoning laws were preempted by 
conflicting tribal law, it quickly turned into a question of whether the tribe had 
the right to zone the property at all.
The case deeply fractured the Court.   The Court issued three opinions, 
none of which commanded a majority. Different majorities of five justices 
upheld tribal jurisdiction as to Brendale’s land,139 and rejected it as to 
Wilkinson’s.140  No opinion gained a majority as to its reasoning.  The 
decisions, therefore, have no precedential value.  Rather, the case is important 
because it signals the contested visions of sovereignty that figure in later 
cases.
Justice White, joined by Justices Kennedy and Scalia and Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, would not have upheld zoning jurisdiction over either parcel of 
land.   This opinion, for the first time, stated that Montana expressed a 
“general principle”141 against tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers and that the 
situations in which tribes had jurisdiction on fee lands were “exceptions” to 
the general rule.142  The plurality would have these two “exceptions” function 
not as expressions of the general right of a sovereign, but as a kind of legally 
protected special interest that could be raised in proceedings of other fora.  
Whether the proposed non-Indian activity had a direct effect on the tribe 
would be evaluated on a case-by- case basis, not as a general category of 
activity impacting tribal sovereignty.  What should have happened in the case 
at hand, according to the opinion, was that the tribe should have intervened in 
the county zoning proceedings arguing that with respect to the parcels of land 
had challenged this restriction on equal protection grounds, but lost in district court.  Id. at 
n.3.  
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 492 U.S. at 417.
138 Id. at 418.
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 492 U.S. at 433 (Stevens, J., joined by O’Connor, J., announcing the judgment of the Court 
in No. 87-1622 and concurring in the judgment in Nos. 87-1697 and 87-1711) & 492 U.S. at 
448 (Blackmun, J, joined by Marshall and Justice Brennan, concurring in the judgement in 
No. 87-1622 and dissenting in Nos. 87-1697 and 87-1711).
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announcing the judgement of the Court in Nos. 8701697 and 87-1711) & 492 U.S. at 433 
(Stevens, J., joined by O’Connor, J., announcing the judgment of the Court in No. 87-1622 
and concurring in the judgment in Nos. 87-1697 and 87-1711.). 
141 Id. at 426.
142 Id. at 428.
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at issue tribal interests were imperiled.143  Only then would the district court 
have authority to review the question.   This process had been followed in the 
Wilkinson case.  Justice White’s opinion did not further review the district 
court’s findings that the proposed use would not threaten the tribe, but simply 
affirmed it.  As county zoning proceedings had not yet been completed with 
respect to the Brendale parcel, the plurality opined, the district court should 
not have exercised jurisdiction.  The plurality would therefore have vacated 
the finding of tribal jurisdiction in the case.144
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice O’Connor, wrote an opinion 
concurring in the judgment on the Wilkinson parcel, and announcing the 
opinion of the Court upholding tribal jurisdiction over the Brendale parcel.  
Justice Stevens’ proposed solution seemed to be motivated by two concerns: 
the concern for fairness to nonmembers subject to tribal power, and the 
concern that tribes be able to maintain their “traditional character.”145 Thus, 
while Stevens found it “difficult to imagine a power that follows more 
forcefully from the power to exclude than the power to require that 
nonmembers . . . not disturb the traditional character of the reserved area,”146
he found it “equally improbable that Congress [in selling reservation land to 
non-Indians] envisioned that the Tribe would retain its interest in regulating 
the use of vast ranges of land sold in fee to nonmembers who lack any voice 
in setting tribal policy.”147 This balance would support comprehensive tribal 
zoning jurisdiction over the closed area: 
By maintaining the power to exclude nonmembers from 
entering all but a small portion of the closed area, the Tribe has 
preserved the power to define the essential character of that 
area.   In fact, the Tribe has exercised this power, taking care 
that the closed area remains an undeveloped refuge of cultural 
and religious significance, a place where tribal members "may 
camp, hunt, fish, and gather roots and berries in the tradition of 
their culture."148
With respect to the open area, however, time had “produced an integrated 
community that is not economically or culturally delimited by reservation 
143 Id. at 431.
144 Id. at 432-33.
145 Id. at 435. 
146 Id. at 434-35.
147 Id. at 437.
148 Id. at 441 (quoting Amended Zoning Regulations of the Yakima Indian Nation, Resolution 
No. 1-98-72, §  23 (1972)).
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boundaries” and was no longer “a unique tribal asset.”149   “As a result, the 
Tribe’s interest in preventing inconsistent uses is dramatically curtailed.”150
While the tribe “of course” retained the power to regulate trust land in the 
area, it could not regulate Wilkinson’s fee land.151
Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, concurred 
in the judgment that the tribe could zone the Brendale parcel, but would have 
held that the tribe had inherent and exclusive power to zone all reservation 
lands.  Blackmun’s opinion was a stinging criticism of both plurality opinions.   
First, the opinion pointed out that with “no more than a perfunctory 
discussion” Justice White had elevated the Montana decision to “a general 
rule, modified only by two narrow exceptions,” that tribes had no authority 
over non-Indians on their reservations “absent express congressional 
delegation.”152  This general rule was all the more “remarkable” given its 
anomalous nature: “except for those few aspects of sovereignty recognized in 
the Cherokee Cases as necessarily divested, the Court only once prior to 
Montana (and never thereafter) has found an additional sovereign power to 
have been relinquished upon incorporation.”153  With respect to civil and 
regulatory jurisdiction, Blackmun wrote, the Court’s cases before and since 
“clearly recognize that tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on reservation 
lands is consistent with the dependent status of tribes.”154  In light of these 
cases and in light of Montana’s explicit recognition of inherent tribal 
jurisdiction on fee land in certain circumstances, Montana should be read “to 
recognize that tribes may regulate the on-reservation conduct of non-Indians 
whenever a significant tribal interest is threatened or directly affected.”155
White’s case by case approach to the second Montana “exception,” moreover, 
essentially a “newfangled federal nuisance type cause of action” for injunction 
of particular land uses, would destroy the tribe’s ability to engage in “long-
term, active management of land use” that was the “essence of zoning 
authority.”156
But while White’s opinion misconstrued the case law regarding 
inherent sovereignty, Blackmun wrote, Stevens’ opinion “disregards those 
decisions altogether.”157  Those decisions, including Montana, plainly 
149 Id. at 444 & 447.
150 Id. at 445. 
151 Id.
152
 492 U.S. 408, 449 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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156 Id. at 460. 
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recognized inherent sovereignty separate from the power to exclude non-
Indians from the reservation.158  Nor was the hypothetical intent of the 
Congress in passing the Dawes Act, which had been repudiated by Congress 
and the Court, relevant to this inquiry.159  Practically, moreover, Justice 
Stevens’ standardless distinction between open areas, in which tribes had 
concurrent jurisdiction, and sufficiently closed areas, in which they had sole 
jurisdiction, was even less workable than the approach of Justice White.160
Justice Blackmun also criticized the crabbed vision of sovereignty 
Justice Stevens would protect.  Stevens’ reasons for upholding tribal 
jurisdiction in the closed area, he wrote, “betray a stereotyped and almost 
patronizing view of Indians and reservation life.”161  Blackmun argued that 
protection of tribal authority could not be limited to actions that would protect 
a stereotypical past:  “In my view, even under Justice Stevens’ analysis, it 
must not be the case that tribes can retain the ‘essential character’ of their 
reservations (necessary to the exercise of zoning authority) only if they forgo 
economic development and maintain those reservations according to a single, 
perhaps quaint, view of what is characteristically ‘Indian’ today.”162
Given the fractured nature of the Brendale Court, all one can take from 
the case is that sometimes tribes can zone nonmember fee land, and 
sometimes they cannot.  Similarly, this middle period of the 1980s raised 
more questions than it answered.  Was Montana’s limitation on civil 
jurisdiction on fee land an exception or a rule?  Would the Court’s vision of 
tribal sovereignty conform to the broad, dynamic understanding being 
promoted by Congress and exercised by tribes?  Or would it protect only those 
exercises of sovereignty that conformed to historical stereotypes of tribes:  
separate and self-contained, pursuing a culture and needs that were neither 
related to non-Indian actions nor affected by them.  Montana could be read 
either way.  Merrion, Colville, National Farmers and Iowa Mutual had all 
suggested that tribes had broad civil jurisdiction over non-Indians, even on fee 
land, as necessary to govern their territory and their people.  The various 
Brendale opinions decided none of these questions, but drew the battleground 
for the future. 
e. Congressional Rejection:  Duro v. Reina
158 Id. at 462-63.
159 Id. at 463. 
160 Id. at 464.
161 Id. at 464-65. 
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In 1990, the Court took a step too far.  In Duro v. Reina,163 the Court 
determined that tribes had no criminal jurisdiction over Indians that were not 
members of their tribe.  Albert Duro was a member of the Torres Martinez 
Band of Cahuilla Indians of California who lived on the reservation of the Salt 
River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community with a Pima-Maricopa “woman 
friend” and worked for the tribe’s construction company.164  He was charged 
with shooting Biscuit Brown, a 14-year-old member of the Gila River Pima-
Maricopa Indian Community living on the Salt River reservation. After the 
shooting, Duro fled to California, where the FBI arrested him and brought him 
to the Salt River tribal jail pending trial.165  But the federal district attorney 
declined to prosecute the case,166 so the tribe decided to prosecute Duro 
itself.167 Duro filed a habeas action challenging jurisdiction, and the Supreme 
Court held that the tribe had no criminal jurisdiction over him.
The Oliphant Court had relied heavily on federal laws providing 
federal jurisdiction over non-Indians committing crimes on Indian land to find 
a congressional belief that there was no tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians.  
The same federal laws supported the opposite conclusion with respect to 
nonmember Indians:  they referred to “Indians” generally, rather than to 
members of tribes,168 and failed to provide for comprehensive federal 
jurisdiction over crimes between Indians.   Despite its reliance on these laws 
in Oliphant, the majority held that laws regarding federal jurisdiction were not 
relevant to the question of tribal jurisdiction.169
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165 FERGUS M. BORDEWICH, KILLING THE WHITE MAN’S INDIAN:  REINVENTING NATIVE 
AMERICANS AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY at 94 (1996).
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 The tribe sought to prosecute Duro on a misdemeanor gun charge, hoping to collect more 
evidence on the murder charge to provide to the FBI. Id. at 95. 
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 495 U.S. at 702 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  Indeed, in U.S. v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567 (1846), 
the Court held that this term referred to the “race of Indians,” rather than tribal membership, 
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 The Court had previously held that these federal laws, while excluding state criminal 
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nonmember Indians.  495 U.S. at 687 (discussing Washington v. Confederated Tribes of 
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While the United States, as well as many tribes and tribal advocacy 
organizations filed briefs in support of tribal jurisdiction, no states or non-
Indian rights associations filed briefs in opposition.  This contrast with 
Oliphant might be explained by the lesser concern of states for their Indian 
residents, but is more probably the result of the jurisdictional alternatives to 
tribal jurisdiction.  The Major Crimes Act provides federal jurisdiction over 
all Indians committing crimes in Indian country, but only covers serious 
felonies such as murder and rape.170  And while the Indian Country Crimes 
Act provides broad federal jurisdiction over all crimes between Indians and 
non-Indians, it specifically excludes crimes between Indians from its 
coverage.171  This exclusion is believed to preempt state jurisdiction over such 
crimes.172  Tribal jurisdiction thus did not challenge existing state jurisdiction, 
and filled a practical and quite likely a legal jurisdictional void.  The Supreme 
Court, however, held that the potential for a jurisdictional void was irrelevant, 
a matter for Congress and not the courts.  
Although the Court declined to be moved by policy considerations 
with respect to the potential jurisdictional void, it is clear that other policy 
considerations affected its decision to deny jurisdiction.   First, while the 
Court held that tribes retained the jurisdiction over nonmembers necessary to 
“the maintenance of tribal integrity and self-determination,”173 Justice 
Kennedy’s majority opinion reflected a stereotypical sense of what self-
determination meant.  This retained sovereignty was that “needed to control 
their own internal relations, and to preserve their own unique customs and 
social order.”174  The modern realities of tribal communities, in which 
nonmember Indians like Albert Duro and his victim Biscuit Brown helped 
shape the texture of daily life, were excluded from this vision of tribal 
governments acting only to preserve unique customs untouched by time. 
The Court’s concerns about the justice dispensed by tribal 
governments complemented this limited view of tribal sovereignty.  While 
acknowledging that the federal government could constitutionally legislate 
however, depends on federal preemption and tribal interests, while the question of implicit 
divestiture, according to the Court, depends on federal assumptions.
170
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regarding Indians as a class, the Court emphasized that nonmember Indians 
were citizens, and, like non-Indians, were “embraced within our Nation's 
‘great solicitude that its citizens be protected . . . from unwarranted intrusions 
on their personal liberty.’175   The Court thus “hesitate[d] to single out  . . . 
nonmember Indians, for trial by political bodies that did not include them.”176
Tribes had additional powers over those who consented to membership, but 
their criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians was divested.
The dissent pointed out that neither consent nor a voice in government 
were required for jurisdiction other contexts; the United States and the 
individual states regularly exercised jurisdiction over citizens of other states 
and countries within their borders—the only “consent” necessary was the 
choice to break the laws while within their borders.177 In addition the dissent 
argued that tribal members were also citizens and were entitled to the same 
rights as nonmembers, and their consent to membership could not waive any 
constitutional protections to which they were entitled.178
Rather than point to a legal basis for making the distinction between 
members and nonmembers, the majority declared that the “special nature of 
the tribunals at issue” justified its focus on consent and citizenship.179 Tribal 
courts were “influenced by the unique customs, languages, and usages of the 
tribes they serve,”180 were often "subordinate to the political branches of tribal 
governments," and their legal methods sometimes depended on "unspoken 
practices and norms."181   It was also “significant that the Bill of Rights does 
not apply to Indian tribal governments” and that the guarantees of the Indian 
Civil Rights Act were “not equivalent to their constitutional counterparts.”182
While the Court cited Reid v. Covert for the proposition that the 
“constitutional limitations even on the ability of Congress to subject American 
citizens to criminal proceedings before a tribunal that does not provide 
175
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constitutional protections as a matter of right,”183 the Court did not cite any 
constitutional limitation on tribal court jurisdiction.184  Rather these allusions 
to the constitution went to the Court’s policy-based uneasiness with tribal 
power, rather than the legal basis of the decision itself.185
The Court confirmed that it did not see its opinion as having a 
constitutional basis by inviting Congress to overrule it.186  Congress 
responded with alacrity.187  In 1990, the same year the Court issued the 
decision, Congress acted to address what it described as an “emergency 
situation.”188 Although the legislation as enacted was to expire after one year 
183 Id. at 694 (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957)). 
184 Nor could it.  Reid held that the United States was still bound by the United 
States Constitution in trying Americans overseas, and that therefore it could 
not try the wives of service men overseas without providing rights to 
indictment by grand jury or trial by jury.  The Indian Civil Rights Act entitled 
Duro to the procedural protections he would have received in state court with 
the exception of provision of counsel by the tribe if he could not afford his 
own.  More important, the Reid holding and its legal basis applied only to the 
federal government.  Military tribunals exercise jurisdiction as arms of the 
federal government, and therefore are bound by all of the constitutional 
restrictions on its power. See US v Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 320-31 (1978). 
Other sovereigns, even when they exercise jurisdiction within the boundaries 
of the United States, are not bound by these restrictions absent an independent 
constitutional provision.  Thus even states, despite the incorporation of most 
of the Bill of Rights under the Fourteenth Amendment, are not bound by the 
grand jury requirement in indicting defendants for capital crimes.  See 
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).  Without overruling its decisions 
that tribes are not bound by the constitution and do not exercise criminal 
jurisdiction as arms of the federal government, the Court could not hold that 
Reid or its reasoning applied to tribal prosecutions.
185
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to provide more time to study the issue,189 the subsequent Congress made the 
legislation permanent.  Congress described the Duro opinion as “[r]eversing 
two hundred years of the exercise by tribes of criminal misdemeanor 
jurisdiction over all Indians residing on their reservations,” an exercise which 
“[t]hroughout the history of this country . . . Congress has never 
questioned.”190 This break with precedent had created a jurisdictional void, 
and tribal courts were the most appropriate fora to fill it.191
To address this void, Congress amended the Indian Civil Rights Act.  
As originally enacted, the Act had defined Indian tribes’ “powers of self-
government” as including “all governmental powers possessed by an Indian 
tribe” and its various branches.192  The so-called “Duro Fix” supplemented 
this definition by adding “and means the inherent power of Indian tribes, 
hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction over all 
Indians.”193  While circuit court judges have disagreed on the legal effect of 
this provision,194 and the Supreme Court is reviewing this conflict this term,195
it is clear that Congress firmly rejected the Court’s vision of tribal jurisdiction.
f. To the Present:  Strate, Hicks, and Atkinson
One might think that this Congressional rebuke would make the Court 
reevaluate whether its tribal jurisdiction opinions in fact reflect federal 
common law.  But after Duro the Court lost its strongest advocates for tribal 
sovereignty.  Justice Brennan retired in 1990 and was replaced by Justice 
Souter.  Justice Marshall, in ill health, retired in 1991 and was replaced by 
Justice Thomas.  Justice Blackmun retired in 1994 and was replaced by 
Justice Breyer.  While Justice White, who retired in 1993, was no friend to 
tribal sovereignty, his replacement, Justice Ginsburg is little better.
That Justice Thomas has continuously voted against tribal rights is not 
surprising; it is well in line with his pattern of favoring state rights and 
189
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disfavoring minority group rights. That the liberal wing of the Court has often 
joined him in cases involving nonmembers, and in particular that Justices 
Souter and Ginsburg have helped to lead it on the campaign to take away 
tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers, takes more explanation.
Part of the explanation may be that these new justices are simply not 
familiar with Indian law.  David Getches in analyzing the internal memoranda 
of the justices identified a sense that there was no coherent body of Indian 
law, leaving the field free for them to impose their policy preferences in 
decision-making.196  In particular, the justices appointed in the 1990s were not 
there during the making of the implicit divestiture cases, and may have 
believed that Oliphant did not emerge fully formed in 1978 but instead 
reflected longstanding principles of Indian law.  In addition, the opinions of 
Justices O’Connor, Breyer, and even Stevens have more recently taken the 
Court to task for not faithfully following its Indian law precedents,197
suggesting that they may have benefited from some on-the-job-training.198
But unfamiliarity with the law cannot be the only explanation; judges 
are charged with familiarizing themselves with unfamiliar laws.  Rather, I 
believe, the new members of the liberal wing of the Court have so easily 
joined the campaign against tribal jurisdiction precisely because, as for Justice 
Stevens, they are the liberal wing.   For them, tribal jurisdiction is subjection 
to an unfamiliar government, one with different rules, designed for a different 
culture, in which nonmembers have no voice and are at a disadvantage.   For 
the same reason, tribes are the bearers only of the same crabbed sort of 
sovereignty reflected in Justice Stevens’ Brendale opinion—a sovereignty that 
is to be protected when it affects tribal members alone, or allows tribes to 
protect a traditional, insular culture, but that does not adequately serve tribes 
when they act as modern, changing governments.
In this transformed Court, Justice O’Connor has been the most 
consistent vote for following existing Indian law precedent.   She has been a 
strong advocate, for example, for the unique canons of construction applicable 
196
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to Indian law cases,199 drafting the Court’s opinion in Minnesota v. Mille Lacs 
Band of Chippewa Indians200 in which the canons were deployed to protect 
off-reservation hunting and fishing rights, and dissenting from Justice 
Breyer’s opinion in Chickasaw Nation v. United States construing federal law 
to allow certain excise taxes on tribal gaming businesses on the grounds that 
the canons did not permit this construction.201  Having grown up on a ranch in 
Arizona, she is more familiar than most justices with Indian tribes.202 In 
addition, her tendency to rule with awareness of the effect of law on 
communities as well as individuals203 sometimes leads her to rule to protect 
tribal communities as well.   But even her protection of tribal communities has 
often been limited to tribal actions that fit a stereotypical idea of the tribe.  
Thus, while Mille Lacs upheld traditional hunting and fishing rights, Justice 
O’Connor joined Justice Stevens’ opinion arguing for tribal zoning 
jurisdiction only over the closed area of the Yakima Nation, and has not 
faithfully applied the canons of construction in reservation diminishment 
cases where she found that the areas in question had lost their “Indian 
character.”204
This transformed Court has been disastrous for questions of tribal 
jurisdiction over nonmembers.  In 1997 the first case concerning such 
jurisdiction came before the newly composed Court.205 Strate v. A-1 
Contractors involved a personal injury suit brought in tribal court by a non-
Indian woman against a non-Indian contractor arising from an accident on a 
highway running through the reservation of the Three Affiliated Tribes of 
North Dakota.  The plaintiff, Gisela Fredericks, was the widow of a tribal 
199
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member, the mother of several tribal members,206 and resided on the 
reservation.  The defendants, Lyle Stockert and his employer A-1 Contractors, 
were on the reservation pursuant to a building contract with the tribe.   The 
Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Ginsburg, held 
that the tribal court had no jurisdiction over the case. 
The opinion sweepingly declares, “Our case law establishes that, 
absent express authorization by federal statute or treaty, tribal jurisdiction 
over the conduct of nonmembers exists only in limited circumstances.”207
Although Iowa Mutual held that civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on 
reservations “presumptively lies in the tribal courts unless affirmatively 
limited by a specific treaty provision or federal statute,” the Court engaged in 
a tortured interpretation of the sentence, declaring it to mean no more than that 
where federal law had granted tribes power to regulate activities of 
nonmembers on reservations, tribal courts also had the power to adjudicate 
with respect to those activities.208
The Court did “’readily agree,’” as it had in Montana, “that tribes 
retain considerable control over nonmember conduct on tribal land.”209 But 
then the Court tore a gaping hole in previous understandings of what 
constituted tribal land.  Although the highway on which the accident occurred 
ran over tribal trust land, the tribe had granted the state a right of way for the 
highway pursuant to federal law,210 had received compensation for the grant, 
and had not maintained a “gatekeeping right” to prevent entry onto the 
road.211 Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, of course, concerned equivalent 
land.  There, the nonmember activities took place land leased from the tribe 
pursuant to federal law, and the tribe had received compensation and had not 
maintained a gatekeeping right over the leased land.212 But the Strate Court
concluded, without reference to Merrion, that this right of way rendered the 
stretch of state highway “equivalent, for nonmember governance purposes, to 
alienated, non-Indian land.”213
206 Id. at 443. Ms. Fredericks’ children had also sued the defendant for loss of consortium, but 
the tribal court did not appeal and the Court did not address the question of jurisdiction over 
that case.  Id. at 443 n.3.
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The Court did similar damage to what it called the Montana 
“exceptions.”214  Although the defendants had a contract with the tribe and 
were on the reservation carrying out this consensual relationship, the Court 
announced that there had to be a direct nexus between the particular 
consensual relationship and the activity for which tribal jurisdiction was 
sought.  As “Gisela Fredericks was not a party to the subcontract, and the 
Tribes were strangers to the accident” the case did not fit within the 
consensual relationship exception.215  Only, the Court suggested, a party to the 
consensual relationship litigating to enforce the terms of that relationship 
could do that. 
Nor did the situation come under the second exception, under which 
tribes retained inherent jurisdiction over conduct that “threatens or has some 
direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or 
welfare of the tribe.”216  The Court acknowledged that “[u]ndoubtedly, those 
who drive carelessly on a public highway running through a reservation 
endanger all in the vicinity, and surely jeopardize the safety of tribal 
members.”217  While this would seem to be enough to satisfy the Montana 
test, the Court held that it did not because “if Montana’s second exception 
requires no more, the exception would severely shrink the rule.”218 The Court 
needed the second Montana test to remain both an exception and a narrow 
one.  To accomplish this, the Court narrowed Montana’s second prong by 
holding that it implicitly incorporated language earlier in the Montana opinion 
that tribes had only such inherent jurisdiction as was necessary to “protect 
tribal self-government or to control internal relations.”219  Jurisdiction over the 
highway accident, it held, did not meet this test.220
In a footnote, the Court also casually undermined the exhaustion rule 
established by National Farmers and Iowa Mutual.  The Court declared that 
“[h]ereafter, when it is plain that no federal grant provides for tribal 
governance of nonmembers’ conduct on land covered by Montana’s main 
rule, it will be equally evident that tribal courts lack adjudicatory authority 
over disputes arising from such conduct,” and there would be no requirement 
to challenge tribal jurisdiction in tribal court before doing so in federal 
court.221 National Farmers, of course, concerned an accident on “land 
214 Id. at 456.
215 Id. at 457.
216
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covered by Montana’s main rule,” fee land owned by the state.   Again, the 
Court ignored this inconsistency.  In addition, by implying that it was 
pointless to have tribal courts consider whether the Montana exceptions were 
satisfied, the Court revealed what it was trying to do to the exceptions:  
narrow them out of existence.
None of these results were required by the Court’s prior opinions, and 
in many cases they did violence to them.  Why then did the Court take these 
steps?  The answer lies in the Court’s view that, “requiring A-1 and Stockert 
to defend against this commonplace state highway accident claim in an 
unfamiliar court is not crucial to ‘the political integrity, the economic security, 
or the health or welfare of the [Three Affiliated Tribes].’”222   Two related 
ideas are embedded in this clause.  First, non-Indians are at a disadvantage in 
“unfamiliar” tribal courts, and so should only rarely be called before them.  
The Court reinforced this idea by referring in a footnote to the rule that 
nonresident defendants may remove cases filed in state court to federal 
court.223  The second idea is that the need to exercise jurisdiction over the 
“commonplace” stuff of government is not properly a tribal matter.  To be 
protected, the opinion suggests, tribal interests cannot be commonplace, but 
must satisfy judicial notions of what is uniquely tribal.
In 2001, the Court further reshaped Indian law to deny tribes 
commonplace governmental powers in Shirley v. Atkinson Trading Post.224
The case concerned the power of the Navajo Nation to collect a hotel tax from 
non-Indian guests at a hotel owned by a non-Indian on fee land on the Navajo 
reservation.  As discussed above, the case law had suggested either that taxing 
jurisdiction would not be subject to the Montana test or that if it was, it would 
be found easily to meet the test.  The Court in Colville had already stated that 
“federal law to date has not worked a divestiture of Indian taxing power,”225
upholding taxes on non-Indians on trust land.  Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache 
222 Id. at 459 (quoting Montana at 566) (footnote omitted). 
223 Id. at 459 n.13 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1441).  Of course the result in Strate went beyond this 
removal option:  the Court did not grant A-1 the right of removal, but instead denied Gisela 
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altogether.  Nor do the two provisions stem from the same source: federal diversity 
jurisdiction is based on a Congressional statute explicitly providing for such jurisdiction; 
limitations on inherent tribal civil jurisdiction are founded on vague judicial ideas of tribal 
sovereignty that often conflict with congressional policy.  For more on the analogy to 
diversity jurisdiction, see Part I.g.
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40
Tribe226 had held that tribes retained the power to tax non-Indian activities on 
land from which they had no right to exclude as an extension of “the tribe's 
general authority, as sovereign, to control economic activity within its 
jurisdiction, and to defray the cost of providing governmental services . . .”227
Atkinson, however, dismissed this language as dicta.228  The Court 
stated that even with regard to taxing power, “we apply Montana straight 
up.''229  “Straight up,” for the Court, meant not only applying Montana, but 
applying it so narrowly that neither of the two Montana exceptions authorized 
the tribal tax.   Following Merrion, the Navajo Nation argued that by choosing 
to avail itself of “the advantages of a civilized society” and governmental 
services the tribe provided to businesses within its borders,230 on-reservation 
businesses entered into consensual relationships sufficient to justify tribal 
taxes.231 It pointed to evidence that the hotel benefited from police, emergency 
medical treatment, and fire protection.232  But the Court held that the 
consensual relationship must stem from "’commercial dealing, contracts, 
leases, or other arrangements,’ and a nonmember's actual or potential receipt 
of tribal police, fire, and medical services does not create the requisite 
connection.”233   Why not?  The answer is the same as that in Strate: “If it did, 
the exception would swallow the rule:  All non-Indian fee lands within a 
reservation benefit, to some extent, from the "advantages of a civilized 
society" offered by the Indian tribe.”234  The Court was apparently not 
troubled by the irony that to avoid swallowing the Montana rule as it saw it, it 
had cast aside the rule of Merrion that these same advantages justified broad 
tribal taxing power over non-Indians on tribal land.235
In the same term, in Nevada v. Hicks,236 the Court pushed the 
presumption against tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers even further, holding 
that even on tribally owned trust land, tribal courts did not have jurisdiction 
over a suit against state officials alleging that they had violated his rights in 
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searching his house.  The state pursued the case largely to get a declaration 
that state officials had official and qualified immunity in tribal courts.237  As 
in Montana and Brendale, however, the Court took the case as an opportunity 
to address wide-ranging issues of tribal inherent jurisdiction.  
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion followed the trend of minimizing 
tribal interests where they conflicted with the interests of nonmembers.  The 
Court focused on the harm to state interests should tribes be able to limit the 
execution of state process for crimes committed off the reservation.238  This 
discussion was wholly hypothetical.  State and tribal officials assumed that 
tribal approval was needed for states to execute warrants on tribal lands and 
had accommodated themselves accordingly.239  Indeed, in the Hicks case, this 
accommodation was a boon to the state:  after the tribal courts approved 
execution of the state warrant, tribal police assisted the state wardens in their 
search, and later provided evidence leading to the second warrant and 
search.240  Nor did the case law support a finding of state jurisdiction in such 
matters.  The Supreme Court had persistently disapproved of state jurisdiction 
over tribal members on reservations,241 and even with respect to off 
reservation crimes, the Eighth and Ninth Circuits had suggested that states 
were bound by the need to respect tribal governments in executing state 
criminal process on reservations.242
In the absence of contemporary case law or facts supporting state 
jurisdiction, the opinion relied on dicta taken out of context from opinions of 
the late nineteenth century.  First, the Court quoted language from Utah & 
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Northern Railroad Co. v. Fisher, an 1885 case holding that the territory could 
tax a non-Indian railroad company incorporated within the territory for its 
activities on land withdrawn from the reservation.  In Utah & Northern the 
Court stated that “[i]t has . . . been held that process of [state] courts may run 
into an Indian reservation of this kind, where the subject-matter or controversy 
is otherwise within their cognizance.”243  But it is plain that by this language 
the Court meant only state process against non-Indians on the land.  The Court 
had, a few years before, held that states had jurisdiction over crimes between 
non-Indians on reservations,244 but had consistently excluded state power over 
Indians.  Indeed, in language conveniently not quoted by Hicks, Utah & 
Northern acknowledged that full execution of territorial laws on the land 
“would undoubtedly interfere with the enforcement of the treaty provisions, 
and might thus defeat provisions designed for the security of the Indians.”  
The authority of the territory, therefore, only extended to “matters not 
interfering with that protection.”245
Hicks then quoted from U.S. v. Kagama, which, in holding that 
Congress had the power to subject certain crimes between Indians to federal 
jurisdiction, stated that the law “does not interfere with the process of the state 
courts within the reservation, nor with the operation of state laws upon white 
people found there. Its effect is confined to the acts of an Indian of some tribe, 
of a criminal character, committed within the limits of the reservation.”246  But 
the Hicks Court omitted the language that followed Kagama’s brief reference 
to state process.  In context, it is clear that the Kagama Court held that the law 
did not interfere with state process because states had absolutely no 
jurisdiction over the Indians there.  The Kagama Court stated that, “Because 
of the local ill feeling, the people of the states where they are found are often 
their deadliest enemies,” then cited Worcester v. Georgia247 for its holding 
that “the state could not, while they remained on [Indian] lands, extend its 
laws, criminal and civil, over the tribes; . . .the tribe was under [federal] 
protection, and could not be subjected to the laws of the state, and the process 
of its courts.”248 The Kagama opinion next cited Fellows v. Blacksmith,249 The 
Kansas Indians,250 and The New York Indians,251 as additional support for the 
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proposition that states had no power to enforce the law against Indians.252
What chutzpah to claim, as the Hicks Court did, that this testimonial to 
immunity of tribal members from state law “suggest[s] state authority to issue 
search warrants in cases such as the one before us.”253
On the basis of this ill-founded suggestion, the Court held not only that 
states could exercise process on reservations, but also that “tribal authority to 
regulate state officers in executing process related to the violation, off 
reservation, of state laws is not essential to tribal self-government or internal 
relations.”254  State interest was the only justification for this conclusion: “The 
State’s interest in execution of process is considerable, and even when it 
relates to Indian-fee lands it no more impairs the tribe’s self-government than 
federal enforcement of federal law impairs state government.”255  (The 
analogy was misplaced.  While the federal government may serve federal 
warrants in state boundaries, states have jurisdiction to hear actions 
challenging the conduct of such federal officials.  The analogous power, 
however, was denied tribal courts, without analysis of the impact on tribal 
self-government.) 
While the majority opinion, without explanation, interpreted tribal 
jurisdiction as dependent on the interest of non-tribal governments in freedom 
from tribal authority, it is unclear what its effect on Indian law will be.  
Although the Court held that tribal ownership of lands “is not alone enough to 
support regulatory jurisdiction over nonmembers” of the tribe, it agreed that it 
remains a factor in the analysis, and “may sometimes be a dispositive 
factor.”256  The Hicks majority opinion also emphasized that the “holding in 
this case is limited to the question of tribal court jurisdiction over state 
officers enforcing state law” and left “open the question of trial court 
jurisdiction over nonmember defendants in general,”257 acknowledging that 
actions by state officials unrelated to their law enforcement duties were 
“potentially subject to tribal control.”258  Justice Ginsburg, who joined the 
majority opinion, specially concurred to underscore this point.259
Justice Souter, joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas, concurred to 
urge the Court to go further still.  Justice Souter would hold that land status 
was not a “primary jurisdictional fact,” but was only relevant in determining 
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whether the nonmember conduct met one of the two Montana exceptions.260
Despite the fact that both Montana and Strate had “readily agree[d]” that 
tribes “retain considerable control over nonmember conduct on tribal land,”261
he would read these cases to establish a “rule that, at least as a presumptive 
matter, tribal courts lack civil jurisdiction over nonmembers.”262  He would 
hold that civil jurisdiction for on reservation activities “depends in the first 
instance on the character of the individual over whom jurisdiction is claimed, 
not on the title to the soil on which he acted.”263
It is plain that the perceived “special nature of [Indian] tribunals"264
motivated this reading of the case law.  While Souter acknowledged that the 
federal Indian Civil Rights Act imposed “a handful” of protections analogous 
to the Bill of Rights on Indian tribes (in fact the law imposes almost all of the 
Bill of Rights on tribes265), he cited the "definite trend by tribal courts" toward 
the view that they "ha[ve] leeway in interpreting the ICRA's due process and 
equal protection clauses and need not follow U.S. Supreme Court precedents 
jot-for-jot."266  He also was concerned that “tribal law is still frequently 
unwritten, being based instead ‘on the values, mores, and norms of a tribe and 
expressed in its customs, traditions and practices. . . .”267  The resulting law 
“would be unusually difficult for an outsider to sort out.”268  The rule he 
proposed was further confirmed by the “fact that ‘[t]ribal courts are often 
‘subordinate to the political branches of tribal government.’”269  For Souter, 
the “presumption against tribal-court civil jurisdiction” he advocated “squares 
with one of the principal policy considerations underlying Oliphant, namely, 
an overriding concern that citizens who are not tribal members be "protected... 
from unwarranted intrusions on their personal liberty."270
260 Id. at 375-76 (Souter, J., concurring).
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Justice O’Connor, joined by Justices Stevens and Breyer, concurred 
with an opinion that the majority recognized as “in large part a dissent.”271
Although Justice O’Connor concurred in the holding that Montana governed 
questions of tribal jurisdiction on tribal trust lands, she recognized that the 
Court’s opinions had not been consistent on this point.  She believed, 
however, that establishing this rule was necessary to obtain coherence in the 
Court’s jurisprudence.272  Given the contrary indications in the Court’s 
opinions, however, she took the Court to task for failing to acknowledge the 
significance of its holding.273
The rest of the majority opinion, she declared, was “unmoored from 
our precedents.”274  Nothing in the case law supported the majority’s casual 
decision that consensual relationships between governments, such as the joint 
activity with regard to the warrant, could not fit within the first Montana 
exception.275  The concurrence was even more damning with respect the 
majority’s treatment of the second exception.  The majority’s assertion that 
not all state law was barred from tribal land did “not mean the tribal interests 
are to be nullified through a per se rule.”276  If Montana was to “bring 
coherence to [the] case law,” moreover, land status had to be a “significant 
factor” in the analysis of tribal jurisdiction.277  Because state official action 
might involve significant tribal interests, Justice O’Connor would remand for 
determination as to whether the case satisfied the Montana factors, and 
whether the state officials were entitled to official or qualified immunity.278
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Breyer, also wrote separately to 
emphasize that the Court’s analysis of whether tribal courts had jurisdiction to 
adjudicate claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was “exactly backwards.”279  They 
would recognize the question of a tribal court’s jurisdiction as one of tribal 
law unless federal law dictated otherwise.280  With respect to Section 1983, 
Stevens saw “no more reason for treating the silence in § 1983 concerning 
tribal courts as an objection to tribal-court jurisdiction over such claims than 
there is for treating its silence concerning state courts as an objection to state-
court jurisdiction.”281
271 Id. at 370.
272
 Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 389 (O’Connor, J. concurring).
273 Id.
274 Id. at 387. 
275 Id. at 392.
276 Id. at 395. 
277 Id.
278 Id. at 401. 
279
 533 U.S., 353, 402 (Stevens J., concurring).
280 Id. at 403.
281 Id. at 404. 
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g.The Actual State of Things282
What is the law now with respect to tribal jurisdiction?  Is the game 
up?  Far from it.  First, despite judicial inroads on tribal jurisdiction where 
non-Indians are defendants, well-settled case law establishes that for many 
litigants, tribal court is the only option.  Lawsuits arising on a reservation in 
which the defendant is a tribal member can only be heard in tribal fora.283
Even where the cause of action arises off reservation, actions against tribes 
themselves must also be brought in tribal courts absent a waiver of tribal 
sovereign immunity.284  Despite the actions of the Supreme Court, therefore, 
the number of cases in which non-member litigants appear in tribal courts will 
only increase as tribes and their members become increasingly involving in 
commercial and other relationships with nonmembers.
Even where defendants or subjects of tribal jurisdiction are 
nonmembers, relatively little is clear.  Hicks established that ownership of 
land did not automatically provide for civil jurisdiction over nonmembers, but 
gave little guidance on how questions of jurisdiction over activities on trust 
land will be decided.  The Court’s decisions acknowledging inherent tribal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians on trust land,285 as well as its suggestions that 
federal treaties and laws setting aside land for tribes might constitute a federal 
grant of jurisdiction,286 would seem to create a wide arena of protected 
jurisdiction.  
Even on non-Indian owned land, tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers 
will be protected when the dispute arises from a consensual relationship with a 
tribe or its members, or where jurisdiction is necessary to protect the right of 
tribes and their members to “self-government.”287  What self-government 
282
 This is Justice Marshall’s phrase from Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 533 (1932) 
calling on the Court to focus on practice on the ground as well as the pure expression of 
judicial statements.
283 See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959). 
284 See Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. 523 U.S. 751 (1998).
285 Strate and Montana acknowledged tribal jurisdiction to regulate non-Indian hunting and 
fishing on this land, Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 454 (1997); U.S. v. Montana, 
450 U.S. 544, 557 (1981), a majority in Brendale recognized tribal zoning jurisdiction on trust 
and certain fee land, Brendale v. Confederated Tribes of the Yakima Nation, 492 U.S. 408, 
445 (1989) (Stevens, J. concurring in part and announcing the opinion in part); 492 U.S. at 
449 (Blackmun, J. dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment in part), and Merrion and 
Colville both recognized tribal taxing jurisdiction on trust land. Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache 
Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian 
Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
286
 U.S. v. Montana, 450 U.S. 544, 558-59 (1981).
287 See Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 359 & n.3 (2001).
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means in this context remains relatively open.  The Supreme Court has 
decided questions regarding nonmember jurisdiction on an incremental, case-
by-case basis, and has established few firm rules.  Rather, it has acted in 
accordance with its assumptions about what tribal court adjudication of 
nonmembers means both for those considered outsiders and those considered 
insiders to the tribes.   The answer in both cases is the same:  nothing good.  
Nonmembers will find themselves at a disadvantage, and tribes will not 
appreciably gain in self-government by the exercise.  The remainder of this 
Article examines these assumptions both empirically and theoretically.
II. The Experience of Outsiders in the Navajo Nation Appellate Courts
The empirical part of this project examines decisions involving 
outsiders in the Navajo Nation appellate court.  In my examination, I find that 
the court is surprisingly balanced in hearing the rights of outsiders, even areas 
that might appear particularly prone to bias. 
a.  The Navajo Nation Court System
I chose the Navajo court system for several reasons.  First, it is the 
court system I am most familiar with.  Having worked for three years as a 
lawyer on the Navajo Nation, I have litigated many cases in the tribal court 
system, know many of the actors, and have a better, although still limited, 
sense of the texture of life on the Navajo Nation than I do of most other Indian 
nations.  
Second, the materials necessary for the survey are both accessible and 
sufficiently voluminous to examine.  All of the Navajo Nation’s appellate 
court opinions from 1969 to the present are now on-line.288  While several 
other tribal courts also have opinions on line or in printed form, the Navajo 
Nation publishes virtually all of its non-summary opinions, limiting the 
problem of judicial selection biases.  There are over five hundred of these 
opinions, providing a broad enough sample to show valid patterns.  
Third, the experience of nonmembers on the Navajo Nation is 
disproportionately important in evaluating the experience of nonmembers in 
tribal legal systems generally.  With 13% of the total Indian population in the 
United States and about one-third of the total land base over which any tribe 
may exercise jurisdiction, the Navajo legal system potentially has jurisdiction 
over a significant proportion of disputes regarding nonmembers arising on 
reservations.  Not surprisingly, therefore, the Navajo Nation figures 
288
 The decisions are available on www.versuslaw.com. 
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prominently in the debates and litigation concerning jurisdiction and non-
members.  Several of the Supreme Court’s most important jurisdictional 
cases—Williams v. Lee,289 Warren Trading Post v. Arizona Tax 
Commission,290 McClahahan v. Arizona,291 U.S. v. Wheeler,292 Kerr-McGee,293
and Atkinson Trading Post v. Shirley294—have arisen on the Navajo Nation, 
and the Nation is an important voice in current discussions on the subject.
There are, of course, disadvantages in focusing on the Navajo Nation, 
as there would be in focusing on any single tribe.   The United States 
recognizes 562 Indian tribes.295  While some tribes, such as the various Sioux 
tribes of the Dakotas, reflect federal divisions of single tribes,296 most have 
different indigenous languages and cultures.  Tribes also have vastly different 
physical and social circumstances.  While the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma, 
the most populous tribe, has over 300,000 members297 most tribes have fewer 
than 1,000 members and many have fewer than 100.   Their land bases also 
differ widely.  While the Navajo Nation is the approximate size of the State of 
West Virginia or the Country of Ireland, and several other reservations are the 
approximate size of my state, Connecticut, other reservations encompass only 
a few hundred acres.  In addition, 226 of the 562 tribes recognized by the 
United States are Alaska Native Villages,298 whose land is not considered 
“Indian country.”299  Generalizations are therefore dangerous.  
The Supreme Court, however, has created general tests for tribal 
jurisdiction.  While it has left open the possibility that individual treaties and 
laws may create different rules, in practice it has given short shrift to legal or 
factual differences between tribes.  The failure of one tribe, particularly one of 
the size and significance of the Navajo Nation, to conform to its judicial 
assumptions should make the Court more cautious in assuming a policy-
making role with respect to tribal jurisdiction.
289
 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
290
 380 U.S. 685 (1965).
291
 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
292 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
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 471 U.S. 495 (1985).
294
 532 U.S. 645 (2001). 
295 Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible To Receive Services From the United States 
Bureau of Indian Affairs, 67 Fed. Reg. 46328-01 (July 12, 2000).  The term “tribe” is 
inappropriate for the 226 Alaskan Native Entities, which prefer the term Native Village, and 
is rejected by some other groups on the list, which prefer the term “nation.”  As a generic 
term, however, I generally use the term tribe for the sake of clarity and simplicity. 
296 See 1982 COHEN, supra note 92 at 6.
297
 U.S. Census, Top 25 American Indian Tribes for the United States:  1990 and 1980 (1995)
298
 These villages reject the term “tribe” as appropriate to them, and reject the term Indian in 
favor of “Alaskan Native.” 
299
 Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie, 522 U.S. 520 (1998).
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In addition, all tribes struggle with the problem of establishing 
legitimate and just governmental systems in the face of a history of American 
colonialism.  A close study of the challenges this poses to one tribal legal 
system is therefore meaningful both for other tribes and for judges and policy 
makers considering tribal jurisdiction.
The Navajo Nation, moreover, is a paradigmatic example of the kind 
of tribal court system the Court is concerned about. While students of tribal 
courts often look to the Navajo Nation Supreme Court as a model, in some 
ways it seems a breeding ground for the horror stories about tribal court 
systems.  All of the judges, at both the trial and Supreme Court levels, are 
Navajo.300  One of the qualifications for judicial service is fluency in the 
Navajo language,301 effectively ensuring that judges will be drawn from the 
more traditional portion of the population.  A J.D., however, is not a 
requirement for judgeship,302 and only a minority of Supreme Court justices, 
and even fewer trial court judges, have been law school graduates.303
The court has also pioneered one of the bugaboos of those opposing 
tribal court jurisdiction over outsiders, the incorporation of tribal customary or 
common law in dispute resolution.304  Navajo customary or common law is 
“comprised of customs and long-used ways of doing things”305 that gain the 
status of law, like the Anglo common law catalogued by Blackstone.306 Since 
the judicial reforms of 1959, the Navajo Code has provided for use of Navajo 
customary law in legal proceedings,307 and judicial opinions have discussed 
300
 7 N.N.C. § 354(a).
301
 7 N.N.C. § 354(e).
302
 7 N.N.C. § 354(c) (applicants must have minimum of high school education).  Applicants 
must also have a minimum of two years experience in a law related area. 7 N.N.C. § 354(d).
303
 In 2002 three out of eighteen Navajo court judges were law school graduates.  Testimony 
of Robert Yazzie, Hearing Before the Committee on Indian Affairs, S. Hrg. 107-338, 107th
Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 27, 2002). One of the most influential and successful courts (that of 
Justices Tom Tso, Homer Bluehouse, and Raymond Austin) had only one law school 
graduate.  See Jim Maniaci, Panel Extend’s Justice’s Probation; King-Ben Gets Year to Get 
Better, GALLUP INDEPENDENT (July 3, 2003). 
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 For a fine and nuanced article on the tribal common law movement, see Christine Zuni 
Cruz, Tribal Law as Indigenous Social Reality and Separate Consciousness—
[Re]Incorporating Customs and Traditions into Tribal Law, TRIBAL LAW JOURNAL.
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 Tom Tso, The Process of Decision Making in Tribal Courts, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 225, 230 
(1989). 
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 Estate of Belone (Dawes v. Yazzie), No. A-CV-01-85 (Navajo 07/10/1987).
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 7 N.T.C. § 204 (1959) provided that: 
(a) In all civil cases the Court of the Navajo Tribe shall apply any laws of 
the United States that may be applicable, any authorized regulations of the 
Interior Department, and any ordinance or customs of the Tribe, not 
prohibited by such Federal laws.
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custom since the Navajo Nation began publishing opinions in 1969.308  In the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, the justices of the Navajo Nation began to place 
new emphasis on Navajo common law, applying it beyond the domestic 
relations arena in which its use had always been sanctioned, to questions of 
judicial review,309 personal injury lawsuits,310 and restrictions on freedom of 
speech.311  Today common law is the “law of preference” in the Navajo 
courts.312  The tribal common law movement is, at some level, a rejection of 
Anglo-American standards as the best or most appropriate way to resolve 
disputes arising on reservations, and the use of such customary law helps to 
undergird the sense that tribal courts are unfamiliar, foreign places, where 
those not part of the traditional culture will find themselves at a disadvantage.
313
One might also expect that because of the unique circumstances of the 
Navajo Nation, adjudication of the rights of nonmembers would play a 
relatively small role in Navajo law.  The Navajo reservation is the largest in 
the country.   Unlike the vast majority of reservations, very little of this land 
has been “allotted” or sold by the United States to non-Indian settlers.   While 
on heavily allotted reservations a substantial proportion and sometimes the 
vast majority of residents may be non-Indian, Navajos compose over 90% 
percent of the reservation population.314  Only 3.5% of the 145,843 people 
(b) Where any doubt arises as to the customs and usages of the Tribe, the 
court may request the advice of counselors familiar with these customs and 
usages.
(c) Any matters that are not covered by the traditional customs and usages 
of the Tribe, or by applicable Federal laws and regulations, shall be decided 
by the Court of the Navajo Tribe according to the laws of the state in which 
the matter in dispute may lie.
Ironically, this provision is in large part the product of federal influence—this language was 
taken essentially verbatim from the federal code of regulations for tribal courts. As part of the 
court reforms of 1985, the Navajo Nation reenacted this choice of law provision and modified 
it to make clear that it applied in all cases, not simply civil ones, and that in cases where 
Navajo and federal law was silent the court “may” not “shall” apply local state law. 7 N.N.C. 
§ 204.
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 In re Trust of Benally, 1 Nav. R. 10, 12 (Ct. App. 1969); see Daniel L. Lowery, 
Developing a Tribal Common Law Jurisprudence: The Navajo Experience, 1969-1992, 18 
AM. IND. L. REV. 379 (1993) (discussing development of common law in the Navajo courts).
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 Duro v. Reina, 494 U.S. 676, 693 (1990); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 384 (2001) 
(Souter, J. concurring).
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 1990 Census Population and Housing Characteristics of the Navajo Nation, Table NN04 
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51
living on the reservation are non-Indian, and only 6.5% are nonmember 
Indians.315 And although Native Americans in general are the most 
exogamous of American ethnic groups, a fairly small proportion of the on-
reservation Navajo population marries outside the tribe.  
Navajo custom and tradition also remain deeply embedded in daily 
life.  The appropriate way to introduce oneself, for example, is to give not 
only one’s name but the clans of both one’s mother, father, and grandparents, 
acknowledging not only one’s individuality, but one’s traditional heritage and 
relationships.316  While ensuring the vitality of the Navajo language among 
younger members is a concern for the tribe, as it is for most tribes with living 
languages, as of 1990 Navajo was spoken at home by 142,886 members of the 
Navajo Nation,317 and it is still the only language of many Navajo elders.  
The Navajo Nation is almost unique in its degree of independence 
from non-Navajo society.  Interactions with outsiders might seem to compose 
little of the work of the courts, and to be relatively unimportant to Navajo self-
government.  The Navajo Nation thus provides an excellent opportunity to test
the accuracy of the Supreme Court’s vision of tribes as largely isolated from 
nonmembers and dedicated to preserving customs and culture unrelated to the 
outside world.
b.  Focus on Appellate Decisions
Written appellate decisions, of course, are not necessarily 
representative of disputes in a particular society.  Individuals transform only a 
small fraction of disputes into articulated grievances and a smaller fraction of 
those into legal actions; an even smaller fraction of those result in litigated 
legal decisions and a yet smaller fraction result in appellate decisions.318
Although there is an intuitive sense that reported decisions reflect the 
315 Id.
316 See, e.g., Claudeen Bates-Arthur, The Role of the Tribal Attorney, 34 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 21, 21 
(2002).  In beginning her remarks, Bates-Arthur provided her clan (which is her mother’s 
clan), and the clans of her father and her grandparents, saying, “That is who I really am.” Id.
The importance of these traditional ties is also reflected in the saying to condemn the behavior 
of an individual, “He acts like he has no relatives.” Arizona Public Service Co. v. Office of 
Navajo Labor Relations, No. A-CV-08-87 (Navajo 10/08/1990).
317
 U.S. Census, Characteristics of American Indians by Tribe and Language, Table 18: 
American Indian Languages Spoken at Home by American Indian Households, By Age and 
Sex (1994).
318 See Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don’t Know 
(and Think We Know) About Out Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 U.C.L.A. L. 
REV. 4, 11-36 (1983) (discussing the “dispute pyramid” of grievances to litigation).
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underlying activity in society, the relationship between activity, litigation, and 
decisions is not so direct.319  Not all injuries are sensed as wrongs, and even 
fewer as legal wrongs.  Disputes litigated to decision are more likely than 
others to involve “hard cases,” those in which both parties predict relatively 
equal chances of success.320  In addition, as discussed further below, litigation 
disproportionately reflects situations in which there is no common agreement 
on the way disputes should be resolved, or in which the parties do not have 
common social ground, resulting in a turn to formal legal institutions for
resolution.321
This lack of representativeness, however, is not a significant problem 
for the study.  While many disputes do not even come before the courts, it is 
tribal formal legal institutions that have come under the scrutiny and criticism 
of the United States Supreme Court.  More important, it is perhaps more 
relevant in determining the relative bias of the courts to see what they do in 
adjudicating hard cases rather than easy ones.   The indirect relationship 
between disputes and litigated claims, moreover, only increases the likelihood 
that disputes that are litigated reflect the friction points in society, the areas in 
which parties feel themselves particularly aggrieved and need to turn to a 
hopefully objective third party for resolution.  
In addition, to the extent one can tell from the published trial court 
decisions and discussions of the decisions below in the appellate court 
decisions, the primary differences between trial and appellate level decisions 
are not the extent of bias against nonmembers.  While in some instances 
319 See William A. Felstiner, Richard L. Abel & Austin Sarat, The Emergence and 
Transformation of Disputes: Naming, Blaming, Claiming . . ., 15 L. & SOC. REV. 631 (1980-
81) (discussing factors in transformation of disputes into litigation).  This is certainly true for 
the Navajo court system.  Although 70,338 cases were filed in the Navajo courts in the 2001-
2002 fiscal year, only 65 cases were filed in the Navajo Supreme Court, and the court issued 
only 14 published decisions.
320
 The seminal article articulating this theory is George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The 
Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEG. STUDIES 1 (1984).
321 See Part IV(a) below; see also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, THE LEGAL SYSTEM:  A SOCIAL 
SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE at 144 (1975); David M. Engel, The Oven Bird’s Song: Insiders, 
Outsiders, and Personal Injuries in an American Community, 18 L. & SOCIETY REV. 551 
(1987), reprinted in THE LAW & SOCIETY READER 13 (Richard L. Abel ed. 1995) (plaintiffs in 
personal injury lawsuits were outsiders to rural Illinois community; insiders either chose not 
to litigate or were able to quickly settle their disputes); Sally Engle Merry, Going to Court: 
Strategies of Dispute Management in an American Urban Neighborhood, 13 LAW & SOCIETY 
REVIEW 891 (1979), reprinted in THE LAW & SOCIETY READER 36 (Richard L. Abel ed. 
1995) (reliance on court in urban housing project occupied by different ethnic groups with 
little social common ground).
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decisions against nonmembers below seem to clearly violate the law,322 the 
differences between the trial and appellate courts appear to reflect different 
visions of the role of the court rather than greater or lesser bias against 
nonmembers.  Thus while the appellate court has reversed decisions that the 
Navajo courts lacked jurisdiction over claims against non-Indians, these 
decisions appear motivated by the belief that the court has and should have 
broad jurisdiction over all actions arising on the reservation rather than bias 
against the nonmember.323 Similarly, the appellate court appears to have a 
greater preference for the application of Navajo common law, and has 
reversed decisions in favor of non-Indians where it held that state law rather 
than common law inappropriately formed the rule of decision.324
c.  Who Wins When Nonmembers Go Before the Courts?
Since 1971, the Navajo appellate courts have issued 513 written 
opinions.  Each of these was reviewed to determine which involved parties 
that could be identified as involving nonmembers of the tribe, whether 
because the opinion identifies them as such, because of the names of the 
parties, because of knowledge of the parties, or because of the status and 
location of the parties.325  Where the identity of the litigant could not be 
determined to a reasonable degree of certainty, the case was assumed to 
involve only Navajos.
Through this method, 109 cases involving non-Navajo litigants were 
identified.   Nine of these cases involve Indians that are not members of the 
Navajo tribe, and the rest, 91.7% of the total, involve non-Indians.  The cases 
were read and categorized as to who won or lost the case and the subject 
matter of the case.   The cases run the gamut in subject matter: they include 
322
 See, for example, Deal v. Blatchford, 3 Nav. R. 159 (1982), in which the appellate court 
reversed the trial court for granting punitive damages of $250 and compensatory damages 
against a non-Indian found liable for a car accident without evidence that the act was willful 
or malicious or evidence of the financial damages other than the plaintiffs’ testimony.  (The 
decision as to liability seems straightforward—the non-Indian hit the plaintiff’s car with her 
motorcycle while the plaintiff was stopped at a red light.)
323 See, e.g., In re Custody of S.R.T., 6 Nav. R. 407 (S. Ct. 1991) (reversing dismissal of 
custody case for lack of jurisdiction and remanding for more facts).
324 See, e.g., Nez v. Peabody Western Coal, Inc., 7 Nav. R. 416 (S. Ct. 1999).
325
 In doing this, I assumed that litigants with common Navajo names such as Kee, Yazzie, or 
Begay were Navajo absent other evidence to the contrary and that off-reservation businesses 
such as Babbitt Ford were non-Indian.  In more difficult cases, I did research regarding the 
party before determining whether they were Navajo or not.  So, for example, where Edker 
Wilson, a provider of livestock for rodeos was sued for injuries caused by one of his bulls at 
the Northern Navajo Fair, see Wilson v. Begay, 6 Nav. R. 1 (S. Ct. 1988) I found an article 
profiling him before categorizing him as non-Indian. 
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cases regarding contracts, torts, child custody, employment law, practice of 
law, trusts and estates, and taxation.   The majority of cases involve non-
Indian companies, whether as employers, vendors, alleged tortfeasors, 
taxpayers, or insurers.  
Out of these cases, in 16 neither party won or the results were too 
mixed to say one party won or lost,326 in four non-Navajos were on both sides, 
and in three non-Navajos and Navajos were on the same side.   The remaining 
86 cases were perfectly equally divided:  in 43 the non-Navajo party won, and 
in 43 the non-Navajo party lost.  This radical equality would almost suggest 
that it is intentional,327 except that the evenness of the decisions is only 
apparent when the results are aggregated.  In no five-year period except one 
are the win and loss rates the same.  But over the 32-year period the numbers 
of wins and losses become equal.  The results are shown in Table I. 
Table I: Win-Loss Rates of Non-Members
1971-
81
1981-
87
1987-
92
1992-
97
1997-
2003
Total
Nonmember wins 13 11 6 7 6 43
Nonmember loses 9 6 13 7 8 43
No party won or lost 
or results 
substantially mixed
3 7 3 1 2 16
Nonmembers on 
both sides
1 3 4
Nonmember and 
Navajo on same side
1 1 1 3
326
 These included, for example, cases in which the decision simply reported that the matter 
had been dismissed by stipulation of the parties, cases responding to requests for opinions on 
certified questions, and cases in which the Supreme Court simply certified the presentation of 
candidates for admission to the bar.  They also, however, included a few substantive cases 
such as Manygoats v. Cameron Trading Post, No. SC-CV-50-98 (Navajo 01/14/2000), in 
which the court affirmed that the tribe had jurisdiction over a non-Indian employer and that 
the employer had failed to create an atmosphere free from harassment, but reversed the 
damages, civil penalty, and the award of attorney fees because it agreed with the employer 
that requiring it to prove substantial justification for firing the employee by clear and 
convincing evidence violated due process and that the civil penalty was improper for lack of 
notice in the complaint. 
327
 It is widely believed, for example, that the Bureau of Indian Affairs Branch of 
Acknowledgement and Research strives for numerical equality because the numbers of tribes 
whose recognition is approved always equals those whose recognition is disapproved.  This 
kind of balance is plainly easier to achieve for the BIA, which has decided only about 25 
petitions in the same period in which the Navajo Supreme Court has decided 513. 
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Total cases 
involving 
nonmembers
25 24 24 16 20 109
This kind of equality is evident across various kinds of cases. Whether 
the issue is child custody, torts, contracts, or employment, Navajo litigants 
win some, and non-Navajo litigants win some.  This is true whether the court 
is deciding on procedural or substantive grounds, whether the decision affirms 
or reverses the district court, even whether the opposing party is the Navajo 
Nation or not.
According to an influential theory developed by George Priest and 
Benjamin Klein, this 50-50 win-loss rate is what one would expect from 
litigated decisions.328 Assuming that parties have relatively accurate 
information regarding their chances of success, they will settle cases in which 
they agree that one party is significantly more likely to win.  It is only where 
the likely outcome is subject to a large degree of uncertainty, where each party 
appears to have a relatively equal ability to win, that parties will go to trial.  
Other factors being equal,329 therefore, one would expect the results to 
approach a 50-50 win-loss rate for any set of parties.  
But where judges are influenced by legally irrelevant factors such as 
bias against a particular kind of party or claim, it skews the results.  Parties 
that make an accurate assessment of the law and facts in their favor will 
nevertheless lose disproportionate numbers of cases.  While Priest & Klein 
predicted that parties would adjust their litigation decisions to account for this 
bias, thus maintaining the 50-50 win-loss rate, subsequent studies do not 
confirm their thesis.330  Parties appear to continue to rely on their assessment 
that the law and facts are in their favor, and only very slowly, if at all, 
effectively strategize to avoid a court biased against them. 
328
  George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEG. 
STUDIES 1, 51-52 (1984).  
329
 Differing stakes between the parties, for example, will shift their interest in litigation, and 
therefore may shift the proportion of cases won by any party.  Priest & Klein. Repeat players 
in litigation systems, moreover, should have greater flexibility in choosing not to litigate cases 
in which the facts may lead to negative outcomes, and therefore may be expect to win a 
greater proportion of cases litigated.  Marc Galanter, Why the Haves Come Out Ahead: 
Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974).
330 See, e.g., Vicki Schultz & Stephen Petterson, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1073 (1992) (plaintiffs 
disproportionately losing employment discrimination cases in which defendants alleged a lack 
of interest defense); James Henderson & Theodore Eisenberg, The Quiet Revolution in 
Products Liability: An Empirical Study of Legal Change, 37 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 479 (1990) 
(plaintiffs disproportionate loss of products liability cases). 
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Indian law cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court provide a nice 
example of this.  David Getches has calculated the win-loss rate of tribes in 
Indian law cases decided by the United States Supreme Court.  He found that 
while the win-loss rates in the Burger Court were relatively balanced, in 
Indian law cases decided by the Rehnquist court (those since 1986) tribal 
interests lose 77% of the time.  It is only now, after almost twenty years of this 
clear, extremely high profile trend, that tribes are actively seeking to avoid the 
United States Supreme Court, and still find themselves often unable to do so 
as opposing parties refuse to settle.331  Bias in lower level courts should be 
even more difficult to detect and address through litigation behavior.  
To summarize, the Navajo appellate courts are as likely to rule in favor 
of nonmembers as they are to rule in favor of members.  This figure suggests 
that parties are able to make a relatively accurate assessment of their chances 
of winning before the court, and that legally irrelevant factors do not 
significantly influence the court’s decisions in ways that disadvantage 
nonmembers.  Indeed, a non-Navajo going before the Navajo Supreme Court 
can be much more confident of winning than can a tribe going before the 
highest court in the land.  While not conclusive as to the “fairness” of the 
courts, these statistics should at least provide some reassurance to those 
concerned about bias.
d.  Closer Analysis of Cases Vulnerable to Bias
Closer reading of the cases supplements the suggestion that the court is 
acting in a relatively balanced manner.  While not everyone would agree with 
the reasoning or method of the court in every case (indeed almost by 
definition each decision will disappoint a litigant who thought that he or she 
should win) the cases appear uniformly governed by thoughtful attempts to 
determine the relevant law, policies, and facts.  There are some decisions in 
which the court reaches questionable legal results, but the source of the errors 
does not appear to be bias against the parties, nor do the errors
disproportionately disadvantage nonmembers.  While I do discuss one 
troubling custody case below, it appears that the basis of decision was Anglo 
common law.   In other cases, the status of the litigant appears to have made 
the court particularly careful to ensure fairness.332
331
 There were, for example, significant, but unsuccessful, efforts to settle both Nevada v. 
Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 384 (2001) and U.S. v. Navajo Nation, 123 S. Ct. 1079 (2003).
332 In re Practice of Battles, 3 Nav. R. 92 (S. Ct. 1982), for example, considered a challenge 
made by William Battles to a new rule that required membership in a state bar for non-
Navajos seeking to practice in the Navajo courts.  (The rule is intended to ensure that the 
courts will benefit from Navajo practitioners that either are educated in Navajo legal traditions 
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To supplement the data, I will now discuss the decisions of the court in 
three areas in which one might expect that decisions would be tainted by the 
biases or unfamiliarity of the courts:  decisions involving Navajo common 
law, decisions involving commercial relations, and custody disputes involving 
custody of children with Navajo heritage.
1.  Non-member Decisions Involving Navajo Common Law
The Supreme Court has repeatedly cited the use of indigenous 
common law as a justification for denying tribal courts jurisdiction over 
nonmembers.  It might also seem that such concepts would be relevant only to 
disputes that closely resemble those the tribe engaged in pre-contact.333  An 
examination of the use of one prominent Navajo common law concept, that of 
nalyeeh, debunks the notion that indigenous common law need not and cannot 
be fairly applied to contemporary disputes involving non-Indians.  Indeed, in 
this example, the use of common law adds to the fairness of the courts by 
or can compliment their lack of knowledge of such traditions with knowledge of Anglo law 
and a legal education that enables them to familiarize themselves with unfamiliar laws.)  
Battles had practiced in the Navajo courts for several years and had passed the newly instated 
Navajo bar exam two years before the rule was promulgated.  When Battles sought to 
represent an individual challenging an extradition agreement between the Navajo Nation and 
the State of Arizona, however, the Navajo prosecutor sought to disqualify him based on his 
ineligibility to practice under the rule.
In the words of the court, “Mr. Battles is a rather controversial figure. He passed the first bar 
examination administered by the Navajo Courts, along with 79 other individuals. . . . The 
following year Battles filed a $12.2 million lawsuit in our courts against Raymond Tso, the 
prosecutor in this case. . . Later participation in controversial suits, proceedings and disputes 
has made Battles a figure disliked by some, but neither the decisions of the District Court nor 
this court are based upon Mr. Battles' notoriety.” The court held that Battles long practice in 
the Navajo Nation courts gave him an equitable right to continue to practice there despite the 
new rule.  (During my time on the Navajo Nation over a decade later, Mr. Battles continued to 
prosecute in the Navajo courts, and was even a Domestic Violence Commissioner in the court 
system.  He was also a presenter in the mandatory course on Navajo Common Law for new 
bar members, where he regaled students with stories of his 12.2 million dollar lawsuit against 
the Navajo Nation.) 
333
 Some tribes deliberately segregate the use of indigenous justice ways to more “traditional” 
disputes.  The Mohegan Tribe, for example, has two court systems, a Gaming Disputes Court 
that hears cases arising from its successful casino and whose procedural and substantively law 
closely mirror state and federal law, and a Mohegan Tribal Court, which hears disputes 
concerning tribal members and which has more freedom to apply Mohegan common law. 
MTC.  The Navajo Nation does something similar with its Peacemaker Court, which hears 
primarily family disputes and whose procedures, hearkening to traditional dispute resolution 
methods, involve an attempt to obtain consensus through talking through of the problem with 
the mediation of an elder.  NTC.
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creating legal guarantees of justice in situations in which tribal codes have not 
yet created them.
Nalyeeh is the traditional concept of making restitution for wrongs.334
The concept includes not only the payment itself, but the proper process for 
negotiating and making payment.335  The focus is distinctly equitable:336 the 
concern is not with the amount of damages, but on what kind and manner of 
restitution is “fair,” so as to “fix the victim’s mind.”337   Although the concept 
has long been part of traditional law practice on the Navajo Nation,338 nalyeeh
apparently first appeared in a written opinion in 1986.339  The case involved a 
wrongful death action against the Navajo Nation by the mother of a Navajo 
child who died after being hit by a truck driven by a tribal employee.340  The 
Navajo Nation argued that that under Anglo common law there was no action 
for the negligent death of a human being, so the right to bring such an action 
must be provided by statute.341  Although most states have enacted wrongful 
death statutes, the Navajo Nation had not.  But the district court held that the 
common law concept of nalyeeh, under which Navajos could seek 
compensation for the death of a relative, allowed the action to go forward.342
In addition, although traditionally nalyeeh damages were paid in livestock and 
goods, the court recognized that “[m]ore Navajos work for money today” and 
“[p]ayment in material goods is no longer adequate.”343
Since 1986, the Navajo courts have used nalyeeh to resolve a range of 
distinctly modern disputes, including election of remedies in worker’s 
compensation cases,344 “stacking” of uninsured motorist insurance 
coverage,345 and requests for prejudgment interest in tort cases.346   Seven out 
334
 Singer v. Nez, No. SC-CV-04-99 (Navajo 07/16/2001); Benally v. Navajo Nation, 5 Nav. 
R. 209 (W.R. Dist. Ct. 1986).
335
 Benalli v. First National Insurance Co. of America, 7 Nav. R. 329 (S. Ct. 1998).
336 See id. (comparing concept of nalyeeh to English concept of equity). 
337
 Benally v. Navajo Nation, 5 Nav. R. 209, 212 (Window Rock Ct. 1986).
338
 The efforts of parties and the Navajo police to resolve a rape case by negotiated 
compensation rather than imprisonment almost led to a rebellion by the Navajo people in the 
1890s, see text accompanying footnotes __ to __ below, and informants spoke of current use 
of resolution according to nalyeeh in the early 1970s.  DAN VICENTI, LEONARD B. JIMSON, 
STEPHEN CONN, M.J.L. KELLOGG, THE LAW OF THE PEOPLE: DINÉ BIBEE HAZ’ÁANII, A 
BICULTURAL APPROACH TO LEGAL EDUCATION FOR NAVAJO STUDENTS at 121, 159, 198 
(Ramah Navajo High School Press 1972).
339 Id.
340 Id. at 209.
341 Id. at 210.
342 Id. at 210.
343 Id. at 213. 
344
 Benally v. Broken Hill Property Ltd., No. SC-CV-79-98 (Navajo 09/21/2001).
345
 Benalli v. First National Insurance Co. of America, 7 Nav. R. 329 (S.Ct. 1998).
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of the eleven cases concerning nalyeeh now on -line involve non-Indians, 
mostly as defendants.  In three of the seven, the non-Indian party lost.  In 
Bennalli v. First National Insurance Co.,347 the court used the concept of 
nalyeeh as an aid in reading an insurance contract to find, against the 
arguments of the non-Indian insurance company, that the driver of a car 
insured in an accident with an uninsured motorist was entitled to stack the 
uninsured motorist coverage provided in the policies of each of the cars of the 
insured in order to receive full compensation for her injuries.  In Jensen v. 
Giant Industries, Arizona, Inc.,348 the court reversed a grant of summary 
judgment in favor of a non-Indian gas station chain that was sued after the 
plaintiff was injured by a third party in the parking lot of one of its stations.   
While Giant had argued successfully below that nalyeeh prohibited recovery 
from third parties, the court held that a single affidavit by a medicine man was 
not enough to establish a common law prohibition on such recovery.349  The 
court remanded for more evidence.
And in the controversial case of Nez v. Peabody Western Coal Co., 
Inc.,350 the court reversed a grant of summary judgment against a Navajo who 
sued a non-Indian company in tort after accepting worker’s compensation for 
his injuries.  Federal law provides that state worker compensation schemes 
apply to individuals working for private companies on federal lands,351 and 
has been interpreted to apply to private employers in Indian country as well.352
But while the Navajo Supreme Court agreed that this application of state law 
was authorized, the court held that, just as the worker’s compensation 
remedies of one state did not automatically deprive another state of 
jurisdiction over a common law tort based on the claims,353 it did not deprive 
346
 Singer v. Nez, No. SC-CV-04-99 (Navajo 07/16/2001).
347
 7 Nav. R. 329 (S.Ct. 1998).
348
 No. SC-CV-51-99 (Navajo 01/22/2002).
349
 In Jensen, the district court had granted summary judgment in the defendant’s favor in part 
because the plaintiff had not presented evidence to rebut the evidence of the medicine man.  
Id.  The court found that to accept such evidence as binding on the court, particularly without 
the court satisfying itself as to the expertise of the affiant, would contravene the proper role of 
evidence regarding Navajo common law as a guide rather than an adversarial tool which must 
be rebutted. Id.
350
 7 Nav. R. 416 (S.Ct. 1999).
351
 40 U.S.C. § 290.
352 See Begay v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 682 F.2d 1311 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that § 290 allows 
state workers' compensation laws to apply to employees of private employers on Indian 
reservations).
353
 Nez v. Western Peabody Coal at 419 citing Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955)) 
(holding that full faith and credit clause does not compel one state to enforce the exclusive 
remedy provision of another state's workers' compensation law) and Garcia v. American 
Airlines, Inc., 12 F.3d 308 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding that the forum state had jurisdiction over 
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the Navajo Nation of jurisdiction over claims for remedies that were 
“substantially different” than the worker’s compensation.354  Although the 
court vacated the dismissal and remanded to the lower court, it held that the 
Navajo law would bar the action if the plaintiff had waived the right to seek 
further recovery, the action was barred by collateral estoppel, or the action 
would unduly prejudice the defendant.355  The court also left open for the 
district court the question whether Navajo common law itself barred plaintiffs 
from seeking damages twice for the same injuries.356
While the decision created significant concern regarding potential 
impact on reservation employers,357 when the issue subsequently came before 
the court, it held that nalyeeh did not permit additional recovery.358  In Benally 
v. Big A Well Service Co.,359 the first such case, the court emphasized that 
nalyeeh had 
A deeper meaning of a demand to "make right" for an injury 
and an invitation to negotiate what it will take so that an 
injured party will have "no hard feelings." . . . In most 
an employee's common law tort suit even after the employee had received benefits under 
another state's workers' compensation program).
354 Id.at 420.
355 Id at 420-21.
356 Id. at 421.
357
 This concern was significant enough that the Navajo Nation Council, four months after the 
decision, enacted the following resolution:
1. The Navajo Nation Insurance Services Program Workers Compensation 
Program is directed to begin development of a comprehensive workers 
compensation statute to cover all employers operating within the territorial 
jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation.
2. Until such time as the Navajo Nation develops a comprehensive workers 
compensation law covering all employers within the jurisdiction of the 
Navajo Nation, the Navajo Nation Council recognizes existing workers 
compensation coverage, whether under a state statutory scheme or under 
Navajo statutory law to be the exclusive remedy for covered injuries to 
employees occurring in the work place.
The court rejected this apparent restriction on its institutional authority, holding that given the 
presumption against ex post facto deprivations of remedies in existing cases and as the 
resolution did not take the prescribed form legislative enactments, the resolution should be 
interpreted as a statement of policy rather than a rule to be applied to pending cases. In re 
Certified Question from the U.S. District Court for the Dist. of Arizona, No. SC-CV-49-2000 
(Navajo 07/18/2001); see Benally v. Big A Well Service Co., No. SC-CV-27-99 (Nav. 
8/28/2000).
358
 Benally v. Broken Hill Property Ltd., No. SC-CV-79-98 (Navajo 09/21/2001); Benally v. 
Big A Well Service, Co., No. SC-CV-27-99 (Navajo 08/28/2000). 
359
 No. SC-CV-27-99 (Nav. 8/28/2000).
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instances where an employee receives a workers' compensation 
award, the nalyeeh principle should be satisfied, because there 
is a method of determining the nature of the injury and the 
monetary needs of the worker. . . . [S]uch benefits may not be 
the same as an award in a personal injury action, but at the 
same time, workers have a prompt remedy, they do not have to 
face the defenses of contributory or fellow worker negligence, 
and costs in terms of money and time are minimal.360
In a subsequent case, the court elaborated on this reasoning, declaring that 
while nalyeeh was similar to Anglo-American concepts of compensation, 
Nalyeeh has an additional procedural aspect which addresses 
relationships. Nalyeeh does not simply require restitution or 
reparation, but calls upon the person who has caused an injury 
or is responsible for an injury to talk out both compensation 
and relationships. . . . It is not simply a legal equitable doctrine 
to be applied by a court as an impartial decision-maker, but a 
relationship value. . . . In the case before us, the district court 
chose to ignore the parties' contentions on the cause of the 
death and the amount of damages which resulted using a 
commonsense doctrine that it would be unfair for the 
appellants to choose one remedy, receive its benefits, and then 
seek another. . .
We have said that Navajo common law requires people 
to keep their word and honor their promises. . . . In this 
particular situation, the appellants' decedent went to work at a 
coal mine understanding that if he was injured, the mining 
company would pay for the injury under a workers' 
compensation program. The appellants sought and received 
death benefits under that program, and the company kept its 
word by paying them, as agreed. The wrongful death suit 
attempted to reject the agreement the parties reached and thus 
broke it. Accordingly, the district court was correct in 
dismissing the wrongful death suit on equitable principles as a 
matter of Navajo common law.361
360 Id.
361
 Benally v. Broken Hill Property Ltd., No. SC-CV-79-98 (Navajo 09/21/2001).
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Thus, Navajo common law, far from a trap for the unwary in tribal courts, 
became a tool to ensure comparable protections to those in state courts even in 
situations where tribal codes had not yet provided protection.   But by finding 
these guarantees in Navajo traditions, they become part of the general code of 
conduct appropriate for the Navajo people rather than foreign restrictions on 
action imposed because of a need to model non-Indian courts.
2.  Cases Arising from Business Relationships
The cases involving outsiders largely arise from business relationships, 
the most common situation in which non-Indians find themselves in Navajo 
courts.  Sixty out of the 109 cases involving non-Navajos, or approximately 
55% of the total cases, arise from employment, contract, and worker’s 
compensation disputes alone.  In most of these cases, non-Indians appear as 
powerful institutions, as employers, sellers, or lenders, while Navajos 
typically appear in their individual status.  The Navajo Nation has a 
significant interest in protecting its members from predatory practices by such 
institutions, and indeed has passed several laws, including a law prohibiting 
self-help repossession without judicial approval362 and the Navajo Preference 
in Employment Act,363 which prohibits termination of employees without just 
cause, in order to protect Navajo individuals in their business relationships.  
One might fear that this concern would result in bias against such institutions 
when they appear in court.  At least one litigant, the Atkinson Trading 
Company, current owner of the Cameron Trading Post, sought 
(unsuccessfully) to avoid exhausting a claim in tribal court by arguing that the 
court was biased against it.364
Review of the decisions regarding such cases reveals that the court is 
balanced in hearing cases against non-Indian businesses.  As reflected in the 
chart below, after subtracting cases in which non-Navajos were on both sides 
and there was no clear winner, non-Indian businesses won 29 of the cases and 
lost 23.  If the numbers are adjusted to reflect the two cases in which Hopi 
employees were involved in disputes with non-Indian businesses, both of 
which the Hopi litigants won, non-Indian businesses lost 25 of the cases.
Table II:  Disputes Arising from Commercial Relationships with Non-Indians
Non-Navajo 
Won
Non-Navajo 
Lost
Non-Navajos 
on both sides
Results mixed 
or no win or 
Total
362
 7 N.N.C. § 607.
363
 15 N.N.C. §§ 601-619.
364 See Atkinson Trading Company v. Shirley, 210 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 2000).  
63
loss
Contract-
consumer 
goods & 
services
12 9 1 1 23
Contract-with 
Navajo 
Nation
3 5 8
Contract-
other
1 2 3
Total 
Contract 
Cases
16 16 1 1 34
Employment 10 7/9365 4/2366 21
Worker’s 
compensation
3 1 1 5
Total 29 23/25 6/4 3 60
Even the Atkinson Trading Company seems to have gotten a fair 
shake.  While the court has twice rejected claims that it has no inherent 
jurisdiction over the company,367 in the one case deciding on the merits of a 
case it reversed an employment decision in favor of a Navajo employee, 
holding that the lower court was improper in requiring the defendant to prove 
just cause for termination by “clear and convincing evidence.” 368
Comparison of the likely results in state and federal courts provides 
further evidence that non-Indian businesses are not overly disadvantaged in 
the Navajo courts.  Several of the cases regarding contracts for consumer 
goods involve either federal or state consumer protection laws.369   These 
365
 The numbers before the slash include only cases in which the employee was Navajo; the 
numbers after the slash include both those where the employee was Navajo and the employee
was Hopi.
366
 The numbers before the slash include cases in which a Hopi was on one side and a 
business was on the other.
367
 Manygoats v. Cameron Trading Post, No. SC-CV-50-98 (Navajo 01/14/2000) and In Re 
Atkinson Trading Co., 7 Nav. R. 275 (S.Ct. 1997).
368 Manygoats v. Cameron Trading Post, No. SC-CV-50-98 (Navajo 01/14/2000).
369
 In interpreting federal statutes, the court takes a stance similar to that of state or federal 
court.  It accepts decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court regarding federal laws as binding, but 
accepts lower court decisions only as guidance, and considers itself to have the same power to 
interpret such laws as would a state or federal court.  See Manygoats v. General Motors 
Acceptance Corp., 4 Nav. R. 94 (1983).  With respect to state law, the court relies state courts 
to determine the proper interpretation of state statutes, but in the absence of such 
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cases provide an opportunity to examine what other courts did with similar 
claims.  In Smoak v. Chevrolet,370 for example, the court considered whether 
provisions for acceleration of installment payments were “charges” that 
needed to be disclosed on the face of contracts for consumer goods under the 
Truth in Lending Act.371  The court held that while an acceleration clause that 
simply accelerated the rate of payment need not be disclosed, one that 
provided the seller with an unearned benefit by allowing the seller to keep 
unearned interest or other finance charges was the equivalent of a charge, and 
therefore required disclosure.372   In so holding, the court declined to follow 
decisions by the Third, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits that such provisions need not 
be disclosed.
While at first glance this result might seem to suggest a less favorable 
climate for non-Indian businessmen, further examination counters this 
suggestion.  First, the court noted that the Third Circuit relied on a state statute 
providing that unearned finance charges and interest could never be retained 
in the face of acceleration, and agreed that where state law required such 
rebates, there was no charge that needed to be disclosed.373  Second, the Fifth 
Circuit subsequently met en banc to reverse its prior decision, reaching 
essentially the same decision as the Navajo court.374 The Ninth Circuit 
subsequently reached a more radical position than the Navajo Court, (one 
previously adopted by several district courts) holding that acceleration clauses 
must always be disclosed to inform the consumer of their effect on unearned 
finance charges.375  Finally, the Federal Reserve Board, the agency charged 
with administering the Truth in Lending Act, itself interpreted the Act as the 
Navajo Nation had, an interpretation implicitly adopted by the U.S. Supreme 
Court when it overruled the Ninth Circuit.376 Thus the Navajo Nation, rather 
than adopting an unusually pro-consumer stance, instead struck a middle 
ground ultimately consistent with the holdings of the majority of circuits as 
well as the administering agency. 
interpretations makes its own attempt to determine the intent of the legislature.  See General 
Electric Credit Corp. v. Becenti, 
4 Nav. R. 34, 34-36 (Ct.App. 1983).
370
 1 Nav. R. 153 (1977).
371
 15 U.S.C. §§ 1638-1639.
372
 1 Nav. R. at 159.
373
 Johnson v. McCrackin-Sturman Ford, Inc., 527 F.2d 257, 268-69 (3d Cir. 1975).
374
 McDaniel v. Fulton National Bank of Atlanta, 571 F.2d 948 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc) 
(acceleration clause alone not charge but provision permitting retention of unearned interest 
charge requiring disclosure).
375
 St. Germain v. Bank of Hawaii, 573 F.2d 572 (9th Cir. 1977).
376
 Ford Motor Company v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555, 563 n.8 (1980) (discussing 
administrative interpretations).
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In other cases, the Navajo courts reached positions more favorable to 
businesses than those of surrounding courts.   The court held, for example, 
that counterclaims under the Truth in Lending Act were barred by the Act’s 
one year statute of limitations,377 although a slight majority of state courts, 
including the New Mexico Supreme Court, had reached the opposite 
conclusion.378  In 1980, Congress amended the statute to permit such 
counterclaims after the expiration of the statute of limitations; only then did 
the Navajo court reverse its prior position.379
And while very few of the businesses that find themselves before the 
court are run by Navajos, the court appears very aware that an anti-business 
climate will not serve the Navajo people.   In one employment case, for 
example, the court rejected an interpretation of the Navajo Preference in 
Employment Act that would require companies to grant preference to 
“potentially qualified” applicants, and thereby require the employer to delay 
hiring until potentially qualified Navajo applicants had been given a 
mandatory welding test.380  The court found that such a requirement would 
discourage businesses from locating on the Navajo Nation, reduce 
employment opportunities, and thereby defeat the ultimate intent of the law.381
In another case, the court upheld the Navajo Nation’s claim of sovereign 
immunity, but encouraged the Navajo Nation Council to waive sovereign 
immunity in its contracts to encourage economic development on the Navajo 
Nation.382  In developing its judicial system, the Navajo Nation seeks both to 
protect Navajo individuals and to encourage non-Indian business to invest and 
participate in economic development.  The court appears to be aware that the 
best way to accomplish both goals is to provide a forum that merits the trust of 
all parties.
3.  Child Custody Cases
Another area in which one might fear bias is in cases involving child 
custody.  The Navajo Nation, like many Indian nations, sees maintaining a 
connection with Navajo children as necessary to safeguard its future.  The 
Navajo Nation court has declared that “[t]he most precious resource of the 
377
 Smoak v. Chevrolet, 1 Nav. R. 153, 160-61(1977).
378
 A-1 Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Becenti, 2 Nav. R. 72, 75 (C.P. Dist. Ct. 1979) (collecting 
cases).
379
 Manygoats v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 4 Nav. R. 94, 97 (1983) (discussing P.L. 
96-221, Title VI, Sec. 615, 94 Stat. 180).
380
 Largo v. Gregory & Cook, Inc., 7 Nav. R. 111 (S.Ct. 1995).
381 Id. at 114-15. 
382
 TBI Contractors, Inc. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, 7 Nav. R. 57 (S.Ct. 1988).
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Navajo Nation is indeed its children,” and interprets the Navajo Nation 
Children's Code as designed “to protect this vital resource of the Navajo 
Nation.”383 It would not be surprising if this concern resulted in a bias against 
non-Navajo parents when they seek custody of children born in relationships 
with Navajos, or in favor of the jurisdiction of Navajo courts over custody 
determinations.
The federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) 384 provides the Navajo 
courts with broad, controversial jurisdiction over these custody disputes.  
Congress enacted ICWA in 1978 to address the startling and disproportionate 
rates at which Indian children were being removed from their homes and 
placed with non-Indian families.  One of the central means through which the 
Act tried to curb this trend was to increase tribal court jurisdiction over 
custody decisions385 involving Indian children.386  The Act provides tribes 
with exclusive jurisdiction over such cases where the children are domiciled 
on reservations or are wards of the tribal court, and presumptive jurisdiction 
where the children are domiciled off reservation.387  Concern that tribal courts 
given jurisdiction will favor tribal retention of Indian children over the 
children’s best interests or the rights of the parent involved appears to 
motivate much ICWA litigation in state courts.  
The Navajo Nation has one of the most active Indian Child Welfare 
offices in the country and in the 1980s obtained a landmark decision from the 
Utah Supreme Court affirming its jurisdiction over a Navajo child that had 
never lived on the reservation and had been placed since birth with a non-
Indian adoptive family.388  Its aggressive enforcement of the Act surely brings 
children with connections to non-Indian guardians and relatives into the 
Navajo courts.  Despite this, not one of the 513 Navajo appellate cases on line 
383
 In re A.O., No. 4 Nav. R. 121 (Sh.R.Dist.Ct. 1987); see also In re Custody of S.R.T., 6 
Nav. R. 407, 411 (S.Ct. 1991) (“There is no resource more vital to the continued existence 
and integrity of the Navajo Nation than our children. Consequently, we have a special duty to 
ensure their protection and well-being.”) 
384
 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1931.
385
 The definition of child custody cases excludes both those arising from disputes between 
parents and those arising from criminal acts by minors.  25 U.S.C. § 1903(1).
386
 An “Indian child” is one that is either an enrolled member of a federally recognized tribe, 
or the biological child of an enrolled member and eligible for enrollment in the tribe. 25 
U.S.C. § 1903(4). 
387
 25 U.S.C. § 1911(a) and (b).  Under Section 1911(b), even where a case arises in state 
court, the court must notify the relevant tribe, and, upon a request by the tribe or the child’s 
parent or guardian, must transfer the case to tribal court absence an objection by one of the 
child’s parents or “good cause” to the contrary.  
388
 In re Adoption of Halloway, 732 P.2d 962 (Utah 1986).  The U.S. Supreme Court quoted 
extensively from the Holloway case in reaching the same holding.  Mississippi Band of 
Choctaw Indians v. Holyfield, 490 U.S. 30 (1989).
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arises under ICWA.389   This alone suggests that when the Navajo Nation 
courts exercise jurisdiction in custody cases involving nonmembers, parties 
tend to be satisfied with the results.
Additional evidence comes from the custody cases the court has 
decided.  Custody disputes arising between parents are not governed by 
ICWA, and the Navajo courts have decided several of these.  Of the six on-
line appellate decisions involving custody of children of both Navajo and non-
Navajo parents, non-Navajos won four.  The earliest of these is In re 
Chewiwi,390 a 1977 case concerning custody of the daughter of an Isleta 
Pueblo man and a Navajo woman.391  During their marriage, the couple lived 
on the Isleta Pueblo, and enrolled their daughter, Catherine Chewiwi, with the 
Pueblo.392  When Catherine was five, both her parents were killed in an auto 
accident and the Isleta Pueblo court appointed her paternal uncle as her 
guardian.393  A few months later, while Catherine was visiting her Navajo 
maternal relatives on the Navajo Nation, they filed a petition for guardianship 
with the Navajo courts.  The trial court granted them temporary guardianship, 
and the Chewiwis appealed.394
The Navajo Court of Appeals vacated the order.  The court held that 
although it had jurisdiction over any Navajo child properly on the reservation, 
and the child was on the reservation with the consent of her legal guardian, 
“[t]he mere fact that the child visited relatives within the Navajo Nation 
cannot by itself confer on a Navajo court the subject matter jurisdiction to 
determine this child's status.”395  As to the Isleta Pueblo order, the court held 
that although the Navajo Nation was not a party to the U.S. Constitution, and 
therefore not bound to grant full faith and credit to foreign orders, the order 
would be recognized as a matter of comity.396
Subsequent decisions also recognize the rights of non-Navajo relatives 
in child custody disputes.  In 1982 in Lente v. Notah,397 the court vacated a 
district court order granting a Navajo father custody of his child with a 
Comanche woman.  Although the parents had agreed to a divorce decree 
389
 Four cases, including three district court cases, mention the Act, but only to use its findings 
as guidance or to say that the cases are not brought under the Act.  While none of the district 
court cases on line arise under the Act either, given the limited publishing of district court 
decisions one should not draw significant conclusions from this statistic.  
390
 1 Nav. R. 120 (1977).
391
 Id. at 120.
392
 Id. at 124.
393
 Id. at 120-21.
394
 Id. at 121.
395
 Id. at 124.
396
 Id. at 126-26.
397
 3 Nav. R. 72 (1982)
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stipulating that Ms. Lente would have custody, two years later Mr. Notah filed 
for custody claiming that she had given him the child saying she did not want 
her anymore.398   The trial court granted temporary custody without granting 
the mother proper notice, an order the court found denied her “basic rights 
guaranteed by the Navajo Bill of Rights and common sense.”  399Although 
Ms. Lente had later been given notice and participated in the hearings leading 
to the final custody order, she had preserved her right to object to jurisdiction 
and the appellate court held that the subsequent hearings were not enough to 
cure the initial improper order.  400Although the appellate court vacated the 
order, it held that because the child likely formed psychological bonds with 
her father in the four years she had lived with him, she should not be removed 
pending rehearing.  The court ordered that upon rehearing the lower court 
should obtain expert evaluations of the best interests of the child, and listed 
thirty-four factors it should consider in making its decision.401  While the 
mother argued that the Navajo custom of matrilocality should determine the 
case in her favor, the court held that this was a decision for the trial court, 
which had the power to determine whether it was appropriate to follow 
common law under the circumstances.402  (In a subsequent custody dispute 
between Navajo parents, the court held that following the common law 
presumption of custody in favor of the mother would violate the Navajo Equal 
Rights Amendment.403)
The next case, Yazzie v. Yazzie404 concerned an action filed by a 
Navajo father for divorce of his Comanche wife and custody of his four 
children.  At the time of the filing, his wife and their children had not resided 
on the reservation for some time.405  After initially filing a motion challenging 
jurisdiction, the mother did not further participate in the proceedings.406  The 
judge, therefore, granted the divorce and decided as to the division of property 
and custody of the children by default.407  The appellate court reversed.  It 
held that while the trial court had jurisdiction over the marriage as the father 
resided on the Navajo Nation, it did not have custody over the children or 
398
 Id. at 72.
399
 Id. at 75.
400
 Id. at 74.
401
 Id. at 78-79.
402
 Id. at 79-80.  In Matter of Chewiwi the court had recognized an order placing a child with 
her non-Navajo paternal relatives, an order that would go against this customary tradition.  
Common law, however, does not appear to have been raised in the case.  
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property off the reservation.408  While affirming the divorce, therefore, the 
court vacated the remainder of the order for lack of jurisdiction. 
The court has also made substantive custody determinations that 
favored non-Navajo parents.  In Pavenyouma v. Goldtooth,409 the lower court 
found both the Hopi mother and Navajo father to be suitable parents,410 but 
after the parents could not agree on a plan for joint custody of their five 
children ordered that the mother would have custody of two of the children 
and the father would have custody of the other three.  The appeals court 
reversed, finding that while it was preferable for parents to agree on 
arrangements for joint custody, it was the obligation of the court to step in if 
they could not.411  The court ordered that the mother would have custody of 
all children during the school year, while the father would have custody 
during the summer, and ordered the father to pay child support while the 
children were with their mother.412
The one troubling case is In re Custody of S.R.T.,413 in which the court 
upheld a default order granting a Navajo mother custody over her child 
against the claims of a non-Indian that claimed to be the father.  Although the 
child was an enrolled member of the Navajo Nation, he was living in Texas 
with the sister of the non-Indian alleged father at the time the petition for 
custody was filed.414  The non-Indian father had received notice of the petition 
and had retained local counsel before the hearing.415  Neither the father nor his 
attorney, however, showed up for the hearing.  The attorney had mailed a 
motion for continuance to the court on the day before the hearing, and it was 
not received until the day after the hearing.416  The appellate court found that 
the father had proper notice of the hearing and no excuse for failing to 
appear.417
The Navajo Supreme Court did, however, examine the limited 
evidence of paternity presented on appeal. The mother’s name alone was on 
the birth certificate and the child had the mother’s name, and the couple had 
only lived together briefly before the appellant began living with another 
woman.418  The only written evidence of any family relation with the 
408 Id. at 70-71.
409
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appellant was a letter authorizing his sister to consent to medical care for the 
child, and the court found this was not enough to establish paternity.419 As to 
jurisdiction, the court found that as the child was born out of wedlock, 
because the father had made no efforts to establish paternity his domicile for 
jurisdictional purposes was the same as that of the natural mother.420  While 
the jurisdictional decision seems unfair to the off-reservation father, the 
principle that domicile of an illegitimate child was that of the child’s mother 
regardless of whether the child had ever been present in the jurisdiction 
derives from Anglo-American law.421
While the appellate court has decided one additional case, In re 
A.O.,422 in a way unfavorable to a non-Navajo parent, this was an intermediate 
decision.  In the case, the court reversed a lower court’s dismissal of a petition 
for custody and remanded for more facts as to jurisdiction.423  On remand the 
district court affirmed the denial of jurisdiction.424  The child had been made 
the ward of the court based on a petition alleging abuse, a fact that would 
ordinarily grant the court jurisdiction.  The district court found, however, that 
the order of wardship was based on a fraud on the court, as the petitioners had 
not notified the court of the pending New Mexico court case.425  Under these 
facts, the court ceded to the concurrent jurisdiction of the New Mexico 
courts.426 Two other district court cases involving non-Navajo parents are also 
on-line, and both reveal the same reluctance to accept questionable 
jurisdiction.427
419 Id.
420 Id. at 409-411.
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 The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed this as a principle of federal common law in Mississippi 
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427 In re Custody of B.N.P., 4 Nav. R. 155 (1983), for example, involved a custody dispute 
between a Mescalero Apache mother and a Navajo father.  The couple obtained a divorce 
decree in Mescalero Apache court, and originally stipulated to custody in the father.  Two 
years later, however, while the children were on the Mescalero Apache reservation visiting 
their mother, the mother returned to the Mescalero court and, under the pretext of the presence 
of the children, had the decree modified.  Some months later, when the children were visiting 
the father, he went to the Navajo Nation court for custody using the same pretext.  The court 
recognized the delicacy of the dispute, stating that “this court is called upon to make a 
decision on which of the two Indian governments should exercise the power and duty to 
protect children under their care. The foremost consideration for this court must be the best 
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In sum, therefore, even in the vital issue of custody of children with 
Navajo heritage, the court appears to have been equitable to non-Navajo 
parents, and not to have asserted a broad jurisdiction that would deprive 
parents of their rights.
e. Conclusion
The data regarding the experience of nonmembers in the Navajo courts 
do not support the assumption of the United States Supreme Court that 
nonmembers will be at a disadvantage in tribal courts.  Nonmembers win half 
of the time they appear before the courts, and the decisions reveal few 
troubling assessments of law or fact.  This is true even in cases involving 
matters that would seem particularly vulnerable to bias.   More work needs to 
be done regarding nonmembers in other tribal court systems.  But given the 
disproportionate size and population of the Navajo Nation and the fact that 
more than most tribal courts it has the characteristics particularly troubling to 
the U.S. Supreme Court, data regarding the Navajo courts are of particular 
relevance.
The relative fairness of the courts, however, does not speak to the 
second assumption of the Supreme Court, that adjudication of outsider rights 
has little to do with “self-government,” or the legal and governmental integrity 
of tribes.  The following sections of the Article will discuss the particular 
historical position of tribal legal justice systems, additional statistics regarding 
nonmembers in the Navajo courts, and theoretical insights regarding the role 
of formal legal institutions to challenge this assumption.
III.  Origins of Tribal Courts and the Struggle for Legitimacy 
interests of the children who come before it, and after that considerations of governmental 
relations come into play.”  It declared that it was uncomfortable with the parental kidnapping 
on both sides, but declined to recognize the modified Mescalero Apache decree as jurisdiction 
was fraudulently obtained.  Deciding the case on the merits, the court held that because the 
children had always lived on the Navajo Nation, and said they were afraid to live with the 
mother because of her drinking, the court ordered custody in the father with reasonable 
visitation in the mother. In In re Adoption of S.C.M., 4 Nav. R. 167 (1983), the court denied a 
Navajo uncle of a Canadian Indian child the right to an adoption and temporary custody order.  
Although the parents had signed consent to adoption in Canada, it was not clear why the 
adoption had not been pursued in Canadian court, or that the Navajo Nation courts even had 
jurisdiction over the child under the applicable rules of domicile and personal jurisdiction. 
Nor could the uncle have the investigation for adoption waived, although a Canadian report 
appeared to be attached to the affidavits of consent.  Instead, the uncle was required to prove 
that the Navajo Nation court, and not the Canadian courts, was the appropriate forum.  
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Tribal courts in the United States have an ambiguous meaning in 
Indian communities.  They have been both tools of acculturation, intended to 
undo indigenous culture and contribute to assimilation of Indian people, and 
tools of resistance to the colonial project, means of asserting sovereignty, 
warding off foreign interference, and finding uniquely tribal ways of dealing 
with the clash between tribal and non-tribal cultures.  The history of the 
Navajo Nation court system repeats these themes of colonialism and 
resistance.  This distinctive history shapes the present struggle to develop 
legitimate and functioning legal systems, and the role of outsiders within this 
struggle.
a. Tribal Courts as Tools of Acculturation
The current denigration of tribal justice systems is not new.  Federal 
policy makers have long portrayed Indian people as without meaningful 
law,428 even when there was ample evidence to the contrary.  Thus in 1834, 
Congress declared that the Indian country beyond the Mississippi was 
characterized by a “want of fixed laws, of competent tribunals of justice,”429
despite the fact that the southeastern tribes it had settled there had police, 
constitutions, written codes, and trial and appellate courts as sophisticated as 
many territorial courts.430  Similarly, in 1883 the Supreme Court described 
Brûlé Sioux methods of dealing with murderers as “red man’s revenge,”431
although federal officials knew that the tribe had already resolved the matter 
through Sioux justice methods of mediation and symbolic compensation,432 a 
mode of punishment at least as civilized as the hanging in vogue in non-Indian 
courts of the time.
This constructed absence of law served federal purposes well.  For a 
country whose most important legal decision proudly declares that “[t]he 
government of the United States has been emphatically termed a government 
of laws, and not of men,”433 to be without law was automatically to be 
inferior.  In addition, it was easier for the federal government to continue to 
428 See, e.g., Carole E. Goldberg, Public Law 280 and the Problem of Lawlessness in 
California Indian Country, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1405, 1410-11 (1997). 
429
 H. Rep. No. 23-474, 23d Cong., 1st Sess., 18 (1834), reprinted in 263 U.S. Serial Set.
430
 When these legal systems were examined by independent observers, they confirmed their 
fairness and efficiency.  See, e.g., Bethany R. Berger, “Power Over this Unfortunate Race”: 
Race, Politics and Indian Law in U.S. v. Rogers, WILLIAM & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 
2004) (discussing independent reports on Cherokee courts, police, and legal codes).  
431
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432 SIDNEY L. HARRING, CROW DOG’S CASE: AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY, TRIBAL LAW, 
AND UNITED STATES LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY at 103-05 (1994).
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believe itself worthy of the “high appellation” of a government of laws434 if it 
could pretend that it was not breaking the laws of another people in taking 
their property and sovereignty.  The perceived absence of law thus created a 
vacuum that justified the extension of federal power.435
These policy makers were also well aware of the ways that law 
transforms consciousness.  They saw acceptance of Anglo law as both 
necessary and instrumental to acceptance of Anglo civilization.  In 1832, the 
first Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Elbert Herring, declared that, “the 
absence of meum and tuum in the general community of possessions, which is 
the grand conservative principle of the social state, is a perpetual cause of the 
vis inertiae of savage life.”436 By the 1850s, when the Indian Department was 
formulating its policy of forcible assimilation, it was advocating for 
imposition of legal systems on tribes.437  Treaties of the time allowed the 
President to prescribe systems of law for the Indians, and administrators 
advocated for dictation of civil as well as criminal laws as a necessary step in 
the assimilationist project.438
In the 1860s, federal agents on Indian reservations began to 
experiment with using Indian people as tools for imposition of legal order on 
reservations.  They appointed Indians as police officers, and set themselves or 
trusted Indians as judges.  While federal officials quite early began to place 
Indians in positions of power in reservation legal systems, they did not do so 
to empower tribal people.  By appointing tribal members as judges and police, 
federal agents not only saved money and gained staff, they made tribal people 
434 Id.
435 See, e.g., Berger, Power Over this Unfortunate Race at ___ (describing fabrication of 
jurisdictional gap in order to justify criminal jurisdiction over intermarried white citizen of 
Cherokee nation); Carole E. Goldberg, Public Law 280 and the Problem of Lawlessness in 
California Indian Country, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1405, 1406-1415 (1997) (describing effect of 
misperception of lawlessness in passage of P.L. 280); HARRING at 100-01 (describing creation 
of appearance of absence of law and order to justify Major Crimes Act extending federal 
jurisdiction over crimes between Indians).
436 WILLIAM T. HAGAN, INDIAN POLICE AND JUDGES: EXPERIMENTS IN ACCULTURATION AND 
CONTROL at 9 n.8 (1966).
437
 Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs for 1851, S. Execdoc. No. 1, 31st
Cong., 1st Sess., Doc. 41 at 416-17 (1851), reprinted in 613 U.S. Serial Set (report of Gov. 
Alexander Ramsay, Superintendent of the Minnesota Superintendency).
438 See id. (describing need for “the prescription of laws, which shall not alone punish 
criminal offenses, but which may also protect the delicate and complicated rights which arise 
when the relations between man and man are carried to a high degree of perfection.”); 
HAGAN, supra note 436 at 9 (“Until the rights of property, the distinctions of meum and tuum, 
are recognized; until the wrongdoer himself can be made to feel the punishment due to his 
misdeeds, it will be vain to expect that reform, morally or physically, so much desired by our 
government.”) (quoting 1851 Report of Commissioner of Indian Affairs).
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agents of their own acculturation.  These tribal members were more effective 
in enforcing the will of the colonizers than the government itself could ever 
be.  Seduced by the hope of gaining power and prestige in a federal system 
intent on depriving them of traditional sources of pride, Indian people were 
wonderfully efficient at policing, hunting, and capturing their own.439  But the 
Indian Department was not satisfied with even this level of tribal involvement 
in Indian control, and sought the extension of all federal laws over Indians.440
Congress would not accede to this violation of tribal sovereignty, and instead 
simply authorized funding for tribal police in 1878.441
The first federally sanctioned tribal courts did not have even this 
minimal congressional support.  Rather, they were the result of direction by 
H.M. Teller, the newly appointed Secretary of the Interior, to create 
institutions to help put an end to a variety of practices he saw as obstacles to 
tribal assimilation:  religious dances, polygamy, use of medicine men, and the 
custom of abandoning and destroying the homes of the dead.442  By April 10, 
1883, a few months after this order, Commissioner Hiram Price had 
promulgated regulations establishing of Courts of Indian Offenses443 along 
with a code forbidding each of these expressions of indigenous culture.444  In 
1888, the District Court of Oregon called these courts “mere educational and 
disciplinary instrumentalities, by which the government of the United States is 
endeavoring to improve and elevate the condition of these dependent tribes to 
whom it sustains the relation of guardian.”445
While the district court stated that the courts were a “laudable effort  . . 
. to educate these Indians in the habit and knowledge of self-government,” 446
policy makers in the East hoped that they would destroy tribal governments.  
One Commissioner of Indian Affairs declared that the tribal police force was 
“a power entirely independent of the chiefs.  It weakens, and will finally 
destroy, the power of tribes and bands.”447  Indian police and courts were used 
to round up children for boarding schools, to sanction tribal members that did 
439 HAGAN, supra note 436 at 26-27, 31, 35-36.  As the Agent of San Carlos Apache boasted, 
“our little squad of Indian Police have done more effective scouting. . . . than General Kautz 
has done with all his troops and four companies of Indian scouts.”  Id. at 37.
440 HAGAN, supra note 436 at 42. 
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not carry out BIA work assignments, and capture those that rebelled against 
federal policies.
Nor were there any guarantees of neutrality in the justice dispensed.  
While one of the contemporary complaints is that tribal courts are not 
independent from tribal political branches,448 it appears that the blurring of 
judicial and political roles is an inheritance from this early period of federal 
domination.  The federal superintendent or agent typically appointed the 
Indian judges, sometimes acted as prosecutor, and all of the decrees of the 
court were subject to his approval.  At many agencies, congressional failure to 
appropriate any funding for judges’ salaries until 1888, or adequate funding 
thereafter, necessitated that tribal police double as judges, arresting a suspect, 
bringing him in, and then changing hats and sentencing him.449  In 1891, the 
Board of Indian Commissioners declared that the courts were “more in the 
nature of courts martial than civil courts, and practically register the decrees 
of the Indian agent.”450
While by 1900 two thirds of Indian agencies had Courts of Indian 
Offenses,451 this was the height of their existence, and by 1928 there were 
only 30 remaining.452 As part of the Indian New Deal of the 1930s, federal 
officials worked with tribes to create “tribal courts” with the freedom to draw 
up their own codes.453  Indian Services officers were prohibited from 
“controlling, obstructing, or interfering with the function of Indian Courts,” 
and tribal approval was needed for appointment or removal of judges.454  By 
1978, when Oliphant was decided, out of 133 tribal courts, only 33 were 
Courts of Indian Offenses.455  But despite the name changes, the new tribal 
courts were still creatures of federal influence,456 and the heritage of western 
448
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style courts as tools of the federal agents directed at assimilation still colors 
the perception and the reality of these courts on many reservations.457
b. Tribal Courts as Tools of Resistance
But there is an alternative history to tribal courts.  In this history, tribal 
courts are tools of resistance, ways both to ward off outside interference with
tribal affairs and win the right to achieve tribal solutions to modern problems.  
Even where the institutions were designed by outside forces hostile to tribes, 
tribal people often found ways to subvert these purposes and validate their 
culture in the foreign forms.  By doing so in institutions recognizable by non-
Indians, moreover, they created a space and means for resistance. 
The first western style tribal courts were those created by the Cherokee 
Nation in 1820.458   The courts and the code they enforced may be criticized as 
voluntary assimilation, an example of more assimilated members of the 
community hijacking the Cherokee government and forcing it to turn from 
traditional law ways.459  But as Rennard Strickland has shown, Cherokee 
adoption of a centralized legal authority and many of the laws subsequently 
adopted were not an accession to federal efforts at assimilation, but instead a 
response to the need for unity in the face of attempts to take Cherokee land.460
457 See POMMERSHEIM, supra note 8 at 67; Porter at 263 (criticizing “all modern tribal court 
systems” as “direct descendants of the Anglo-American legal tradition”).
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 Although these courts were the result of western influence, at the time of contact, 
Cherokee villages already had well understood legal rules, with several specialized systems of 
adjudicating and punishing offenses against the law, including a white court for domestic 
matters, a red court for matters of war or external relations, and a women’s council for 
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NATION ADOPTED BY THE COUNCIL AT VARIOUS PERIODS at 118-30, & (1852) (Scholarly 
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the Cherokee Nation by the Treaties concluded with the United States . . . shall forever 
hereafter remain unalterably the same,” then extensively describes the these boundaries, and 
declares that “the sovereignty and Jurisdiction of this Government shall extend over the 
country within the boundaries above described, and the lands therein are, and shall remain, the 
common property of the Nation.” Id. at Art. 1; see STRICKLAND, supra note 458 at 65; see 
also Theda Perdue (discussing tension between assimilationist and traditional elements of 
constitution). Coming at the height of the pressure to remove Cherokees from their 
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While not all laws had this land-preserving justification, the early 
history of the Cherokees’ western legal system shows that it often 
supplemented rather than displaced Cherokee law ways.  The parties before 
the court were largely relative outsiders—assimilated mixed blood Cherokees, 
intermarried whites, and blacks461--and the disputes before it were largely 
those involving new problems that Cherokee customary law did not 
address.462 At the same time, traditional Cherokee law ways often continued 
to govern the situations for which they were designed.  In other cases the new 
Cherokee laws were designed to protect Cherokee people from the opposing 
legal customs of outsiders.  One of the earliest laws, reenacted several times, 
provided that a white man could not, by marriage, gain the right to dispose of 
a Cherokee woman’s property without her consent, 463 a law that both 
protected Cherokee land from white usurpation and preserved traditional 
marital property laws. 464
The western structure also created a space in which traditional law 
ways could be expressed.   The unassimilated Cherokee-speaking majority 
tended to elect judges like themselves who were able to resolve disputes 
according to more traditional norms.465  Jurors as well tended to represent the 
homelands, these declarations of sovereignty and property rights, and the implicit statement 
that the Cherokee Nation was a government equal to any other, were the height of resistance.
461 STRICKLAND, supra note 458 at 75.
462
  In particular, these concerned questions of commerce and transmission of wealth. Id. at 75 
& 84. As traditional Cherokee culture condemned the accumulation of wealth beyond ones 
needs, WILLIAM G. MCLOUGHLIN, CHEROKEE RENASCENCE IN THE NEW REPUBLIC at 326-27 
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traditional majority. 466  Trials were thus conducted in part in Cherokee,467 and 
might incorporate tradition in other ways invisible to non-Indians.468
None of this is to say that the resulting legal system always met this 
goal of addressing the new conflicts posed by this clash of cultures,469 or that 
some of the Cherokees crafting it did not intend for the laws to help displace 
the more traditional Cherokee culture.470  But it is clear that the adoption of a 
western legal system was much an effort at resistance and survival under 
changed circumstances as is was one of assimilation, and that while styled in a 
western mold, it came to reflect traditional practices as well.
Even the federally imposed Indian police and Courts of Indian 
Offenses created space for resistance.  The Indian police were often willing 
participants in their own colonization, helping federal officials complete tasks 
inimical to tribal identity.  But they also at times resisted such tasks.  The 
Shoshone and Bannock police force, for example, resigned en masse rather 
than round up school children or arrest the parents that failed to send them.471
The Ute police chief was fired after he led the opposition to the boarding 
schools.472  The Jicarilla Apache police force also resigned rather than be 
forced to capture renegade members of another Apache clan.473
466 See JOHN HOWARD PAYNE, INDIAN JUSTICE: A CHEROKEE MURDER TRIAL AT TAHLEQUAH 
IN 1840 at 51 (Grant Foreman, ed. 2002) (listing names of jurors).
467
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468
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472 Id. at 78.
473 Id. at 81.
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In addition, while Eastern policy makers envisioned the Indian police 
as furthering the assimilationist goals of the administration, in practice much 
of their time was spent controlling non-Indians that preyed on the tribes.474
While it had been a federal crime to trespass on Indian lands or property since 
1790,475 federal officials had never had the will to effectively enforce these 
laws.476  The Indian police forces had no such compunctions. The Kiowa and 
Comanche police spent their days riding the Texas range noting the brands of 
cattle that white ranchers let graze without permission so that fines could be 
charged against their owners.477  Policemen also enforced prohibitions against 
poaching on Indian lands, in one instance confiscating 114 quail stolen for 
export to New Zealand,478 and seizing and destroying shipments by liquor 
smugglers.479
The Indian police and courts also replaced more coercive efforts at 
federal domination.  Agents originally turned to Indian police to decrease the 
influence of the U.S. military,480 and were able to use their existence to justify 
removal of troops from Indian agencies.481  While federal statements as to the 
wishes of Indian people are often more reflective of federal rather than Indian 
desires, commonsense gives credence to federal reports that Indians were not 
eager to be supervised by federal troops.482  Indian police and courts were also 
authorized in a time of intense pressure by the Indian Department to extend 
full federal jurisdiction over Indian people.483  The Indian institutions, while 
also coercive, at least preserved some measure of self-government.
474 Id. at 52-53, 127.
475
 1 Stat. 137 (1790).
476 See e.g., Carole E. Goldberg, Public Law 280 and the Problem of Lawlessness in 
California Indian Country, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1405, 1413 (1997)
477 HAGAN, supra note 436 at 52-53.
478 Id. at 53-54. 
479 Id. at 55. 
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 Major Indian wars in the aftermath of the U.S. Civil War lead to a vehement and nearly 
successful campaign to transfer the Indian Office back from the Department of the Interior to 
the War Department.  PRUCHA, supra note 454 at 482.  Indian agents were thus under 
pressure to show that their methods, which relied on more subtle coercion of Indian people, 
were at least as successful as military force in preserving order.    
481 HAGAN, supra note 436 at 30-31, 50.
482 See Annual Report of the Comm’r of Indian Affairs, H. Exec. Doc. 1 at 472, 40th Cong., 3rd
Sess. (1868), reprinted in 1366 U.S. Serial Set (Commissioner Taylor reporting that he had 
consulted with leaders of many tribes in past year and “without exception, they have declared 
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483 Hagan, supra note 436 at 42.  See also Harring at 134-36.  In 1885, the Indian Department 
did win a partial victory when Congress enacted the Major Crimes Act extending federal 
jurisdiction over certain crimes between Indians. Harring at 134. 
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Nor did the courts function as the controlled educational instruments 
federal policymakers envisioned.  For example, although the only firm 
prerequisite for judgeship was that the judge not be a polygamist, agents were 
often required to waive this requirement in order to secure the services of 
individuals that actually commanded the respect of their tribes.  The 
Comanche leader Quannah Parker, for example, began his judgeship with six 
wives and married a seventh during his tenure.484  While Parker was an 
advocate for adoption of Anglo concepts of property and commerce, he also 
defended the use of peyote, which he himself used, and refused to support the 
abolition of Indian dances.485  The record of one of his cases shows how little 
Parker enforced Anglo prescriptions against polygamy and adultery.  A man 
had been charged with having seduced a woman away from her husband.  The 
husband had another wife, but she was ill.  The man was found guilty, but was 
not fined or sentenced.486  The woman was told to return to her husband, but 
only until his other wife had recovered.487
The Kiowa and Comanche court was not the only Court of Indian 
Offenses whose operation was better tailored to tribal than federal conceptions 
of justice. While the courts of Indian offenses were criticized as paramilitary 
tribunals of despotic agents, the 1928 Meriam Report found that they were 
“more open to criticism for lenity than for severity,”488 and that when the 
superintendent wished to be “particularly severe on a particular Indian, the 
usual means of attaining his desire [was] to turn the individual over to the 
state or United States courts for attention.”489  Proceedings before the courts 
were informal, and were conducted in the language of the tribe with only a 
brief record in English,490 effectively denying federal officials much control 
over the proceedings.  At most Courts of Indian Offenses, they found, the 
“decision of the Indian judges [was] untrammeled.”491  Probably in response 
to this minimal level of control, at ten agencies superintendents had 
abandoned Courts of Indian Offenses and assumed the judgeship 
themselves.492   Nor were decisions shaped by the federal regulations for 
484 HAGAN, supra note 436 at 135-38.
485 Id. at 133.
486 Id.  To do otherwise would have been rank hypocrisy—the judge’s seventh wife had also 
been married to another man until she left him for Parker.  Id. at 137.
487 Id. at 135.  
488 INSTITUTE FOR GOVERNMENT RESEARCH, THE PROBLEM OF INDIAN ADMINISTRATION at 17 
(1928) (the report is commonly called the Meriam Report after the director of the study, 
Lewis Meriam) (hereinafter MERIAM REPORT). 
489 Id. at 773.
490 Id. at 770-71. 
491 Id.
492 Id. at 772. 
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Courts of Indian Offenses.  In the courts the investigators observed, “[t]he 
decision rendered . . . depends not upon code or precedent, but upon that 
subtle quality of the mind called common sense and upon an understanding of 
the current native ideas of property and justice.”493
In part, the necessity for these courts came from the fact that 
traditional justice systems had either been destroyed by the colonial process, 
or did not have the respect of the outside forces to which tribal members had 
to present formal evidence of marriage, inheritance, or criminal punishment.  
But while the need for such courts may have been created by outside 
influence, the courts responded to this need in a way accessible to and desired 
by at least some tribal people.  Even as federal support for Courts of Indian 
Offenses declined in the early 1900s, therefore, some tribes advocated for 
their establishment.  The Umatilla Tribe, for example, asked for permission to 
reestablish their court, as they needed a formal system to resolve disputes but 
“it is an unheard of occurrence for an Indian to prosecute another Indian in 
civil courts, where they have to employ lawyers and pay cutthroat fees.”494
Others turned against the Bureau interference but independently adopted 
western police and court systems, such as the Mission Indian Federation that 
was active in California at the beginning of the twentieth century.495   While 
these groups felt the need of a legal system that in some ways resembled the 
Anglo one, they also wanted a system tailored to the needs of their 
communities.  The Meriam Report took a similar position, adopting the view 
of one Indian commenter496 that 
When an Indian offender is brought before the Court of Indian 
Offenses, neither he nor his family feels under obligation to 
retain an attorney or to go to any other special expense in the 
matter.  If on the other hand he is taken before a white man’s 
court, either state or federal, he and his family, if not his 
friends, will spend all they can raise in his defense, because to 
them imprisonment in the white man’s institutions, even if only 
493 Id. at 769.
494 HAGAN, supra note 436 at 144.
495
 Carole E. Goldberg, Public Law 280 and the Problem of Lawlessness in California Indian 
Country, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1405, 1414 (1997)
496
 The report describes him as an “exceptionally able mixed-blood Indian employee of the 
government,” MERIAM REPORT at 773, a description that was undoubtedly intended to 
commend him to a white audience, but that requires caution in evaluating whether his views 
reflect those of most Indian people.  
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for a few months, is an extremely severe penalty, as it goes so 
counter to Indian nature.497
For the Meriam Report authors, as for the Congress of the late 
nineteenth century, the existence of such courts also enhanced the argument 
against extension of jurisdiction by state or federal courts.498  The former, it 
was agreed, were irremediably hostile to Indian interests,499 and the latter 
would not be able to as “as wisely or as surely administer justice among the 
Indians” as the Indian judges themselves could.500
Thus despite the overtly colonial intentions behind federal desires to 
“bring law to the Indians,” the impact of the tribally administered western 
styled legal systems was mixed.  In part, they performed a gap filling function, 
creating a forum for disputes for which traditional legal norms and procedures 
were not designed.  In particular, their hybrid nature allowed them to address 
disputes involving those, such as whites and assimilated tribal members, who 
were less tied to traditional norms.  The norms and procedures used to resolve 
these disputes, moreover, were not pale imitations of western concepts; 
traditional tribal conceptions of justice were often incorporated, and new ones 
were developed in response to changing tribal needs.  By doing so in a forum 
that was recognizable by outsiders, these tribal legal institutions also became a 
force for asserting tribal sovereignty and warding off incursions against it.  
The heritage of contemporary tribal courts is thus distinctly ambivalent, one of 
both acculturation and resistance.  It is this legacy that modern tribal justice 
systems must grapple with in the difficult struggle for legitimacy and efficacy. 
c. The Navajo Experience
The above themes repeat in Navajo legal history.  The Navajos’ first 
experience with a western legal system came at the time of their most severe 
domination by the United States.  In 1864, after centuries of successful 
resistance to Spanish, Mexican, and American forces,501 Navajo leaders 
497 Id.
498
 While the Report did advocate extension of such jurisdiction in certain matters, and 
particularly for the more assimilated classes of Indians, it also recommended continuation of 
Courts of Indian Offenses for others.
499 Id. at 774, 775-56.
500 Id. at 777-78
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 Although Spain had first begun to colonize the Southwest in the 1500s, RAYMOND FRIDAY 
LOCKE, THE BOOK OF THE NAVAJO 154 (5th Ed. 1992), and the Mexicans in their stead had 
waged a campaign of raiding and slavery against the Navajo for many decades, id., when the 
United States claimed the territory after the Mexican War of 1846, the Navajos still lived 
independently, and few had entered the depths of their country.  Id. at 207. 
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finally accepted defeat at the hands of Kit Carson and his troops.  Under siege 
and threat of starvation if they did not leave their canyon strongholds, about 
half of the Navajo population took the “Long Walk”502 to Fort Sumner in 
Bosque Redondo, New Mexico.  Heartsick at their forced separation from 
Dinetah, the Navajo homelands, and dependent on the federal superintendent 
for inadequate rations,503 Navajos became subjects in a failed experiment at 
forced colonization. Used to living in isolated compounds far from other 
family groups, they were forced to live in closely spaced houses aligned along 
rectilinear streets.504  While the Navajos had long been successful farmers, at 
the ill-situated Fort they were made to clear bitter mesquite brush on diseased, 
alkaline soil to plant crops that failed for four successive years.505  Deprived 
of most of their horses and weapons, the people were preyed upon by raiding 
Comanche.506  Women aborted their children rather than see them die of 
502
 Like the better known Trail of Tears walked by the Five Civilized Tribes across the 
Mississippi, many died on this four hundred mile trip.  In the words of one historian, “By the 
second day of the march coyotes began to follow the long line of Navajos, marching a few 
abreast in family groups, and hawks and crows circled overhead, weakened and stumbled, and 
as soon as they fell they were slaughtered and the meat divided among the hungry Dineh.  
Without the horses, many of the aged, too weak to keep up, were left behind.  Their relatives 
gave them a little footd and marched on with tears in their eyes.”  LOCKE at 363.  More than 
one in ten that began the journey died before its completion.  Id. at 362-63.
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 Futilely counting on harvests that never materialized, see S. Exec. Doc. 36 at 3, 38th Cong., 
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504 Id. at 370.
505 Id. at 366-68, 372, 380.  These problems only worsened as time went on and the limited 
resources of the land were depleted.  In 1867, the Superintendent for the New Mexico Indian 
Agency described their plight with these words:  “The soil is cold, and the alkali in the water 
destroys it.  The corn crop this year is a total failure.  Last year 3,000 bushels only was raised 
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than better. The self-sustaining properties of the soil are all gone.   The Indians now dig up the 
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reservation.” Annual Report of the Acting Comm’r on Indian Affairs, H. Exec. Doc. 1, 40th
Cong., 2d Sess., Attachment No. 48 at 190 (1867), reprinted at 1326 U.S. Serial Set.
506 See, e.g., Annual Report of the Acting Comm’r on Indian Affairs, H. Exec. Doc. 1, 40th
Cong., 2d Sess., Attachment No. 52 at 199 (1867), reprinted at 1326 U.S. Serial Set.  There 
was some evidence that Mexican traders, opposed to the Bosque Reservation, incited the 
Commanches to make these raids.  Annual Report of Comm’r of Indian Affairs, H.Exec. Doc. 
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hunger.507  All were convinced that having left their homeland between the 
four sacred mountains, their gods had deserted them.508
It was in this atmosphere of despair that the federal government began 
its first experiments to “introduce” the Navajo people to the rule of law.  The 
people were divided into twelve villages, each with a principal chief charged 
“to carry out and enforce all laws given to him for the government of his 
village, or any instructions he may receive at any time from the commanding 
officer.”509 Together with his subchiefs, each chief presided over a trial level 
court for arbitration of disputes and adjudication of criminal offenses.510  The 
commanding officer would serve as the court of appeal, with the principal 
chiefs serving as jurors.511
In part, the courts may have been a response to the breakdown of 
Navajo governmental structure accompanying military defeat and 
imprisonment; the officers recommended that “[i]n order to wean the Indians 
from their present helpless dependence on the military power . . . in future all 
complaints must be submitted to the respective chiefs and their courts for 
redress and settlement, and not as heretofore to the post commander.”512 But 
the offenses the military officers designed were more appropriate to a labor 
camp than a court of law, and included imprisonment, lashes, or hard labor for 
such “crimes” as refusing to work, destroying agricultural tools provided by 
the government, destroying farm produce, absence from the reservation, and 
absence from one’s assigned village between 7 p.m. and 5 a.m. in winter, or 8 
1, 39th Cong., 2d Sess., Attachment No. 47 at 151 (1866) (Report of Superintendent Norton to 
Commissioner Cooley, July 31, 1866).
507 LOCKE, supra note 501 at 382.  The military doctor noted that the rate of abortion was so 
high that it would “decrease the number of the tribe and finally wipe them out of existence,” 
but failed to recognize the reason for this unwillingness to have children. Annual Report of 
Comm’r of Indian Affairs, H.Exec. Doc. 1, 39th Cong., 2d Sess., Attachment No. 46 at 150 
(1866).  His opinion might also have been shaped by the fact that an enormous portion of the 
patients he saw were those that had contracted syphilis, presumably after becoming prostitutes 
to U.S. soldiers.  Id. at 151 (out of 331 patients in the year, 235 were cases of syphilis).  
Because of the strong Navajo prohibition against entering dwellings where others had died, 
most Navajos that still clung to traditional norms would have shunned the hospital. 
508 LOCKE, supra note 501 at 364-65. 
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p.m. to 4 a.m. in summer.513  The drafters also made clear their disdain for 
Navajo ideas of law.  The proposed code, they declared, 
[H]as embraced only such offenses as are particularly 
applicable to these people in their present transition state. . . . It 
may appear unjust to punish people for a violation of laws 
which they do not only not understand, but have heretofore 
been taught to regard as the highest virtue to break.  But it must 
be recollected that these Indians have got to be made to respect 
the bonds which unite civilized society, and the only practical 
way of doing this is by inflicting a punishment, however light, 
for the first offence, and increasing the punishment in 
proportion to the increase of knowledge, until its severity 
would prevent further repetition.  This is the only possible 
mode of instructing them on the subject of the law.”514
After four years of imprisonment, the enormous expense of the 
experiment and the reports of misery of the Navajos moved even federal 
policy makers.  Although federal officials had hoped to remove the Navajos to 
the Indian Territory in Oklahoma, they ultimately acceded to the pleas of the 
Navajo people and agreed that they could return to the Dinehtah.515  In the 
Treaty of 1868, the United States solemnly promised that a portion of their 
former lands would be “set apart for the use and occupation of the Navajo 
Tribe of Indians.”516
Soon after their return, the agent set up a Navajo police force to 
control Navajos that were leaving the reservation to raid Mexican livestock.  
While the force might be seen as another instance of Navajos being tempted 
by federal dollars and uniforms to turn against their own,517 the force was led 
by Barboncito, Ganado Mucho, and Manuelito,518 all powerful leaders of the 
Navajo people who were equally concerned with the raids, which they saw as 
a violation of the promises they had made in the Treaty of 1868.519  In part, 
therefore, federal support for these police forces facilitated the ability of the 
513 Id. at 24.
514 Id. at 23-24.
515 LOCKE, supra note 501 at 383-84.
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 Treaty with the Navaho, Art. 2, 15 Stat. 667 (1868). 
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 William Hagan, for example, in his study of Indian police as courts as instruments of 
control, states that the police were necessary because the Navajo “had not been completely 
broken of their wild, free habits.” HAGAN, supra note 436 at 26.
518 LOCKE, supra note 501 at 397.
519 Id. at 393-94. 
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Navajo leadership to enforce what they saw as Navajo law.  Perhaps dismayed 
at the effectiveness of this police force, the administration in Washington 
quickly disbanded it, although local agents intermittently found ways to 
reinstate the force without official funding. 
An incident at the beginning of the twentieth century poignantly 
illustrates the conflict between external and internal legal constraints in the 
development and practice of these legal institutions.  The incident arose from 
the alleged rape by a Navajo man of a young Navajo woman.  The Navajo 
policeman originally informed of the crime had already resolved it according 
to Navajo tradition: he had the families of the victim and the offender agree on 
a restitution payment of one white horse and had taken the horse to the family 
of the girl.520  But the federal agent to the Navajos, Reuben Perry, insisted that 
the offender be arrested and imprisoned.521  When he tried to arrest the man, 
Navajos detained Perry himself, and two thousand Navajos, hearing of the 
incident, gathered at a Yei-bi-chei ceremony in St. Michaels to participate in 
the resistance.522   But Chee Dodge, a rising Navajo leader whose mother had 
died on the Long Walk and who later served three times as chairman of the 
Navajo Nation, addressed the crowd:
The President has given you a long rope so that you may graze 
wherever you please.  If a man has a good horse and pickets 
him out he gives him a long rope in good grass and lets him 
graze as far as he can; but if he has a mean horse he gives him 
a short rope with his head tied close to a post so he can get but 
a little feed.  The President has given you a long rope.  Some of 
you have a very long rope . . . others  . . . have a shorter rope; 
but the President has a rope on every one of you, and if you do 
not appreciate the good treatment you are given, if you try to 
make trouble, he will pull on all the ropes and draw you 
fellows all together in a tight place . . . You will lose your stock 
and you will be wiped out, and you will be guarded by troops, 
and everybody will laugh at you and say ‘See what a large tribe 
this was and this is all that is left of them.”523
520 DAN VICENTI, LEONARD B. JIMSON, STEPHEN CONN, M.J.L. KELLOGG, THE LAW OF THE 
PEOPLE: DINÉ BIBEE HAZ’ÁANII, A BICULTURAL APPROACH TO LEGAL EDUCATION FOR 
NAVAJO STUDENTS at 121 (Ramah Navajo High School Press 1972).
521 Id.
522 Id.
523 Id. at 122 (quoting AUBREY WILLIAMS, THE NAVAJO POLITICAL PROCESS 14 (1970).)
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In response to the speech, the Navajos that had seized Perry released him and 
delivered the defendant themselves.524  In the incident we see the ambivalent 
history of legal institutions among the Navajo people:  the policeman who 
uses his federally funded position to implement Navajo traditional law, the 
non-Indians who reject this tradition, and the Navajos that comply with non-
Indian law because of their keen awareness of the federal rope around their 
necks.
A Navajo Court of Indian Offenses was created in 1892525 after a 
federal report that “if conducted it would serve to teach the tribe the white 
man’s manner of dealing out justice and give them an idea of law and legal 
procedure.”526  The Navajo court and police quickly became associated with 
alien federal practices.527   Shortly before the court was created, Black Horse, 
the leader of the Rough Rock portion of the Reservation, lead a federal siege 
against the agent and his Navajo police when they came to forcibly collect 
Navajo children to send to boarding school.528  The Navajo police and courts 
also enforced the infamous federal stock reduction programs of the 1930s.529
By taking away Navajo livestock, these federal attempts to reduce overgrazing 
on the Navajo Nation tore at the deep structure of Navajo economic and 
cultural life.530  The legal system also played into the factionalism of Navajo 
politics, with the police and the courts occasionally serving as tools for 
harassment of political opponents.531
But the Navajo courts also performed much needed law and order 
functions.  Because of the failure of federal officials to adequately prosecute 
crimes under the Major Crimes Act, between 1957 and 1958, 12 out of 14 
manslaughter cases, 12 out of 14 rape cases, 45 out of 48 cases of assault with 
a deadly weapon, and 16 out of 18 burglary cases were prosecuted in the 
Navajo courts.532  In addition, social change had created both problems and 
segments of the population not amenable to the social control provided by the 
524 Id. at 122. 
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clan system.533  Young men returning from military service overseas brought 
with them problems not easily dealt with by traditional ceremonies,534 and a 
disdain for the informality of the Navajo courts and the lack of formal 
education of their judges.535 Local communities asked that their members be 
deputized to control increasing crime.536  The Navajo Tribal Council therefore 
lobbied Congress for funds, and when this failed dedicated scarce tribal 
resources to expanding their legal system in response to the demands of the 
Navajo community.537
The shape of this expansion, however, was in part defined by external 
ideas of law.  In the late 1940s, termination of the distinct political status of 
Indian people and tribes became the goal of federal policy.  As part of this 
policy Congress proposed giving states criminal and civil jurisdiction over 
Indians on reservations.  In 1949, members of Congress attempted to 
condition passage of Navajo-Hopi Rehabilitation Act538 upon extension of 
state jurisdiction over the Navajo Nation.539  The amendment was supported 
by the non-Indian attorney for the tribe, and was initially approved by the 
Navajo Tribal Council.540 But fear of the prejudice of non-Indian legal actors 
against Navajos541 created a grassroots opposition so strong that the tribal 
533 Id. at 339.
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Pueblo veterans, see Leslie Marmon Silko, Ceremony (1977).
535
 Conn at 342.
536 Id. at 339.
537 Id. at 340.
538
 P.L. 81-474, 64 Stat. 44 (1950) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 631-640c-3).
539
 S. 1407, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. Sec. 9. 
540 Conn at 342 & 344-45.
541
 This fear was well founded.  Prejudice was not only rampant in the public, but among state 
officials.  Arizona and New Mexico were the last two states in the union to grant Indians the 
right to vote, Harrison v. Laveen, 196 P.2d 456, 458 (1948).  At the time the extension of state 
jurisdiction was proposed, the Arizona was still fighting to justify this practice.  Id.  Even 
then, state and local governments sought repeatedly to dilute the right of Indians living on 
reservations to elect representatives of their choice, and to seek and hold elected office.  Ely v. 
Klahr, 403 U.S. 108, 91 S.Ct. 1803, 29 L.Ed.2d 352 (1971); Klahr v. Williams, 339 F.Supp. 
922 (D. Ariz. 1972); Goodluck v. Apache County, 417 F.Supp. 13 (D. Ariz. 1975), aff'd 429 
U.S. 876 (1976); Shirley v. Apache County, 109 Ariz. 510, 513 P.2d 939 (1973), cert. denied
415 U.S. 917 (1974).  The State is still subject to strict oversight under section 5 of the Voting 
Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) because of its history of using overtly discriminatory tests 
and devices to prevent Native Americans and other minorities from fully participating in the 
electoral process. State of Arizona v. Reno, 887 F. Supp. 318, 320 (D.D.C. 1995), appeal 
dism'd, 516 U.S. 1155 (1996).  Until losing legal actions between the 1930s and 1950s, 
moreover, state agencies denied Indians living on reservations disability benefits, State of 
Ariz. ex rel. Ariz. State Bd. Public Welfare v. Hobby, 221 F.2d 498, 499 (D.C. Cir. 1954), 
motor carrier licenses, Bradley v. Arizona Corporation Comm'n, 60 Ariz. 508, 141 P.2d 524 
89
council asked President Truman to veto the entire aid package rather than 
allow the passage of the amendment.542  Declaring himself “greatly 
influenced” by the preference of the tribe to forgo the benefits of the bill 
(which included 88 million dollars in aid), President Truman vetoed the bill as 
[I]n conflict with one of the fundamental principles of Indian 
law accepted by our Nation, namely, the principle of respect 
for tribal self-determination in matters of local government.  
The Congress and the executive branch have repeatedly 
recognized that so long as Indian communities wished to 
maintain, and were prepared to maintain, their own political 
and social institutions, they should not be forced to do 
otherwise.”543
The fight against extension of state jurisdiction was not over.  In 1949, 
Congress gave New York criminal jurisdiction over Indians within the 
(Ariz. 1943), and hunting and fishing licenses, Begay v. Sawtelle, 53 Ariz. 304, 88 P.2d 999 
(1939). As late as 1975, Navajos were denied emergency care at New Mexico hospitals and 
sent to the federal Indian hospital 45 minutes away, Penn v. San Juan Hospital, 528 F.2d 1181 
(10th Cir. 1975), and the state and New Mexico municipalities have repeatedly be found 
guilty of discrimination in provision of services to Indians in the state. See Navajo Nation v. 
New Mexico, 975 F.2d 741 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied 113 S. Ct. 1583 (1993) 
(discrimination in Title XX funding); Natonabah v. Board of Ed. of Gallup-McKinley County 
School Dist., 355 F. Supp. 716 (D.N.M.  1973) (discrimination in education funding)
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governments a necessary instrument for their continued progress in civilization.  It 
would be unjust and unwise to compel them to abide by State laws written to fill 
other needs than theirs.” Id.
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state,544 citing the inadequacy of tribal legal systems.545  The House Report 
attached a letter of the U.S. Attorney for the Western District of New York 
showing the anti-Indian biases behind the law:
[T]here have been numerous instances . . . of disorderly 
conduct on the part of the Indians, which have been most 
provoking. . . .  Indians get drunk and beat their women and get 
into fights.  Recently a white man was severely beaten by 
drunken Indians.  Theoretically these petty offenses are within 
the jurisdiction of so-called Indian courts but there is no 
provision made for their punishment even if such Indians are 
tried by said local Indian courts.  It is a deplorable situation. 
Something should be done to rectify this unbelievable 
situation.546
The law was followed by a 1950 Act giving New York State civil jurisdiction 
over causes involving Indians,547 and in 1953 by P.L. 83-280, which extended 
state civil and criminal jurisdiction over the tribes in several states and gave 
the remaining states the option of assuming such jurisdiction.548 The Senate 
Report on P.L. 280 stated that while enforcement of law and order on 
reservation had “been left largely to the Indian groups themselves,” many 
“tribes are not adequately organized to perform that function” and willing 
states were best positioned to fill the resulting “hiatus in law-enforcement 
authority.”549
Navajo Tribal Council members of this period clearly understood that 
unless they developed a legal system that satisfied outside observers, either 
Arizona would take jurisdiction or the federal government would thrust it 
upon the state.550  They therefore put even further resources and energy into 
legal reform.  Some of the reforms were intended to make the legal system 
more expressive of local sentiment, such as the 1950 reform instituting local 
544
 P.L. 80-881 (1949).
545
 H. Rep. No. 80-2355, 2284 (June 15, 1948) (“Indian tribes do not enforce the laws 
covering offenses committed by Indians  . . . and law and order should be established on the 
reservations when tribal laws for the discipline of its members have broken down.”).
546 Id. at 2286 (Jan. 27, 1948 letter of Hon. George L. Grope).
547
 P.L. 81-785 (1950).
548
 P.L. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended 18 U.S.C. § 1162, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-
1326, 28 US.C. § 1360).  
549
 S. Rep. No. 83-699, 2411-12 (July 29, 1953).
550
 Conn at 335; Tom Tso, Moral Principles, Traditions, and Fairness in the Navajo Courts,
76 JUDICATURE 15, 15 (1992). 
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election of judges instead of appointment by the federal superintendent.551
Others, such as the adoption of state traffic laws,552 procedures for seizure of 
property to enforce debt judgments,553 and the requirement that marriages 
between Navajos and non-Navajos comply with state or foreign law,554 appear 
more directly designed to appease the fears of outsiders.
In 1959 these efforts brought the tribe a tremendous legal victory.  In 
Williams v. Lee555 the United States Supreme Court reversed the Arizona 
Supreme Court to hold that the state court had no jurisdiction over an action 
by a non-Indian trader to collect a debt against Navajos for goods sold on the 
Navajo Nation.  Citing in part the fact that the the Tribe itself had “in recent 
years greatly improved its legal system”556 the Court held that there could “be 
no doubt that to allow the exercise of state jurisdiction here would undermine 
the authority of the tribal courts over Reservation affairs and hence would 
infringe on the right of the Indians to govern themselves.”557  The same year, 
the Secretary of the Interior approved a comprehensive Navajo judicial reform 
package.  The tribe dates the existence of a tribal court system independent 
from the federally imposed Court of Indian Affairs from that year.
d. Challenges for Navajo Justice
But this triumphant cap on judicial reform does not mean that the 
resulting legal system is a successful one.  Scholars have long realized that the 
most important work of law occurs beyond the eyes of judges and police.  As 
Karl Llewellyn and E. Adamson Hoebel observed in their study of the 
Cheyenne legal system, 
The success of any legal system depends upon its acceptance 
by the people to whom it applies.  Insofar as the system is an 
integrated part of the web of social norms developed within a 
society’s culture . . . it will be accepted as a parcel of habit-
conduct patterns in the social heritage of the people. . . . Law-
in-action exists only because less stringent methods of control 
551 Id. at 346.
552 Id. at 350.
553 Id. at 355.
554
 9 Nav. T.C. § 2 (1957), discussed in In re Validation of Marriage of Francisco, No. A-CV-
15-88 (Navajo 08/02/1989).
555
 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
556 Id. at 222.
557 Id. at 223.
92
have failed to hold all persons in line or in harmony, on points 
of moment.558
The more that law on the books or law in the courts diverges from popular 
conceptions of justice, the less efficient it is in regulating human behavior.   
Individuals will fail to follow the law except when directly observed or 
coerced by representatives of the state.  Few governments can afford the cost 
of this constant surveillance, and even paid governmental representatives will 
often diverge from the announced view of the law in their duties.559  Equally 
important, the perceived tension between justice and the government leads to 
corruption and other rent-seeking behavior detrimental to the community as a 
whole.560
There is evidence that the formal legal system created by the Navajo 
Tribal Council was, at least initially, not well incorporated in the hearts, 
minds, or lives of the Navajo people.  In 1972, a study of Navajo law reported 
that 
Law (bee haz’aanii) in the Navajo language is distinguished 
from ‘a way of living’ in the religious sense (mahagha) or the 
way that people think or plan (nahat’a).  Anglo law is not, 
then, a code that one addresses himself to when he decides how 
to act or tells other people how to act, as it may well be for the 
558 KARL LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY at 239 (1941).  Even 
new legal principles may have their greatest impact outside legal enforcement structures.  A 
recent book on the effect of the Americans with Disabilities Act, for example, found that 
while new legal rights had a significant impact on the sixty people with disabilities 
interviewed for the study, the impact was due to transformation of the self perception of the 
interviewees and voluntary compliance on the part of their employers and coworkers rather 
than formal legal assertion or enforcement of rights.  DAVID ENGEL & FRANK MUNGER, 
RIGHTS OF INCLUSION (2002).
559
 This process is apparent, for example, in the implementation of rape reforms of the 1970s 
and 1980s.  While states have generally reformed their laws to remove requirements for 
corroboration of the victims’ testimony, use of force against the victim, and injury to the 
victim, the laws have not appreciably increased rape convictions because prosecutors, judges, 
and juries continue to rely on these factors in determining whether to prosecute or convict.  
See Julie Horney & Cassia Spohn, 25 LAW & SOCIETY REVIEW 117 (1991). 
560 See, e.g., Stephen Cornell & Joseph P. Kalt, Where Does Economic Development Really 
Come From? Constitutional Rule Among the Contemporary Sioux and Apache, 33 ECONOMIC 
INQUIRY 402 (July 1995).  While I believe that Kalt and Cornell wrongly attribute the 
governmental instability and resulting economic failure of the Oglala Sioux Tribe to the 
failure of its governmental structure to mimic the traditional tribal structure of the nineteenth 
century, I believe they are correct in pointing to its problems as an effect of a community that 
does not respect its government or its representatives. 
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middle class white person . . . Thus while an Anglo might say 
to a child seen removing an object from a pick-up, ‘Don’t do 
that Johnny.  That is against the law,” a Navajo might say 
“Don’t do that son.  That is not how to act.”
Anglo law is best understood by Navajos as the forceful 
activity of the courts, the police and others upon whom the 
authority has been placed.  It is descriptively the function of 
these institutions.  It is not the business of ordinary people.561
Distance between the law and “the business of ordinary people” is not 
necessarily incompatible with a functioning legal system.  The sense of the 
separateness, almost sacredness, of law is a common Anglo perception of 
law,562 and may even be part of what gives force to the idea of the “rule of 
law.”563  But to the extent that the legal system is perceived not only as 
separate from ordinary people, but also as without relevance to the rules that 
govern a good life, it loses much of its efficacy.
The Navajo Nation and tribes generally must struggle with the legacy 
of colonialism in trying to achieve internal legitimacy. On the one hand, their 
governments and courts may be perceived as tools of the colonizers, 
implementing a law that is almost by definition illegitimate.  On the other 
hand, seen through eyes colored by years of non-Indian education, they may 
be perceived as illegitimate because they lack the formality, the resources, or 
the education of non-Indian courts. Frank Pommersheim eloquently lays out 
this dilemma in his book Braid of Feathers:
Identifiable segments of most tribes have at times 
refused to consider tribal courts legitimate.  In this regard, 
many tribal courts are vilified as ‘white men’s’ creations . . . . 
The courts are seen as instruments of outside forces and values 
that are not traditional and therefore not legitimate.
By contrast, some segments of most tribal populations 
(and local non-Indian populations) view tribal courts as 
illegitimate because they fall, or appear to fall, far below 
recognized state and federal standards in such matters ranging 
561
 Vicenti at 156-57. 
562 See PATRICIA EWICK AND SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMONPLACE OF LAW: STORIES FROM 
EVERYDAY LIFE 47, 77 (1998) (describing one understanding of law as separate from and 
transcending everyday life). 
563 See PAUL KAHN, THE REIGN OF LAW: MARBURY V. MADISON AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF 
AMERICA 19-24 (1997) (arguing that the rule of law must be the rule of no one and no time). 
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from the institutional separation of powers to the provision of 
civil due process and enforcement of judgments.564
Two studies of the Navajo courts from the 1970s reveal internal 
legitimacy problems attributable to these factors.  Samuel Brakel examined 
the Navajo courts in his 1978 book The Cost of Separate Justice.   One of the 
essential problems that Brakel found with the Navajo courts as with the two 
other tribal court systems he studied was that a sense of inferiority led the 
relatively uneducated tribal judges to rely heavily on legal technicalities and 
on the urging of legally educated counsel.  This judicial insecurity, he found, 
deprived the courts both of the ability to administer justice, to hear both sides 
fairly, or to express any kind of local or customary sense of justice.  While 
Brakel argued for the abolishment of tribal courts, Dan Vicenti and his 
coauthors on the 1972 The Law of the People: Diné Bibee Haz’áanii,565
argued for their preservation and greater independence from non-tribal law.  
But like Brakel the authors found that Navajo judges in their efforts to appear 
just as good as non-Indian courts relied too heavily on non-Indian attorneys 
and practiced a kind of rigid formality that had little to do with justice.566
The authors also presented evidence that the courts were either not 
appreciated by or accessible to the Navajo population. They cited the fact that 
in 1959, the Navajo courts handled 9,555 criminal cases, but only 690 civil 
actions, and that a 1960s study of the work of one Navajo judge in the 1960s 
reported that the judge handled 2,216 criminal cases and only 275 civil 
cases.567  As individuals are generally forced into criminal court by the 
choices of the government, these statistics suggested that very few Navajos 
voluntarily used tribal courts as a means for the resolution of disputes, 
whether, as Brakel believed, because they preferred state or federal courts, or, 
as Vicenti and his co-authors suggested, because they preferred to rely on 
traditional, extra-judicial systems of dispute resolution.
Contemporary statistics show a somewhat more balanced division 
between civil and criminal cases in the Navajo Nation.568  There is a similar 
trend in other tribal courts as tribal members begin to choose and guide their 
564 POMMERSHEIM, supra note 8, at 67-68.
565 DAN VICENTI, LEONARD B. JIMSON, STEPHEN CONN, M.J.L. KELLOGG, THE LAW OF THE 
PEOPLE: DINÉ BIBEE HAZ’ÁANII, A BICULTURAL APPROACH TO LEGAL EDUCATION FOR 
NAVAJO STUDENTS (Ramah Navajo High School Press 1972) (hereinafter THE LAW OF THE 
PEOPLE). 
566 Id. at 184-86. 
567 Id. at 158.
568
 Judicial Branch of the Navajo Nation, Fiscal Year 2002, Annual Report at 22 (2003).
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involvement with tribal law.569  On the Navajo Nation, this may because of 
tribal laws passed in recent years that address significant legal needs of 
Navajo people, among them a comprehensive child support law, the Navajo 
Preference in Employment Act, and the Navajo Repossession Act.  In part it 
may also be the result of significant efforts to incorporate traditional Navajo 
law ways into formal Navajo legal institutions, both through use of common 
law concepts in decision-making, and through the creation of Peacemaker 
courts that are intended to replicate traditional methods of dispute 
resolution.570
But the Navajo Nation, like other tribal courts, must still struggle with
its historical legacy in building its legal system.  Its decisions are still shaped 
by the very real fear that should it fail to conform to outsider ideas of law, 
non-Indian actors will diminish its power,571 and the knowledge that some 
tribal members will perceive the court as illegitimate for these reasons as well.  
On the other hand, the court is also aware that to the extent it is perceived as 
only a pale shadow of non-Indian courts, it will lose legitimacy both in the 
eyes of other tribal members and many of those that argue for the preservation 
of tribal courts.  At the same time, the courts continue to provide significant 
practical and symbolic possibilities for resisting the pressures of colonization 
and encouraging the revitalization of Indian tribes.  By co-opting western style 
courts as vehicles for the enforcement of tribal visions of law, Indian tribes 
can express and protect tribal interests and independence in a way recognized 
by non-Indian institutions.  
The ambivalent legacy of tribal courts thus presents tribes with 
opportunities as well as challenges.  In the next section, I discuss the ways that 
jurisdiction over disputes involving nonmembers is crucial to exploiting this 
opportunity.
569
 Nell Jessup Newton, Memory and Misrepresentation: Representing Crazy Horse, 27 Conn. 
L. Rev. 1003, 1037-38 (1995).
570 See Tom Tso, Moral Principles, Traditions, and Fairness in the Navajo Courts, 76 
JUDICATURE 15, 15 (1992) (describing efforts to incorporate Navajo common law); Justice 
Robert Yazzie, “Life Comes From It”: Navajo Justice Concepts, 24 N.M.L. REV. 175, 1867-
87 (1994) (describing peacemaker courts).  It is difficult to determine the extent to which 
either effort in fact replicates traditional law ways.  The ways that common law concepts are 
employed may owe as much to Anglo ideas of law as they do to traditional justice concepts, 
and the Peacemaker courts handle only a small fraction of the matters filed in the Navajo 
courts each year.  The “authenticity” of these efforts in the sense that they replicate the law 
ways of Navajo people hundreds of years ago is less important than their reflection of current 
Navajo ideas of justice and their success in creating a sense of ownership of law among the 
Navajo people.
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 Justice Robert Yazzie elaborates on this theme in Watch Your Six: An Indian Nation 
Judge’s View of Where We Are, Where We Are Going, 23 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW 
497 (1999).
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IV.  The Role of the Outsider in Tribal Legal Systems
The recent United States Supreme Court cases regarding jurisdiction 
over nonmembers are colored by the assumption that the most important work 
of justice lies in adjudicating disputes among those that are formally enrolled 
in the community and that concern matters traditionally of unique importance 
to the tribe.  This assumption accords well with much political theory, which 
tends to begin with an imagined community with fixed boundaries and has 
less often grappled with questions of how community boundaries are drawn, 
and the obligations caused by varying levels of community membership.  
While there are, of course, exceptions,572 for much mainstream political and 
legal theory the outsider is an exceptional case, troubling the polity and its 
rules for distribution of goods and rights but not meaningfully contributing to 
its development.573  In this section of the Article, I want to build on theoretical 
work regarding the development of law, and draw on my own research to 
suggest that this is particularly true for today’s Indian tribes. 
Much of formal law everywhere is the product of conflict,574 a means 
to address disputes to which existing norms and relationships do not provide a 
resolution.  Where informal controls, whether the pressure of clan relatives or 
internalized moral or religious norms, are sufficient to regulate individual 
behavior, there is little need for formal legal institutions.575  This is not 
possible where a community includes diverse groups that do not share 
common norms or relationships,576 or where external factors create situations 
to which community norms do not present a clear solution.577  At this point, 
formal legal institutions must step in, to draw on their institutional legitimacy 
to resolve disputes in a way that will be respected by the community of which 
572
 For a broad based political theory that has always incorporated questions of membership, 
see MICHAEL WALZER’S SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 31-
64 (1980).  Feminist theory has also long questioned assumptions that citizenship is a 
straightforward category of belonging.  See, e.g., IRIS YOUNG: JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF 
DIFFERENCE 7-11 (1990) (drawing from feminist and critical race theory to develop a theory 
questioning categories of inclusion). The increasing mobility of people, jobs, and culture has 
also generated a wealth of literature on the different kinds of membership in our polities.  See, 
e.g., THE CITIZENSHIP DEBATES: A READER, Chs. 8-10 (Gershon Shafir ed. 1998) (collecting 
essays).
573 See also BONNIE HONIG, DEMOCRACY AND THE FOREIGNER at 2-3 (2001).
574 See FRIEDMAN, supra note 321 at 143 (“Formal law presupposes [a] climate of conflict”).
575 Id. at 144.
576 See David M. Engel, The Oven Bird’s Song: Insiders, Outsiders, and Personal Injuries in 
an American Community, 18 L. & SOCIETY REV. 551 (1987), reprinted in THE LAW & 
SOCIETY READER 1, 23-24 (Richard L. Abel ed. 1995).
577 FRIEDMAN, supra note 321 at 145.
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they are part.   Thus, despite the assumptions of both opponents and some 
advocates of tribal jurisdiction, in some ways it is precisely to address the 
conflicts involving outsiders and, more broadly, changes brought about by 
outside influences, that formal legal institutions exist.
Evidence regarding other tribal court systems supports this thesis.  As 
discussed above, Rennard Strickland discovered in studying the Cherokee 
legal system of the 1820s and 1830s that disputes exclusively between
Cherokees arising from familiar tribal activities could more frequently be 
resolved without resort to the courts, while the courts disproportionately 
handled cases involving intermarried white men, and economic and social 
disputes arising from contact with Anglo culture.578  In addition, much of the 
work of the Indian police of the late nineteenth century involved controlling 
non-Indians trespassing on Indian lands and game.579
My research regarding the Navajo Nation provides more evidence of 
the importance of outsiders in tribal legal systems.  As discussed in Part II, the 
Navajo Nation has a high degree of insularity relative to most Indian tribes.  
Culturally, demographically, and geographically, it is one of the tribes that 
most closely matches the archetype of the homogenous and traditional tribe.  
Despite this, 21.2% of the cases decided by the Navajo Nation appellate court 
over the last thirty-two years have involved non-Navajo litigants.  This figure 
has little to do with the numbers of non-Navajos residing on the Navajo 
reservation.  For example, while non-Navajo Indians compose about 6.5% of 
the reservation population and non-Indians compose only 3.5%, almost all of 
the cases involving outsiders, 19.5% of the total cases decided by the Navajo 
appellate courts, involve non-Indians.  Cases involving non-Navajos, on the 
other hand, compose only 1.7% of all cases.580
Table III:  Percentage of Navajo Appellate Cases Involving Nonmembers
1971-
81
1981-
87
1987-
92
1992-
97
1997-
2003
Total
Total cases 
involving 
25 24 24 16 20 109
578 STRICKLAND, supra note 458 at 75.
579
 Hagan, supra note 436 at 52-55.
580
 Interestingly, most of the non-Navajo Indian cases arise from family relations with 
Navajos such as custody and domestic violence, while relatively few of the non-Indian cases 
do.  This appears to confirm the assertion of advocates of the Duro Fix legislation, that non-
member Indians often occupy a different role on reservations than do non-Indians, and are 
more integrated in the social life of tribal communities.  See Philip S. Deloria & Nell Jessup 
Newton, The Criminal Jurisdiction of Tribal Courts over Nonmember Indians, 38 FED. B. 
NEWS & J. 70 (1991). 
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nonmembers 
Total cases in 
period
147 151 95 53 67 513
Percent of cases 
involving
nonmembers 
17.00% 15.89% 25.26% 30.18% 30.76% 21.12%
If one looks at cases over only the last ten years, the figures become 
even more striking.  Since 1992, non-Navajos have been parties in over 30% 
of the cases decided by the Navajo Supreme Court, and non-Indians have been 
parties in 28%.   It is not clear that this figure represents an increase in the 
number of cases involving nonmembers, as during the same period the court 
stopped publishing opinions decided on a summary basis,581 which might 
increase the percentage simply by reducing the number of cases for which 
identification of the parties is not possible, or filter out cases that do not raise 
novel questions of law.  It does indicate, however, that over the last ten years 
almost one in three of the cases significant enough to require a publishable 
opinion have involved non-Indians.   
These statistics are a reflection of the reality of Navajo life. Even on 
the Navajo Nation, the tribal community that looks most, in some ways, like 
an independent state, neither the tribe nor the people are isolated from outside 
influences.  This interaction is reflected even in the clan system that is perhaps
the most central aspect of Navajo culture.582  Among the Navajo clans are the 
Nakai or Mexican clan, and clans named after the Utes, the Zunis, and the Flat 
Foot Paiute, all named for members of these groups that incorporated with the 
Navajos.583
The Navajo people have incorporated elements borrowed from 
Europeans and Americans deep within their culture in other areas as well.584
581
 These include, for example, appeals dismissed for failure to timely file or dismissed 
according to a stipulation of the parties.  They also include a case I filed on my own behalf, 
successfully challenging the Crownpoint District Court’s power to appoint me to represent 
parties outside my judicial district. 
582 See Robert Yazzie, “Life Comes From It”: Navajo Justice Concepts, 24 N.M.L. REV. 175, 
182-84 (1994) (discussing significance of clanship system in traditional Navajo law). 
583 ROBERT A. ROESSEL, JR., PICTORIAL HISTORY OF THE NAVAJO FROM 1860 TO 1910 at 146-
47 (1980) (reprinting August 22, 1890 Report of the Navajo Agency, Agent C.E. Vandever); 
see also Means v. District Court of the Chinle Judicial District, 8 (Navajo 05/11/1999) (listing 
clans); In re Marriage of Garcia, No. A-CV-02-84 (Navajo 02/20/1985) (discussing 
contributions of intermarried Mexicans).
584 In the words of former Chief Justice Tom Tso, “Navajos are . . . a flexible and adaptable 
people.  We find there are many things which we can incorporate into our lives that do not 
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The result is not a watered down culture, but instead one that is still uniquely 
Navajo and that has enabled the Navajo Nation to survive and even thrive.  
For example, although Spanish settlers originally introduced sheep to Navajo 
agriculture, sheep have become an essential part of Navajo society.585   The 
federal program of stock reduction in the early part of this century was a 
flashpoint for anger at federal interference with Navajo culture.586  While 
today overgrazing prohibits most people from making a living entirely off 
sheep herding, many Navajos keep some sheep to supplement their income,587
and mutton is part of a traditional Navajo meal,588 and sheep wool is necessary 
for the woven rugs for which Navajos are famous.  Ownership and care of the 
sheep herd are also deeply integrated in Navajo understandings of the world.  
Sheep are used, for example, to teach children values of responsibility and 
survival, and patterns of inheritance and division of sheep reflect and shape 
Navajo ideas of property and descent.589  One of the required portions of the 
annual Miss Navajo Nation contest (which, in contrast to non-Indian beauty 
contests, does not include a bathing suit contest and emphasizes academic and 
cultural accomplishment more than physical attractiveness) includes sheep 
butchering.  These and other fusions of culture have enhanced rather than 
diluted the distinctiveness and cohesion of Navajo society.590 
This interaction continues today.  As the above statistics reveal, a large 
number of Navajo business relationships are with non-Indians.  Many Navajo 
people living on reservations have been educated, lived, or worked in off-
reservation communities.  Even when they live and work on the reservation, 
change our concept of ourselves as Navajo.” Tom Tso, The Process of Decision Making in 
Tribal Courts, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 225, 227 (1989).
585 See JOHN J. WOOD ET AL., ‘SHEEP IS LIFE’: AN ASSESSMENT OF LIVESTOCK REDUCTION IN 
THE FORM NAVAJO-HOPI JOINT USE AREA (1982).  While the 20 years between this study and 
the present has probably reduced the percentage of Navajos involved in sheep herding, my 
experience confirms that sheep remain an integral part of Navajo culture, even for people that 
do not keep sheep themselves.
586 DONALD L. PARMAN, THE NAVAJOS AND THE NEW DEAL at 65-66, 77 (1976).
587 Id. at 26 (noting that 36% of Navajos used sheep as source of income). 
588 Id. (44% used livestock in ceremonies both as part of meal for participants and in symbolic 
role).  During my time on the Navajo Nation, holding a mutton feast was the common way to 
raise money for a colleague hit by hard times, and the weekly mutton buffet was a well-
attended event at the Navajo Nation Inn.
589 Id. at 25-26.  The importance of sheep keeping is also reflected in the bitter legal disputes 
over grazing land.
590 See AUBREY WILLIAMS, THE NAVAJO POLITICAL PROCESS 2 (1970) (“The cultural history of 
the Navajo is replete with references concerning the various cultural items and techniques 
borrowed and incorporated from other people.  Yet each of the historical and cultural accounts . 
. . . mentions the distinctive character of Navajo culture through time, in spite of the influx of 
ideas from different cultures.”) 
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Navajos will frequently interact with non-Navajos.  Non-Indian mining 
companies, such as Peabody Coal, and stores and customer service industries, 
such as Basha’s Supermarket and Cameron Trading Post, are among the most 
significant on-reservation employers.  Given the lack of economic 
development on the Navajo Nation, moreover, most Navajos rely on off-
reservation businesses for their consumer needs.  Navajo people and those 
from other nearby reservations flood the off-reservation town of Gallup, New 
Mexico on weekends, making its mammoth Super Wal-Mart among the most 
successful in the United States.  
Similarly, although the tribe is very aware and proud of its sovereignty 
and separateness from the United States, serving in the U.S. military is an 
important and honored part of Navajo life.  As on most reservations, a 
procession of veterans carrying the U.S. flag is a solemn opening to public 
celebrations and fairs.   Again, military service does not represent only a 
capitulation to Anglo culture, but a celebration of Navajo accomplishments.591
Navajo code-talkers, who played an important role in World War II by using 
the Navajo language to form an unbreakable code, are heroes not simply 
because of their military service but because that service valued the unique 
and formerly oppressed Navajo language. 
The outside world influences ideas of law as well.  If you ask a 
classroom of Navajo students about the Navajo Nation Bill of Rights, you’ll 
probably get blank looks; but ask them what the cops on TV say when they 
arrest someone, and you’ll get a chorus: “You have the right to remain silent, 
if you choose to give up that right anything you say or do can be used against 
you in a court of law . . . .”  And while the clan system retains significant 
importance in Navajo life, it is no longer the primary source of property or 
economic support.  While property formerly descended through the maternal 
clan and individuals depended on matrilineal relatives for support in cases of 
divorce or death rather than on what Anglo society calls the immediate family, 
today many Navajo people expect to inherit from their spouses and expect an 
equitable division of property and future support in the event of divorce. 
Mark Rosen, in his study of Indian Civil Rights Act cases in tribal 
courts over the last 15 years suggests that a similar influence can be seen in 
judicial decisions.592  While tribal courts are engaged in a process of tailoring 
ICRA guarantees to tribal traditions and circumstances, they typically rely on 
federal decisions as guidance in this process, and even when they do not cite 
591
 While many Indians voluntarily sign up for military service, the mandatory draft has been 
objected to as a violation of sovereignty rights.  See Ex Parte Green, 123 F.2d 862 (2d Cir. 
1941).
592
 Mark D. Rosen, Multiple Authoritative Interpreters of Quasi-Constitutional Federal Law: 
Tribe Courts and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 479, 526 (2000).
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federal decisions or law, their interpretations often use federal constitutional 
terms, such as due process, fundamental rights, or equal protection, suggesting 
a deep integration of federal understandings of rights.593   Rosen notes that 
even in Navajo Nation decisions that rely heavily on customary ways to 
interpret ICRA guarantees, traditions are read through a lens colored by Anglo 
legal understandings.  Thus, in interpreting the due process guarantee, the 
Navajo court derived the right to notice and a hearing from traditional 
practices of resolving disputes by a collective decision at a public gathering 
led by an elder statesman and attended by the wrongdoer, rather than rights to 
collective decision-making or arbitration by an elder statesman.594
Mobility between on and off reservation communities has also shaped 
the legal problems faced by the tribe.  In the 1990s, for example, as the 
influence of gangs and drugs was decreasing in urban centers, it was 
increasing on the Navajo Nation as returning residents brought these things 
back from the cities.  The Navajo Nation is dotted with hundreds of open 
uranium mines, leftovers from days when the BIA granted mining companies 
almost unfettered access to Navajo lands.   The extended families that 
formerly supported Navajo children are often scattered by the need to find 
work elsewhere and by partial adoption of the Anglo emphasis on the nuclear 
family.  Federal policies of removing children from their homes and sending 
them to schools that sought to generate shame in Navajo culture and language 
have created generations that lack either appropriate family skills or 
education, and that are firmly grounded neither in Anglo or Navajo tradition.  
Exposure to Anglo ideas of the good life have also created conflict within 
Navajo society regarding the extent to which Navajo ideals should be pursued 
above the material goods valued by mainstream society.  The point is not that 
European American culture has been a boon to Navajo culture—indeed, one 
could persuasively trace many current social problems to European American 
influence595—but that it has importantly shaped the legal and social issues 
facing the Navajo Nation and the range of cultural acceptable solutions for 
resolving them. 
a.  Jurisdiction Over Nonmembers and Institutional Legitimacy
593 Id. 
594 Id.
595
 This is by no means a radical perspective.  In 1928, the Brookings Institution, 
commissioned by the Secretary of the Interior to write a report on Indian Administration, 
concluded that the United States was obliged to help the Indian that wished to live according 
to his traditional culture, because “the old economic basis of his culture has been to a 
considerable extent destroyed and new problems have been forced upon him by contacts with 
the whites.”  MERIAM REPORT at 88 (1928).
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Given this importance of outsiders to contemporary tribes, jurisdiction 
over nonmembers becomes crucial in shoring up tribal legitimacy for two 
reasons:  first, so that tribal legal systems can address the everyday legal and 
social problems of concern to Indian people; second, so that tribal legal 
systems are perceived as respected legal institutions. 
1.  Jurisdiction Over Nonmembers and Utility of Tribal Legal 
Systems 
Given the interrelationships between Navajo and non-Navajo society, 
jurisdiction over nonmembers is crucial in preserving the practical utility of 
tribal legal systems.  As the above statistics show, even on a reservation as 
large and homogenous as the Navajo Nation a large portion of the commercial 
actors are non-Indian.  Non-Indians are the employers, the insurers, and the 
merchants.  They are the building contractors and the mining companies.  
While the Navajo Nation, like other tribes, is actively pursuing economic 
development, given the disparity in capital, experience, and education 
between Indian and non-Indian people this need to turn to non-Indian 
businesses is not likely to change any time soon.  Nor should tribes or their 
members be forced to rely solely on tribal businesses in order to ensure tribal 
jurisdiction.  This would impair tribal economies, discourage cooperation 
between tribes and states and non-Indian businesses, and increase non-Indian 
concern that tribes unfairly grant preference to their members.596
Without jurisdiction over non-Indian businesses, however, tribes lose 
the ability to pursue uniform economic policies on their reservations or protect 
their members in their interactions with outsiders.  The Court’s decision in 
Shirley v. Atkinson Trading Post597 provides a good example.  The inability to 
tax hotel guests at the Atkinson Trading Post did not undermine the taxing 
ability or revenues of the Navajo Nation as greatly as it would for other Indian 
nations, as the Nation is primarily composed of tribal and member owned 
land.  Despite this, Navajo hotel occupancy tax revenues dropped 15%, by 
$181,179 in 2002, and are estimated to be reduced by $506,170 or 44% for 
596
 While many tribes, including the Navajo Nation, granted preferences to tribally owned 
businesses, and these preferences have the approval of the federal government, 25 U.S.C. § 
452, these preferences are only for qualified tribal businesses, and in practice tribes must 
often rely on the businesses of non-members.
597
 532 U.S. 645 (2001) (holding that Navajo Nation could not tax nonmember hotel guests at 
nonmember owned hotel on nonmembers’ fee land). 
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2003.598  Its impact will be much more severe on most other reservations, 
where much more land in non-Indian hands, and where these lands are the 
most significant sites of economic activity.  Eliminating taxing and other 
economic regulatory jurisdiction over these lands would deprive the tribe of 
the ability to set taxes with sufficient uniformity to be meaningfully enforced.  
Governments have enough trouble getting compliance with their tax laws and 
overcoming the perception that evading taxes is common and just.  Imagine
the multiplication of this difficulty if your neighbors had no need to pay taxes 
simply because of who owned title to their land.  And while tribes seek to 
invest in infrastructure to create a favorable climate for economic 
development, without taxing jurisdiction they cannot force businesses on fee 
land to contribute to the costs of this infrastructure.  In the words of Navajo 
Nation Chief Justice Robert Yazzie, “[t]he fee land businesses, for all 
practical purposes, receive a free ride.”599
In addition, jurisdiction over nonmember businesses is crucial to 
protect tribal members.   Jurisdiction over contracts between tribal members 
and nonmember businesses, whether those contracts are for employment or 
for purchases of goods and services, seems firmly protected by Montana’s 
consensual relationship exception.  Encouraged by the Court’s recent cases, 
however, non-Indian employers are increasingly challenging tribal exercises 
of jurisdiction over them.600  Even if the consensual relationship exception 
ensures jurisdiction where non-Indians employ tribal members, to the extent 
that it denies similar jurisdiction over nonmembers it will encourage invidious 
distinctions by both nonmembers and tribes.  Non-Indian employers will have 
incentives to avoid hiring or entering into business relationships with tribal 
members to avoid tribal jurisdiction.  Tribes, moreover, will be encouraged to 
see themselves as legislating only for the protection of tribal members, as it is 
only they and not the broader community of reservation residents for whom 
their laws can be enforced. 
The absence of jurisdiction also undermines tribal efforts to address 
crime on Indian reservations.  Lack of jurisdiction encourages non-Indians to 
perceive reservations as places to flaunt disdain for the law and hostility to 
Indian people.   Oliphant and Belgarde’s actions—punching a tribal police 
598 See www.navajotax.org/new_page_7.htm (reporting and estimated revenues collected from 
various taxes) (last accessed 1/29/04).
599
 Hearing Before the Committee on Indian Affairs, S. Hrg. 107-338, 107th Cong., 2d Sess.  
(Feb. 27, 2002) (written testimony). 
600 See, e.g., Arizona Public Service Company v. Aspaas, 77 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(successfully challenging tribal jurisdiction to strike down company anti-nepotism law); 
Manygoats v. Cameron Trading Post, No. SC-CV-50-98 (Navajo 01/14/2000) (challenging 
tribal jurisdiction over action by terminated employee).
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officer that tried to stop a brawl, engaging with tribal police in a high speed 
chase--might be seen as examples of this.  But even today non-Indians engage 
in flagrant speeding across tribal lands, apparently relishing the perceived lack 
of jurisdiction over them.601
A more disturbing example comes from statistics regarding crime 
against Indians, particular against Indian women.  The average annual rate of 
rape is 3.5 times higher among Native women than it is for other ethnic 
groups, and one in three Native women will be raped in her lifetime.602  But 
while for other ethnic groups, most offenders are of the same race as their 
victims, 90% of Indian women are attacked by an offender of a different 
race.603  (In general, 70% of Indian victims of violent crime are attacked by an 
offender of a different race, again in sharp contrast with the preponderance of 
intra-racial violent crimes among other ethnic groups.)  Although the federal 
government has jurisdiction to prosecute these crimes to the extent they take 
place in Indian country,604 it rarely does:  the U.S. Attorney’s office declines 
to prosecute 50 to 85% of the cases that are reported, and many of those it 
does accept are child sexual abuse cases.605
The lack of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians thus creates a 
significant practical gap in law enforcement, which may help to create and 
perpetuate the high rates of interracial violence in Indian country.606  It 
appears to contribute to a loss of faith in the efficacy of law on the part of 
victims as well.  While sexual assault is significantly underreported across all 
ethnic groups, Native women are even less likely to report such crimes.607
Given the small chance that a successful prosecution will result, the choice not 
601 Testimony of Robert Yazzie, Hearing Before the Committee on Indian Affairs, S. Hrg. 
107-338, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 27, 2002).  This perception is not necessarily accurate.  
Many tribes, including the Navajo Nation, have cross-deputization agreements with their 
surrounding states, under which tribal police have authority to stop and ticket non-Indians for 
traffic violations on behalf of the state.  Under these agreements, of course, states must agree 
to prosecute the tribally issued charges. 
602
 Sarah Deer, Toward an Indigenous Jurisprudence of Rape, KANSAS J. LAW & POLICY
(forthcoming 2004).
603 Id.
604
 In Indian country, the federal government has jurisdiction over all crimes committed by a 
non-Indian against an Indian under the Indian Country Crimes Act, and jurisdiction over 
Indians committing sixteen “major” crimes, including rape and sexual assault, under the 
Major Crimes Act.  18 U.S.C. § 1153.  One significant problem with the statistics regarding 
sexual assault of Indian women is that they do not reflect whether attacks take place in Indian 
country or outside it, and so lack necessary guidance regarding the jurisdictional regime that 
applies.
605
 Deer, supra note __. 
606 Id. at __, quoting Dr. David Lisak.
607 Id.
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to report is understandable.  But it too contributes to the general failure of any 
legal system to address violent crime on Indian reservations.  
2.  Jurisdiction Over Nonmembers and Internal Legitimacy
Jurisdiction over outsiders is also integral to the internal legitimacy of 
tribal legal systems, the extent to which tribal communities accept them as 
valid institutions.  This perceived legitimacy is of significant practical 
importance to Indian communities, because it helps to dictate the extent to 
which legal dictates will be complied with absent perfect surveillance or 
application of force.608
This kind of symbolic legitimacy, of course, is not independent of the 
practical efficacy discussed in the previous section.  Perceived legitimacy 
stems in part from very utilitarian concerns.  If a legal system in general is 
perceived to preserve safety, protect property, and contribute to prosperity it 
gains the allegiance of the community it serves.609  Even where individuals 
believe the exercise of the law to be ineffective or arbitrary in isolated cases, 
the reservoir of belief in the overall utility of the legal system helps to ensure 
compliance and respect.  Where, however, a legal system cannot address 
concerns of significant impact to the community, it loses both its purpose and 
its legitimacy.610  To the extent that tribal legal officials cannot address the 
everyday questions of law and order—to take examples from recent cases, 
zoning, reckless driving on reservation roads, regulation of on-reservation 
businesses, or searches of private property by law enforcement—they lose this 
source of legitimacy.
Power over non-Indians is also crucial for reasons distinct to tribal 
legal systems.  As described above, western style government institutions 
came to most reservations as a means of controlling Indian people.  While 
tribes often used these federal sanctioned institutions as a means to control 
non-Indians poaching on their lands, in the minds of federal policymakers the 
purpose of these institutions was to teach and assimilate Indians.  To the 
extent modern day tribal courts perpetuate a jurisdictional divide between 
members and nonmembers, they confirm the opinion of segments of 
608 See POMMERSHEIM, supra note 8, at 66- 67 (discussing legitimacy with respect to tribal 
legal systems); FRIEDMAN, supra note 321 at 112-116 (discussing importance of legitimacy 
generally).
609 See, e.g., FRIEDMAN, supra note 321 at 143 (“Law is right because it is useful.”).
610
 Sally Engle Merry, Going to Court: Strategies of Dispute Management in an American 
Urban Neighborhood, 13 LAW & SOCIETY REV. 891 (1979), reprinted in THE LAW & 
SOCIETY READER 36, 56 (Richard L. Abel ed. 1995) (noting that inability of courts to resolve 
disputes in urban housing project actually increased violence in community).
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reservation populations that they are simply tools in a continuing colonial 
project. 
But loss of jurisdiction over non-Indians undermines tribal courts in 
the eyes of all segments of reservation populations.  Indian people, with a foot 
each in reservation and non-reservation worlds, are not deaf to the message 
sent by limiting tribal adjudication to them: Indian courts are inferior, good 
enough for Indians but not for white folks.  This message contributes to 
mistrust and alienation from tribal courts and institutions among tribal 
members.  As John St. Clair, the Chief Judge of the Shoshone and Arapahoe 
Tribal Court of the Wind River Indian Reservation, testified to the Senate 
Indian Affairs Committee, “[t]his double standard of justice creates 
resentment and projects an image that non-Indians are above the law in the 
area where they choose to reside or enter into.”611  When the federal 
government declares that the courts of subordinate tribal governments cannot 
have jurisdiction over members of the dominant society, it cannot help but 
undermine the legitimacy of the courts in the eyes of the communities they 
serve.     
b.  Jurisdiction Over Outsiders and Institutional Fairness
The previous section focused on the importance of jurisdiction over 
outsiders in ensuring that tribal legal systems are effective.  This section will 
focus on the importance of jurisdiction over outsiders in ensuring that they are 
just.  If tribal courts did not have power to adjudicate outsider rights, I will 
argue, they would not be so fair.  Despite the recent inroads into tribal 
jurisdiction over outsiders, in many cases tribal courts will be the only fora in 
which they can assert their claims.  Fairness of tribal court systems, therefore, 
is of significant concern both for tribal members and nonmembers.
1.  Jurisdiction Over Outsiders and Conceptions of the Judicial Role
Somewhat counterintuitively, it appears that the best explanation for 
the evenhandedness of the Navajo courts is the sense of self-importance held 
by its decision-makers. Political scientists have long examined judicial “role 
orientations,” or judicial understandings of the institutional role of courts and 
judges,612 as one factor influencing judicial behavior.613 Particular conceptions 
611
 Hearing Before the Committee on Indian Affairs, S. Hrg. 107-338, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. at 
15 (Feb. 27, 2002).
612
 James L. Gibson, Personality and Elite Political Behavior: The Influence of Self Esteem on 
Judicial Decision Making, 43 J. Politics 104, 108 (1981).
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of the judicial role may lead judges to depart in judicial behavior from 
individual preferences, whether it is to cater to the needs of a particular 
group,614 to attempt to strictly follow prior judicial precedent,615 or to defer to 
other governmental institutions.616  Navajo justices’ conception of the court’s 
institutional role appears to be a significant factor behind the court’s relatively 
good track record.  This conception, in turn, is importantly connected to the 
scope of their jurisdiction.    
As an institution, the Navajo court thinks a lot of itself.  Its decisions 
are replete with references to the important role of the court in providing a just 
and distinctly tribal resolution to disputes that come before it, and its judges 
traverse the country and even the world arguing for the preservation of the 
courts and for the dissemination of the legal values promulgated by it.617
613 See John M. Scheb, II et al., Judicial Role Orientations, Attitudes and Decision Making: A 
Research Note, 42 Western Pol. Q. 427, 427 (1989) (collecting citations).    
614
 Such an orientation could be clearly wrong, as when a judge sees herself of serving the 
interests of her particular race or class, or more acceptable, as when a judge sees the judicial 
role as protecting the powerless from oppression by the majority. 
615
 Much work has been devoted to trying to determine the existence and importance of such 
“activist” or “restraintist” attitudes toward the appropriate judicial role.  See, e.g., Victor E. 
Flango et al., The Concept of Judicial Role: A Methodological Note, 19 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 277 
(1975); J. Woodford Howard, Jr., Role Perception and Behavior in Three U.S. Courts of 
Appeals, 39 J. Politics 916 (1977); John M. Scheb, II et al., Judicial Role Orientations, 
Attitudes and Decision Making: A Research Note, 42 Western Pol. Q. 427, 427 (1989).  This 
work is not of great significance to the inquiry as to tribal judicial treatment of nonmembers.  
The supposed restraintist-activist divide conceals the general judicial agreement that restraint 
and creativity both have appropriate roles in decision-making and the narrow range of cases 
(about 10% of cases according to one survey of appellate judges) judges consider offer some 
scope for creativity.  J. Woodford Howard, Jr., Role Perception and Behavior in Three U.S. 
Courts of Appeals, 39 J. POLITICS 916, 922 (1977).  There is general agreement, in other 
words, that both creativity and interpretation are appropriate judicial behaviors, and the 
differences are ones of time and place.  Id.  Rather, the concern about tribal courts is that they 
will be swayed by factors that are generally agreed to be judicially inappropriate, in particular 
the status of the parties and political pressure by tribal communities.  It is the importance of 
judicial role orientations in resisting these pressures that is more important.
616 See Frank B. Cross & Blake J. Nelson, Strategic Institutional Effects on Supreme Court 
Desicionmaking, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1437, 1479-80 (2001).
617
 One can see this by reviewing a few of the many articles and speeches by Robert Yazzie 
and Tom Tso, who together were Chief Justices of the Navajo Nation courts during almost the 
entire period I examine.  See Tom Tso, Indian Nations and the Human Right to an 
Independent Judiciary, 3. N.Y. CITY L. REV. 105 (1998); Tom Tso, Moral Principles, 
Traditions, and Fairness in the Navajo Courts, 76 JUDICATURE 15 (1992); Tom Tso, The 
Process of Decision Making in Tribal Courts, 31 ARIZ. L. REV. 225 (1989); Robert Yazzie, 
Watch Your Six: An Indian Nation Judge’s View of Where We Are, Where We Are Going, 23 
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 497 (1999); Robert Yazzie, “Life Comes From It”: Navajo Justice 
Concepts, 24 N.M.L. REV. 175 (1994); Testimony of Robert Yazzie, Hearing Before the 
Committee on Indian Affairs, S. Hrg. 107-338, 107th Cong., 2d Sess. (Feb. 27, 2002).
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This sense of self-importance is also evident in the one exception to 
the general even-handedness of the Navajo Supreme Court.  Where a litigant 
challenges the inherent jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation, the litigant is 
probably going to lose.618  While in many cases the Navajo courts will cede 
jurisdiction to another forum, whether in a child custody case because the 
child was wrongly taken from another jurisdiction,619 an employment case 
against a state school district in which the court deferred to the state courts as 
a matter of comity,620 or a tort case where the litigant had already chosen state 
worker’s compensation remedies,621 in each case raising the question whether 
the Navajo Nation courts as a matter of inherent jurisdiction had the power to 
regulate a particular dispute, in every single one the court held that it did, even 
in cases in which federal courts might reach a different conclusion.622
This insistence on tribal inherent jurisdiction provides support for the 
importance of Navajo justices’ role orientations in another way, by 
discounting the importance of strategic motivations in their decision-
making.623 The justices, it might be argued, rule in favor of non-Indians only 
to avoid federal judicial and legislative restrictions on their jurisdiction.  But 
questions of jurisdiction over outsiders are among the few tribal court 
618 This does not mean, however, that the court will be biased against the litigant as to the 
substantive issues.  As discussed above, in a 1999 employment case involving an employer 
that had repeatedly challenged the jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation in a variety of contexts, 
the court held that the Nation did have jurisdiction to regulate the company’s employment 
practices, but reversed the lower court’s holding that those practices violated Navajo law. 
Manygoats v. Cameron Trading Post, No. SC-CV-50-98 (Navajo 01/14/2000).
619
 These cases are discussed in Part II.d.3.
620
 Hubbard v. Chinle School District Nos. 24/25, Apache County, Arizona, 3 Nav. R. 167 
(Navajo 12/22/1982).
621
 These cases are discussed in Part II.d.1.
622 See, e.g., McArthur v. San Juan County, 309 F.3d 1216 (10th Cir. 2003) (Navajo district 
court improperly exercised jurisdiction over non-Indian insurance company); Arizona Public 
Service Company v. Aspaas, 77 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 1995) (Navajo court improperly found 
tribal jurisdiction over non-Indian employer).  Of course, as U.S. Supreme Court has 
increasingly departed from precedent to limit tribal jurisdiction, Navajo Nation decisions may 
be seen as a more faithful reflection of precedent, and have been upheld by reviewing lower 
federal courts only to find the decision reversed by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Atkinson 
Trading Company v. Shirley, 210 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding as had Navajo Nation 
Supreme Court that Navajo Nation had jurisdiction to tax Atkinson).
623
 The strategic model for explaining judicial behavior suggests that while judges act 
primarily to forward their individual preferences, they do so strategically, aware that their 
behavior is constrained by the power of other institutional actors.  See Frank B. Cross & 
Blake J. Nelson, Strategic Institutional Effects on Supreme Court Desicionmaking, 95 Nw. U. 
L. Rev. 1437, 1446 (2001).
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decisions that can always be challenged in federal court.624  While the justices 
are keenly aware of their vulnerability to federal control,625 they apparently 
choose to consistently rule against non-Indians in the one area in which the 
federal courts may exercise significant control and even respond by restricting 
their jurisdiction.  This suggests that where role orientations and strategic 
goals conflict, ideas of the institutional importance of the Navajo courts rather 
than the desire to avoid federal control of their actions hold sway.
Rather than create incentives to despotism, this sense of self-
importance has only enhanced the institutional imperatives to ensure that all 
litigants can be heard, and that decisions are not unduly influenced by factors 
perceived as inconsistent with the judicial role such as political pressures or 
the membership status of the parties.  This sense of self-importance is a large 
part of the reason that the Navajo court carefully scrutinizes the facts and law 
before it and tries to rule justly in response.  It is the reason that the court not 
only often rules in favor of non-Navajo parties, but also a substantial portion 
of the time rules against the Navajo Nation itself.  It has led the court, with no 
constitutional separation of powers, to construe Navajo common law and the 
Indian Civil Rights Act to create a right of judicial review of governmental 
actions.626  It has also led it to threaten to create judicial waivers of tribal 
sovereign immunity until the Navajo Nation Council created a legislative 
waiver.627
The deliberate effort to incorporate Navajo customary law has only 
enhanced this concern for justice.   In creating a jurisprudence of Navajo 
common law, the court sees itself as expressing the ideals not of aliens or 
colonizers, but of the Navajo people.  Each articulation of a Navajo common 
law concept, therefore, is a public declaration not only to Navajo people but to 
the wider community, “This is the best of who we are.”  Justice Robert Yazzie 
once commented that the reaction to one of his speeches was “Yazzie is 
624 National Farmers Union Insurance Co. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 852-53 (1985) 
(establishing federal jurisdiction to hear challenges to tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers).
625 Robert Yazzie, Watch Your Six: An Indian Nation Judge’s View of Where We Are, Where 
We Are Going, 23 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 497, 500 (1999) (“It is difficult being a judge when 
you have to watch your rear to make certain that those folks do not push you into something 
that can be the basis for review of one of your decisions by a federal court, or meat for 
testimony in Congress about how bad your court may be.”)
626
 Halona v. McDonald, 1 Nav. R. 189 (1978).
627
 Keeswood v. Navajo Tribe, 2 Nav. R. 46 (S.Ct. 1979) (urging tribe to waive sovereign 
immunity); Johnson v. Navajo Nation, 4 Nav. R. 192, 195-96 (Ct.App. 1987) (holding 
immunity waived under Navajo Sovereign Immunity Act passed “perhaps at the ‘urging’ of 
the Court”).
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bashing the courts again.”628  But this kind of “bashing” suggests that tribal
judges will use the freedom to diverge from Anglo legal standards as an 
opportunity not to lower but to raise the bar in protecting those that appear 
before them.  While tribal judges likely exaggerate the differences and 
superiority of tribal over state and federal legal systems, an empirical study of 
tribal court decisions regarding fundamental rights suggests that the results of 
tribal court adjudication are at least as fair as those that would be expected in 
non-tribal courts.629
Eliminating the power to adjudicate rights of outsiders, and to do so 
with a relative degree of independence from outsider legal standards, would 
greatly diminish this sense of self-importance.  The jurisdiction of tribal courts 
would then be radically less than state and federal courts, and the disputes 
before them would not include many of those in which, I have argued, law 
does its real work.  The impetus to act in accordance with the role of the 
judge, independent from immediate pressures and prejudices, would be 
greatly reduced.   
2. Jurisdiction Over Outsiders and Grappling with Difference
Jurisdiction over outsiders may also enhance the justice of the courts 
and the broader Navajo community in another way, by forcing judges to 
consider and resolve real conflicts in Navajo society.  Despite the claims of 
some advocates of tribal courts that tribal traditional dispute resolution is 
always just, both traditional tribal norms and modern tribal laws, like those of 
any legal system, may reinforce unequal power structures.630  Tribal 
communities are not homogenous—they are composed of men and women, of 
traditionally powerful families and traditionally powerless ones, of those with 
Anglo education and those with traditional education.   Tribal politics and 
laws, whether they reflect pre-contact traditions or modern developments, 
may favor one group over another.  Separated from the demands of the 
broader community in which tribes are situated, uncritical valorization of 
628 Watch Your Six: An Indian Nation Judge’s View of Where We Are, Where We Are Going, 
23 AMER.  INDIAN L. REV. 497 (1999).
629
 Mark D. Rosen, Multiple Authoritative Interpreters of Quasi-Constitutional Federal Law: 
Tribe Courts and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 479, 578-90 (2000).
Rosen found that tribal courts have “interpreted the ICRA in good faith, . . . take federal case 
law seriously and tend to deviate from federal doctrines only for good reasons,” and that 
among the 194 cases “[t]here are no outcomes that flatly violate [the right of] Protection, and 
only one case’s reasoning is clearly problematic.” Id. at 578. 
630 See also BRUCE G. MILLER, THE PROBLEM OF JUSTICE: TRADITION AND LAW IN THE 
COAST SALISH WORLD at 11 (2000). 
111
tradition may prevent tribal communities from examining this inequality.  By 
continually facing litigants and contexts involving a wide variety of 
perspectives, however, judges are forced to reexamine how traditional norms 
and their modern iterations accord with the ideals and reality of the 
community. 
Anthropologist Bruce Miller notes this effect in his study of courts run 
by three different tribes composed of the indigenous Coast Salish people of 
the Northwestern United States.  Miller found that the courts functioned best 
when they had jurisdiction over subjects creating real conflict among tribal 
members.  So the Upper Skagit tribal court system, which was created to 
regulate and adjudicate individual disputes regarding the fishing rights won by 
the tribe in 1974 functioned much better than the South Island Justice Project 
or the Sto:lo Justice Project, both of which were created to provide a forum 
for supposedly harmonious and consensus based law ways rather than to fill a 
meaningful distributive or punitive function.631  Miller concludes that “these 
three cases suggest that it is a dialectical process, an interchange between 
abstractions of past practice and specifics of current disputes, rather than 
simply the contemplation of past practices, that enable tribal justice 
institutions to become effective and acceptable to community members.”632
At the same time, the demands of outsiders may provide judges with 
greater freedom to institute legal change than they might otherwise possess.  
A significant criticism of tribal legal systems is that the small size of tribal 
communities and the importance of clan relationships among community 
members present an obstacle to objective resolution of legal disputes.  This 
obstacle may not be significantly greater than it is in small towns, in which 
judges, lawyers, and parties typically know each other well.  But the presence 
of individuals not tied to the Navajo Nation by bonds of kinship and 
familiarity may enable judges to revitalize legal rules to better respond to the 
disputes before them.
One can see the value of the confrontation with difference in the 
decisions of the Navajo appellate court.  In several cases, judicial review of 
cases involving outsiders has led to changes that tend to equalize Navajo 
statutory law.  As mentioned above, one of the statutes passed as part of the 
Navajo law “reform” of the 1950s provided that while Navajo couples could 
legally marry in a traditional Navajo ceremony, Navajos could only marry 
non-Navajos in accordance with procedures conforming to state law.  In two 
cases, Navajos came before the court seeking validation of their customary 
631 Id. at 7-9.
632 Id. at 12.
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marriages to their deceased non-Navajo spouses.633  In both cases, the court 
refused to grant the petitions, citing the clear language of the statute.  In each 
case, however, the court expressed its concern with the law.  In 1985, in 
Marriage of Garcia, while refusing to validate the marriage between a Navajo 
and a Mexican-American, the court declared that it was 
impressed by the arguments of counsel for the petitioner which 
recounted a history of non-Navajos adopting a Navajo way of 
life and becoming a part of their community. One particular 
example was Jesus Arviso, a man of Mexican origin who 
became a Navajo leader. The Court recognizes the contribution 
and importance of many non-Navajos but finds that the 
provisions of the Navajo Tribal Code require it to affirm the 
decision of the trial court.634
In 1989, the court called for change of the rule: 
[S]aying that marriages between Navajos and non-Navajos can 
only be contracted in compliance with state law, “allows 
outside law to govern domestic relations within Navajo 
jurisdiction.  Such needless relinquishment of sovereignty hurts 
the Navajo Nation.  The Navajo people have always governed 
their marriage practices, whether the marriage is mixed or not, 
and must continue to do so to preserve sovereignty.  [The law] 
enacted in 1957, has outlived its usefulness.635
The Navajo Nation Council subsequently changed the law.
In 1999, the court considered a challenge to its criminal jurisdiction 
over a non-Navajo Indian.636  The Navajo Nation sought to prosecute Lakota 
activist Russell Means for the battery of his father-in-law, Leon Grant, a 
member of the Omaha tribe and his brother-in-law, Jeremiah Bitsui, a member 
of the Navajo Nation.637  Means alleged that because the tribe could not 
prosecute a similarly situated non-Indian, jurisdiction over him was founded 
in race and violated the equal protection provisions of the Indian Civil Rights 
633
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Act, the Navajo Nation Bill of Rights, and the Fifth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.638  The court rejected the challenge.  While it could have 
relied on the federal Duro Fix to justify its jurisdiction, it chose not to, and 
relied instead on the legal relationship with outsiders created by the Navajo 
Treaty of 1868 and by Navajo common law.  
First, the court found that the treaty language, interpreted as the 
Navajo negotiators would have understood it,639 granted the tribe jurisdiction 
over non-member Indians. It pointed to the concern of Navajo treaty 
negotiators and the reassurance of the treaty commissioners that the tribe 
would be able to accept non-members onto their lands and that those outsiders 
would be subject to tribal jurisdiction.640  Second, the court pointed to the 
Navajo common law concept of membership by voluntary affiliation: 
While there is a formal process to obtain membership as a 
Navajo . . . that is not the only kind of "membership" under 
Navajo Nation law. An individual who marries or has an 
intimate relationship with a Navajo is a hadane (in-law). . . The 
Navajo People have adoone'e or clans, and many of them are 
based upon the intermarriage of original Navajo clan members 
with people of other nations. . . A hadane or in-law assumes a 
clan relation to a Navajo when an intimate relationship forms, 
and when that relationship is conducted within the Navajo 
Nation, there are reciprocal obligations to and from family and 
clan members under Navajo common law. . . We find that the 
petitioner, by reason of his marriage to a Navajo, longtime 
residence within the Navajo Nation, his activities here, and his 
status as a hadane, consented to Navajo Nation criminal 
jurisdiction. This is not done by "adoption" in any formal or 
customary sense, but by assuming tribal relations and 
establishing familial and community relationships under 
Navajo common law.641
While a loss for the non-Navajo litigant, by overcoming the largely federally-
created distinction between enrolled members and non-enrolled residents the 
decision created a tribally legitimate basis for incorporating non-members into 
the Navajo community. 
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More recently, in Staff Relief, Inc. v. Polacca,642 the court judicially 
amended a Navajo statute to provide remedies to a non-Navajo.  There, a non-
Indian headhunter had offered a member of the Hopi Tribe a job with the 
Indian Health Service, but then denied him the job after he had accepted and 
moved to the area.  Mr. Polacca sued the headhunter under the Navajo 
Preference in Employment Act, and the headhunter argued that Polacca had 
no standing to sue because the Act limited the right to file a complaint to 
Navajos.  The Navajo Supreme Court declared this limitation was enacted 
“[f]or reasons beyond the knowledge of this court” and “rectif[ied] that 
shortcoming by ruling that under basic principles of equal protection of law, 
any person who is injured by a violation of NPEA may file a claim with the 
Commission.”643  The court relied both on federal constitutional jurisprudence 
declaring that a court might broaden coverage of a statute otherwise 
constitutionally defective, and on the Navajo Treaty of 1868 that recognized 
the power of the Navajo Nation “to admit non-Navajos to its territorial 
jurisdiction and thus its protection, or to deny entry. Once an individual 
obtains the right to enter the Navajo Nation, due process of law requires that 
the Navajo Nation extend the protection of its law to all individuals.”644  This 
decision may not have arisen purely from the court’s sense of justice.  In 
hearing the case, the Navajo Nation was surely aware of contemporary 
challenges to tribal jurisdiction and tribal protection of rights.645  But the 
decision was chosen by the court, and thus became an expression of 
sovereignty and Navajo values rather than a resented intrusion of outside law.
In each of these decisions, we see the ways that allowing judicial 
determination of cases involving outsiders enhances the fairness of the law.  
By considering broad-based statutes as applied to the individual circumstances 
of non-members on the Navajo Nation, the court is moved to criticize and 
amend aspects of the laws that do not treat them fairly.   By struggling to 
understand the position of outsiders in the Navajo community, the court 
recovers traditions in which members and nonmembers were not separated by 
artificial legal rules.  Far from permitting arbitrary control to the disadvantage 
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of outsiders, judicial jurisdiction appears to reveal and correct some of the 
arbitrariness of the position of outsiders in the Navajo community.
V.  Conclusion
In the American imagination, Indian tribes function as the bearers of 
history for a country uneasy about its lack of history, a symbol of tradition and 
culture for a country struggling with its aggressive modernity.  Supreme Court 
jurisprudence has reflected and contributed to this image, emphasizing the 
foreignness of tribal courts, and denying tribes the ability to shape their 
negotiations with the outside world.   
My findings suggest a need to reconceptualize tribes and 
reconceptualize what jurisdiction over outsiders means for them.  Just as the 
Navajo people are importantly intertwined with non-Navajo society, the 
genius of Indian tribes lies not in being living museums, but rather, in 
adapting in the face of change to survive without losing their culture or 
disintegrating as communities.  Sovereignty must be understood in this light:  
not as the right to stand still in a mythicized past, but as the power to change 
so as to maintain and strengthen one’s community when many of the historic 
bonds between that community have disappeared.  The challenge of federal 
Indian law, then, is to create an arena in which tribes can combine their past, 
present, and future to create norms and institutions that can sustain tribal 
communities.
Jurisdiction over those considered outsiders to tribes is crucial in 
allowing this process to occur.  It is precisely cases in which both worlds are 
brought together that tribal courts best perform their community-building role, 
by translating traditions eroded by generations of colonization into living rules 
meaningful to the modern Indian community—a process Nell Newton calls 
“reversing the politics of erasure.”646  Through determining the rules of 
interaction between tribal members and nonmembers, tribal courts use the 
institutional forms of the colonizer to reinvigorate the voice of the colonized 
and make it heard.  Were tribal courts limited to adjudicating the rights of 
their members, they would lose their important role in defining that 
sovereignty and ensuring its preservation. 
At the same time, jurisdiction over outsiders is crucial in preserving 
the fairness of tribal courts, both for members and nonmembers.  Justice is not 
created by ensuring that decision-makers have power only over those that are 
just like them.  Rather, it lies in ensuring that judges have enough pride in 
their judicial role to fairly adjudicate the cases before them, as well as the 
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opportunity to scrutinize laws and practices against a variety of perspectives.  
In the tribal context, jurisdiction over outsiders, along with a measure of 
independence in exercising it, preserves both this necessary institutional self-
importance and the impetus to examine tribal practices and ensure they 
conform to tribal ideals. 
Whether this jurisdiction will be preserved depends, in part, on 
whether the Court maintains the assumptions that color the opinions of the last 
twenty-five years.  Because the Court has proceeded in a haphazard, 
incremental fashion in depriving tribes of such jurisdiction, there remains 
much that can be preserved in future cases.  If the Justices continue to 
perceive tribal courts as unfair, unfamiliar places, they will continue to bend 
the law and ignore the facts to find that tribes have no jurisdiction over tribal 
members.  If they continue to perceive self-government as the power to 
protect practices that are untouched by time and the outside world, they will 
continue to read actions that touch on nonmembers as unrelated to the self-
government that the Court is bound to protect.
These questions are equally applicable to Congress.  As the Court 
continues to undermine congressional and executive efforts to support tribal 
self-determination, tribal advocates will turn to Congress to correct this 
judicial policy-making cloaked in the mantle of federal common law.  
Congress, more aware of the contemporary realities of tribal life, has not 
fallen into the same traps as the Court.  But in considering whether to 
statutorily protect tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians, Congress will need 
evidence that this move is necessary and that it will not result in injustice to 
those affected. 
In the past, the Court has made decisions regarding jurisdiction over 
nonmembers against a backdrop of untested beliefs.   This Article is a 
beginning step in testing those beliefs and raising questions as to their 
accuracy.  It is hoped that it will contribute to the ongoing effort to create a 
more informed basis for legal action, one that will fulfill the commitment to 
tribal self-government embodied in federal law.
